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Central Eurasia

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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-017

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Kiev, Baku, Ashgabat Not Ready To Sign Border Agreements

LD2501152095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1259
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (Interfax)—Nine or ten CIS states will be prepared to sign agreements on cooperation in protecting external borders of the CIS after small amendments.

"This may happen at the February CIS summit in Almaty", Director of the Federal Border Guard Service General Andrey Nikolayev has said. Nikolayev is taking part in a session of the CIS Foreign Minister's Council, which, among other things, is discussing a draft agreement on protecting external borders with border guards of the CIS member-states.

"These agreements have met with no objections from our neighbors in principle", Nikolayev said. "However, some members of the Commonwealth have their own approaches to certain provisions of those documents and different degrees of readiness for implementing them".

The director of Russia's Federal Border Guard Service has opposed the idea of putting any pressure on those countries, which are unprepared to sign the agreements, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. "Though they recognize the need for cooperation, Kiev, Baku and Ashgabat have their own ideas. It is quite natural and such views must be respected", Nikolayev said.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Jan

LD2601074095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0716
GMT 26 Jan 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—The Thursday [26 January] editions of newspapers run reports surveying the Chechnya situation.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA describes routine activities of interior- ministry and police units in Grozny to clear the city from Dudayev's militants".

IZVESTIYA sketches the everyday operation of the Grozny airport, the environs of which are "self-same forward positions with the elements of a rear area".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) carries an article about the work of units of Russian railway troops in Chechnya. The newspaper points out that the railway units get drawn into combat actions, which is not in their nature to do.

Many newspapers comment on the presidential decree relieving Vladimir Polevanov of the duties of Russian vice-premier and head of the Russian state property committee.

ROSSIYSKYE VESTI believes that Polevanov's dismissal is "a blow against those forces which want a new redistribution of property. A second stage of privatisation if enacted by Polevanov would have signified its end".

IZVESTIYA and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA note the fact that Polevanov who leveled numerous accusations at Anatoliy Chubays in view of the privatisation drive, was not simply dismissed from the post but was appointed deputy head of the control department of the presidential staff.

IZVESTIYA is of the opinion that "Polevanov has become a 'controller', which is no comfort to Chubays."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is convinced that "Polevanov is the most apt choice by the presidential administration of late and his positions can be described in various ways but not as those of a loser."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries an article headlined "(Russia's) Security Council is the Politburo of Our Days" by former Justice Minister Yuriy Kalmykov. He points out that up to now there is no federal law which should determine a status of the security council.

Kalmykov's opinion is that the Security Council is only a deliberative body assisting the president and may not make decisions that would be binding to anyone.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, under the headline "it was Yeltsin who brought the democrats to power, not the other way round", runs a forecast about correlation of forces at future presidential elections.

"Most probably, a 'democratic' candidate will win in the end. In the second round, any such candidate if he turns out to be a 'powerful' personality or a person who has shown himself well from the viewpoint of statesmanlike patriotism, would win from both Zyuganov, Rutskoy or Zhirinovskiy."

IZVESTIYA runs an article headlined "who and why needs the discreditation of the army" by Gavril Popov, chairman of the Russian democratic reform movement.

Popov maintains that the public opinion is being injured to the idea about the need for a purge of the Russian Army. Connected with this, he believes, are "an inspection of the 14th Army commanded by Aleksandr Lebed, the reduction in the number of deputy ministers of defence, and an elaborate game around the border troops subordination issue". Popov is convinced that "a purge of the unreliable army would neutralise it as a potential threat to the present authorities".

IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA run reviews of a three-part documentary film about notorious lawyer Dmitriy Yakubosky by the Ostankino television channel.

The newspapers, while pointing out that the film looks caricature-like with pretensions to an in-depth inquiry, draw attention to the fact that it was broadcast at a time when the main character of the film is kept in custody.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is of the opinion that this "resembles very much an attempt to put pressure on law enforcement agencies" while IZVESTIYA supposes that "the film was made to order and was, possibly, paid for by the character of the film himself."

Clinton Speech Shows 'Shift to the Right'*MM2501203195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jan 95 p 3*

[Article by Vladimir Nadein: "Tired of Failures, Clinton Creeps to the Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington—For the third time during his presidency President Bill Clinton has delivered his "State of the Union" message to both houses of the U.S. Congress. He called for party differences to be forgotten in the name of America. "We must not wait for earthquakes, floods, or hurricanes in order to remember that we are Americans!" Bill Clinton exclaimed to approving whistles, shouts, and applause from the hall.

According to instant estimates by parliamentary reporters, there was 34 minutes' applause from the legislators. Sometimes ovations were initiated by the President's party colleagues, and then Al Gore, vice president and Senate chairman, would rise behind Clinton's back to his full basketball player's height. Quite frequently salutations were initiated by Republicans. Round-faced, gray-haired Newt Gingrich, a scathing critic of the President and organizer of the Republicans' landslide victory last November, who for the first time in recent decades gave his party the advantage in both houses of Congress, clapped his hands with obvious satisfaction or simply rubbed them—he heard in the President's speech a lot of borrowings from his own Republican programs.

Bill Clinton's shift to the right, about which there has been so much talk in recent weeks, has become a fait accompli.

The President opted to open his message with the following example of interparty cooperation. Bill Clinton sang the praises of Democrat Harry Truman as the organizer of the "Cold War" and of Republican Ronald Reagan, who managed to end it triumphantly. He emphasized—in an impersonal way and without the standard compliments to the reforms in Russia—that "for the first time a U.S. president has a right to say in the State of the Union message that Russian missiles are no longer targeted on the homes of Americans."

The President also spoke clearly and unequivocally of his own mistakes—maybe a bold admission, but quite inevitable in view of the fact that Clinton is the leader who has led his party to its biggest defeat since World War II. The echo of that defeat could be heard beneath the Capitol's dome even during the minutes when the President was reporting his administration's achievements.

All this was quite unlike some quite recent events. The first speech, right at the start of 1993, sounded like an inspired hymn to change. The young governor of Arkansas, who had gained the upper hand over George Bush, who had seemed invincible, was convinced of his own ability to sweep aside all the obstacles on the way to

his goals. Above all, to the chief goal—a grand, fundamental reform of the health care system.

One year later, in January 1994, he was just a little more cautious. The public opinion polls were terrible, and not even an economy on the rise—the lifesaver of all presidents without exception—was helping him out. But anything can happen at the very start of a presidency! Lightly tapping his fountain pen against the rostrum from which he was speaking, the president vigorously asserted that he would use "this very pen" to veto any law that did not ensure medical services for every American.

Tuesday evening there was no vigor, no tapping—there was an entreaty. On the ruins of many of his ambitions, over the lifeless corpse of the medical reform which was to have glorified the talent of First Lady Hillary Clinton (but made her fall silent for a long time and retreat into the political shadows), the President urged his triumphant opponents to cooperate in a voice that was not so much heartfelt as entreating.

Much, maybe too much, of what Clinton had rejected and cursed in the weeks preceding the November elections has found itself a little place in his present program.

Bill Clinton had ridiculed the very possibility of combining such disparate measures as reducing the state budget deficit, lowering taxes, and increasing defense spending.

But he proposed just this in his message, adding, moreover, an increase in the minimum wage. "Some 2.5 million Americans, including many mothers with children, make \$4.25 an hour," the President said. "The minimum wage does not ensure survival." The Republicans do not support an increase in the minimum wage, but Clinton's other proposal—to increase military spending by \$60 billion over the next six years—elicited vigorous approval from Newt Gingrich, on whom the television cameras were prudently trained.

There have been relatively few instant comments. Christine Whitman, Republican governor of New Jersey, welcomed the Republican motifs in the Democratic President's speech but did not issue any rebukes, as had been expected of her.

There are two reasons for this: First, unlike previous years, the White House did not prerelease the text of the President's address hours before it was delivered. According to legend, Bill Clinton likes to work on his texts right up to the last minute, making quite serious changes. Experienced White House reporters, incidentally, had confidently predicted another lecture on a social topic.

Second reason: a desire to avoid traps, of which the speech by the head of the White House is undoubtedly full. B. Clinton set forth Republican plans so easily and in such sizable numbers as the fruit of his own ideas and

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ponderings that his opponents ought to look carefully down at their feet to avoid being blown up by their own mines.

The President's message was dictated by the conditions and demands of domestic politics. He did, however, mention his desire to secure the ratification by the U.S. Congress of the SALT II Treaty and the destruction of 5,000 more missiles in Russia and the United States, and he spoke of the need to ban chemical weapons, but all this was in passing, as it were, and in the shadow of domestic problems such as school lunches and benefits for pregnant women.

In general, a government that is concerned about school lunches is liked better by citizens than one that licks the wounds of some internecine Chechen strife. But if I am to mention the place in the President's message when I felt envy, it was not even the U.S. minimum wage, on which it is supposedly impossible to live (680,000 rubles [R] a week, over R3 million a month), but this: As a result of changes in the government's work, the annual report of a small enterprise in private business fits onto one page.

Bill Clinton moved a particularly long way away from his former position on the question of immigration to the United States. Whereas, while still a candidate, he attacked George Bush for hindering the reception of refugees from Haiti, this time he promised to sharply reinforce border protection. "We are a nation of immigrants," he said, "but we are also a nation of law."

Right after the President's speech the television companies' news services conducted telephone polls of viewers. Very many approved of points in the President's message, but 51 percent still believe that Bill Clinton should not remain in the White House for a second term.

Duma Deputies Blast Conduct of German Defense Minister

LD2501203595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1945
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—Russian State Duma deputies blasted German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe for openly snapping his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev and termed it an interference in Russia's internal affairs.

Several members of the Agrarian Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by 170 other deputies, voiced protest against Ruehe's conduct, but the issue was not included in the session agenda.

German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe said on Sunday he did not expect his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev to visit Germany in February as was planned earlier.

The minister said his move was prompted by Grachev's recent statements with regard to Russian human rights activist Sergey Kovalev who opposed Russia's actions in Chechnya.

In his comments to Monday's issue of the newspaper *BILD*, Ruehe described Grachev's attacks on Kovalev and Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the state duma defence committee, as "unacceptable slander."

"Minister Grachev must understand that such outbursts endanger the reform process in Russia and the West's partnership with it," he said. "I do not expect the Russian defence minister to come to Germany as had originally been planned in connection with the European security forum" to be held in Munich in February, Ruehe said.

However, Grachev told a news conference on Tuesday that he did not intend to visit Germany in the near future.

Grachev said he had received an invitation to the Munich international conference but had not officially confirmed his participation. "The conference will be held by a private person, not by Germany's defence minister. So Defence Minister Volker Ruehe's fears that the Russian defence minister will arrive in Germany are groundless," he noted.

"I understand the West's emotional response to the Chechen developments," Grachev said, adding at the same time that "it is not difficult to predict the response of the West and particularly of Germany and Mr. Ruehe, if anything similar to Dudayev's regime appears on their territory."

Grachev warned his German counterpart against attempts "to call to attention" the Russian minister. "Mr. Ruehe's reaction to matters of our domestic policy cannot serve as a model for relations between the heads of the two Defence Ministries," the minister stressed.

Foreign Ministry Statement on Estonian Citizenship Law

LD2401190895 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1833
GMT 24 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondents Valeriy Sevryukov and Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—The adoption of a law on citizenship by the state assembly of the Estonian Republic on January 19 this year is "yet another regrettable step" aimed at strengthening of a government policy of discrimination against Russian speaking population in this country, a statement released here by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation says.

The use of this law in practice which essentially stiffens the terms of receiving citizenship, deprives considerable part of Russian speakers of the possibility of natural integration into Estonian society, the document stresses.

A number of provisions in this law do not correspond to modern trends in legislation of European countries and violates commitments of the Estonian side following

from the Russian-Estonian treaty on basic principles of interstate relations signed on January 12, 1991, the statement points out.

The Estonian leadership should clearly understand that the adoption of this law on citizenship in its present form cannot but affect Russo-Estonian relations. The Russian Federation reserves the right to take additional steps for defending the rights and interests of ethnic Russians in Estonia, the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry stresses.

The Foreign ministry of the Russian Federation expresses hope that authoritative international organizations and member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will not pass over this decision of lawmakers of the Estonian Republic.

Russian-Moldovan Interstate Relations Treaty Initialled

LD2401204095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1413 GMT 24 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Valeriy Sevryukov and Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 24 Jan—A protocol to the Treaty on Principles of Interstate Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova was initialled in Moscow today. An official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that this document is expected to be signed later by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur, and presented for ratification to the parliaments of both countries.

In the opinion of the diplomat, the initialled protocol should, in the light of the current circumstances, aid the further development of friendly cooperation in all fields between Russia and Moldova.

Russia, Albania Sign Eight Inter-Governmental Agreements

LD2501205795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1516 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—Eight inter-governmental agreements, which have been prepared for signing, will create a legal basis for the development of trade and economic relations between Russia and Albania. First and foremost, these are agreements on trade, economic and scientific-technical cooperation, the protection of investments, and avoidance dual taxation, journalists were told today by Oleg Davydov, vice prime minister of the Russian Federation and minister of foreign economic relations, following his meeting with Pjeter Filip Arbnori, chairman of the board of the Albanian People's Assembly.

"Trade turnover with Albania remains at an extremely low level. In 1994 it was a mere \$6 million," Oleg Davydov said. "After the signing of the economic agreements, which we believe will take place during the

Albanian prime minister's visit to Russia, specific areas for the development of our cooperation will be defined."

The sides also agreed to resume the work of the Russo-Albanian inter-governmental commission for trade and economic cooperation.

Vice Premier on Customs Union Agreement

LD2501181395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 25 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 15 (758); compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russia's Vice Premier Aleksey Bolshakov has said that the customs union Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan established on January 20, is the main step towards a real economic union of the three countries.

Bolshakov said that the customs union provided for a common customs legislation, standard approaches to regulating external economic activity and a common financial market. Bolshakov said that the treaty had already become operational and signatories to it were introducing a regime of free trade without no exceptions, their common borders were being abolished and banks were beginning to enforce the mutual convertibility of currencies and bear responsibility for their stabilization. Besides, all banks have unlimited access to the markets of each member-country. "All this will let us restore normal flows of goods among the three countries", Bolshakov said.

He announced that the governments of several other CIS member-states have already taken great interest in the customs union. Bolshakov is certain that as the CIS economies gain strength, the customs union would grow.

He strongly dismissed the rumor that Russia may sustain financial losses as a result of that treaty and would become a donor of Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is certain that cooperation within the framework of the CIS would reach new frontiers in 1995.

Kozyrev told the session of the CIS Foreign Ministers' Council in Moscow on Wednesday that this year efforts must be focused on the practical implementation of CIS agreements.

"In 1994 a very good basis was laid to strengthen the Commonwealth as an independent and creative force. Now we must move forward", Kozyrev said.

CIS foreign ministers are going to discuss cooperation in Europe, joint measures to protect the CIS external borders and make preparations for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazism.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gennady Udovenko, who is taking part in the FMC session in the capacity of

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observer, believes that the Russian State Duma's intention to consider the denunciation of the Belaya Vezha agreements was a destabilizing factor in CIS relations.

Udovenko said in an interview that Russian law-makers were nostalgic.

"There will be no return to the past, history cannot be set backwards", Udovenko said.

He believes that measures must be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the CIS, and not revive old, obsolete structures.

Udovenko called for re-establishing economic links that once connected former Soviet republics. "That must be done on a new basis, though", he said.

Oil Export Revenues Set To Rise by Over \$400 Million

MM2501161395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "Good For Oil To Be Not So Good"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London—Russia will be able to earn almost \$500 million more from oil exports this year than it did last year, REUTER reports.

The explanation lies in the fact that demand for Russian oil with its high sulfur content is growing rapidly, since Europe has invested a lot of money in equipment to purify this kind of oil, and the investors, quite naturally, have an interest in seeing a return on their money.

At the same time, economists are noting, deliveries of this kind of oil from the East European countries have been falling, since these countries consider it more profitable to export other types of higher-grade oil.

As a result Russia could earn an extra \$400 million, even if prices on world markets do not change and remain at current levels.

Ukraine Rethink on Economic Union Urged

MM2501120595 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
25 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Nikolayev: "Russian and Ukrainian Presidents Met Yesterday in Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What did Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma discuss? The meeting took place behind closed doors, but from information obtained from German Kuznetsov, Russian deputy minister for cooperation with CIS member states, one thing is clear: Life is dictating the need to elaborate new strategic approaches in the relations between the two states. And it is perfectly obvious to both sides that they can no longer delay tackling the critical factors which have taken shape in their bilateral relations.

It is well known that a useful agreement has been reached between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on many vitally important problems of their relations, including a customs union.

But surely Russia and Ukraine are committed to the free movement of goods between their two countries, to the abolition of duties and taxes, and so forth? Unfortunately the "top brass" are still dragging their feet over such initiatives, at a time when they are being pushed toward more specific actions from below. A meeting of the leaders of the 12 largest oblasts (six Ukrainian and six Russian oblasts) under the auspices of two vice premiers—Aleksey Bolshakov and Yevgeniy Marchuk—is scheduled, and a dialogue between 14 regions of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus has taken place in Novgorod with the participation of Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Obviously, the Ukrainian leaders should consider how to change their positions regarding economic union in view of the realities prevailing in that republic.

Yesterday discussion was expected of such questions as the Black Sea Fleet, political and economic relations—particularly in the area of trade—and also the progress of the preparation of an interstate treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership, and other questions.

Air Defense Forces 'Did Not Shoot Down' Missile

LD2501151495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian
1454 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Ostanin and Boris Zaytsev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Russian air defense forces did not shoot down a missile which allegedly violated Russian airspace. This was announced today to the ITAR-TASS correspondent at the press center of the air defense forces. It denied mass media reports that a missile launched from a North European country was shot down over Russian territory this morning.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent also learned from a source in Washington that the United States could not confirm reports from Moscow that a missile was launched onto Russian territory from Western Europe today. Official spokesmen of the Washington administration have expressed doubt that such an incident actually took place.

Envoy Views Media Reaction to Norway Missile 'Inadequate'

LD2501195995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1905 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov and Yuriy Kozlov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The Russian ambassador to Norway branded as “inadequate” media reaction to a Norwegian research missile fired today from an island in the Spitzbergen archipelago.

“We have to agree with the Norwegian side that it was nothing but a misunderstanding which caused an inadequate reaction from mass media,” Yuriy Fokin, the newly appointed ambassador to Norway, told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday.

According to the diplomat, “Russia is not going to demand any explanations concerning the ‘missile incident’ because no incident factually took place.”

Fokin referred to information obtained from military sources that the missile destined for a routine research, was not targeted at any objects on the Russian territory and “its falling caused no damage of any kind.”

Yeltsin Agrees To Compensate Ukraine Over Nuclear Weapons

LD2501195395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1945 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—At a working meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, on the subject of the Black Sea Fleet, agreed that “the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet should be in Sevastopol [port] and not Sevastopol [region],” the latter formulation a demand of the state delegation of Russia at the negotiations, presidential press secretary Mykhaylo Doroshenko told a briefing on 25 January on the results of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma’s visit to Moscow.

He also said the Russian president consented to pay Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from the territory.

First Deputy Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk, who also took part in the briefing, recalled the agreement on compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons had been signed last year, “although its value has not yet been finalized.” He added: “It is preliminarily estimated at almost \$1.5 billion.”

A procedure to be applied to the payment is to be established at the talks, to be held in the first quarter of this year, Marchuk said. The payment will be made in the form of nuclear power plant fuel assemblies or will go toward the settlement of the gas debt, he said.

Doroshenko announced an accord had been reached in Moscow to continue work on a bilateral treaty on friendship, partnership, and cooperation between both countries.

Marchuk further announced that Yeltsin had agreed to a proposal by the Ukrainian side to exclude from the text of the treaty the article on dual citizenship. In another

article of the document, the Russian Federation confirms the inviolability of the Ukrainian borders. The Russian side had earlier insisted on the formulation “respects the Ukrainian borders.”

Contract for Nuclear Power Station Signed in Tehran

MM2601094995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Boris Kononov: “Russia Will Build Nuclear Electric Power Station for Iran”]

[FBIS Translated Text] A contract for the construction of a nuclear electric power station [AES], “Buchir-1,” in southern Iran has been signed in Tehran; the contract is worth an estimated \$800 million.

Under this contract, signed in Buchir by the “Zarubezhatomenergostroy” concern and the Iranian Organization for Atomic Energy, Russia will build within four years a nuclear unit with a “VVER-1000” type water-cooled water-moderated reactor with a capacity of 1 megawatt. It is proposed subsequently to add to the AES another unit of the same capacity.

This project is to be carried out within the framework of the longstanding agreement between Iran and Russia “On the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes,” signed in 1992 and covering a broad spectrum of cooperation between the two countries on the nuclear agenda. Russia is now becoming Iran’s main partner in the development of high technologies in this sphere.

The “Buchir-1” station will be built on a site which was first developed by German specialists under contract. Two powerful nuclear reactors were expected to be built there. A settlement for the AES builders was built there and the foundations were laid. But following the fall of the Shah’s regime the German firm tore up the contract.

Russia initially proposed to build an AES for Iran in the north of the country. But the Iranian side expressed a persistent desire to complete the AES in Buchir first. Before agreeing, V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister of atomic energy, wrote a letter to the FRG economy minister, explaining the situation and offering to complete the project through joint efforts. Germany showed no interest in this suggestion. Only then did the drafting of the Russian-Iranian contract begin.

Incidentally, the United States did not show the same tact in developing the DPRK’s nuclear power industry, which was initially created by Russian specialists. The United States sidelined Russia, not even inviting, if only for politeness’ sake, Russian nuclear scientists to discuss the technical questions of the construction of the new AES, let alone seeking cooperation—a telling comment on the widely advertised theory that “the West will help us.”

“Our cooperation with China, India, and Iran is now going well,” Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor

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Nikitovich Mikhaylov told me. "Foreign contracts are a great help to our sector, which is having difficulty in submitting to conversion. In January we signed a protocol on further cooperation with the Iranian Organization for Atomic Energy, which is headed by Vice President R. Amrollahi. Russia will train specialists for the Iranian nuclear power industry, accept young researchers for on-the-job training, and deliver fuel for

nuclear reactors. Iran has shown great interest in developing small research reactors, and also nuclear water distillation installations, in the operation of which Russia has accumulated a rich experience. Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, so that our cooperation with this Islamic country does not violate the norms of international law."

Political Issues

Deputy Commander of Land Forces Vorobyev Dismissed

LD2601112495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1050 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (TASS)—Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Land Forces has been released from his post and has been handed over to the Land Forces commander-in-chief prior to his subsequent transfer to the reserve. After checking reports on Vorobyev's refusal to head the operation in Chechnya, the main military procuracy did not consider it possible to instigate criminal proceedings against him.

Eduard Vorobyev stated this himself at a news conference which took place today.

Further on Dismissal of Vorobyev

LD2601115595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1107 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (TASS)—On the basis of a presidential decree, by order of the defense minister on 17 January, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Land Forces, has been relieved of office and placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the Land Forces until his subsequent discharge into the reserve. The Chief Military Procuracy, after checking reports of Vorobyev's refusal to head the operation in Chechnya, did not deem it possible to press criminal charges against him.

This was stated by Eduard Vorobyev at a press conference held today. He explained that the order followed his letter of resignation, submitted on 22 December.

In December, Colonel-General Aleksey Mityukhin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, was removed from direction of the operation in Chechnya "for reasons of health." Defense Minister Pavel Grachev asked Eduard Vorobyev to head the operation provisionally. When he refused, the defense minister said: "I am disappointed with you, and think you should submit a letter of resignation." On arrival in Moscow, Vorobyev submitted such a letter to the commander-in-chief of the Land Forces.

Explaining the motives for his refusal, Eduard Vorobyev stated that he has made this decision "in the view of the Army's complete unpreparedness for combat actions." He reported his conclusions to the head of the General Staff on 20 December over the telephone, stating that "it is impossible to carry out the operation and achieve the end targets due to the poor preparation of the operation."

Among the main shortcomings of the operation's planning, Vorobyev mentioned underestimating of the moral and psychological state of the Chechen population, the fanaticism of the illegal formations, a poor knowledge of the area in which the combat actions were to be conducted, the miscalculation of the required force and equipment, the hastiness and unsatisfactory level of training of the troops sent to the region, and a mistaken reliance on aviation in the bad weather conditions typical for Chechnya at this time of the year.

In response to questions, the general said that he does not intend to turn to politics after his dismissal. At the same time, he did not rule out the possibility of working for the European peace-making structures, should such offers come.

NTV Presents 'Background' to Polevanov Dismissal

LD2401222195 Moscow NTV in Russian 2115 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday evening, Boris Yeltsin removed Vladimir Polevanov by decree from the government's team and included him on his own team as deputy head of the president's Control Directorate. By the way, the head of the president's administration was unaware of this the day before yesterday.

The background to the dismissal of Vladimir Polevanov as deputy prime minister is probably linked to his letter to Viktor Chernomyrdin of 29 December. In this letter, he goes against the grain and cites arguments that reduce to zero all the victorious reports on the completion of the first stage of privatization. In the same letter, he proposes that the State Committee for the Management of State Property be put under the supervision of Oleg Soskovets. To some degree, it all resembles the letter written by Aleksandr Korzhakov to the same Viktor Chernomyrdin, where he speaks against freeing oil exports.

Incidentally, knowledgeable people link the very appearance in Moscow of the 44-year-old Polevanov, the former head of administration of Amur Oblast, with the name of the head of the president's bodyguard [Korzhakov]. [passage omitted]

Possible Successors Viewed

LD2501175895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zhrebttsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Property Committee (SPC) Vladimir Polevanov was relieved from both of his posts and appointed as deputy in charge of the administration's supervisory department on Tuesday, the presidential press service

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told Interfax. IF Note: 44-year-old Polevanov, formerly Governor of Amur Region (Far East) was appointed by Yeltsin as SPC Chairman last November. At a meeting with Russian deputies, the president said that none of his candidates came out of the blue. Some attributed Polevanov's unexpected rise to the blessing from head of the president's security service Alexander Korzhakov. Others, however, saw it as Yeltsin's concession to regional lobbyists aimed at beefing up his positions in the Federation Council [FC]. One of FC deputies Pavel Stein who was Polevanov's deputy in charge in Amur Region told Interfax in mid-November that the latter was ready to work as SPC Chairman and Vice Premier in Moscow. Himself a geologist and running the region for little more than a year, Polevanov could easily claim for vice premiership, Stein said. He spoke of being in the dark about ways in which Moscow picked people for government jobs including corruption charges that the pro-government Rossiiskie Vesti brought against Polevanov, none of which was either confirmed or denied.

Polevanov's statements of planning to renationalize the aluminium and oil industries whose privatization as he put it "was damaging to the country's national security" prompted criticism from his predecessor Anatoly Chubais, government officials and SPC members.

Among the probables likely to replace Polevanov is his Deputy Sergey Belayev who is also General Director of the Federal Department for Bankruptcies.

Grachev Meets Finnish Commander, Comments on Chechnya

MM2501173195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Vadim Markushin: "Russian Army Has Fulfilled Set Task, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation Defense Minister, Has Stated at Meeting with Journalists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 24 January Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, received General Gustav Khegglund [name as transliterated], commander in chief of the Finnish defense forces, who was in Moscow on a two-day visit. A talk took place during which the Russian minister stressed the fact of stable friendly relations between Russia and Finland and the lack of any disputed issues regarding the border. Recalling the good relations with former Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn, Pavel Grachev conveyed greetings and best wishes to Yan-Erik Enestame [name as transliterated], who was recently appointed to this post.

After his meeting with the Finnish commander in chief the Russian Federation defense minister invited newspapermen and television reporters into his office and answered their questions. In particular he commented on the recent statement by Volker Ruehe, leader of the German military department, to the effect that P. Grachev's planned trip to Germany is in doubt.

According to the minister, he understands the reaction of the West, including Germany, to the events in Chechnya, but he would like to ask what they would have done in those countries if something similar to the Chechen crisis had occurred. In general, P. Grachev said, Mr. Ruehe's response to the domestic political affairs in Russia cannot serve as a model for interstate relations. As for the actual trip to Germany then it was a case of a private invitation—to an international conference in Munich. So far P. Grachev has not accepted it and so he considers V. Ruehe's concern over this matter to be excessive.

Touching on the question of cadres reshuffles in the top echelon of the Defense Ministry, P. Grachev said that it is a case of reducing the deputy minister link and specifying the deputy defense ministers' functional duties and responsibility for specific spheres of activity. The minister said that so far none of his deputies has been dismissed. In the future those who are dismissed will be offered posts no lower than those they hold now. Regarding his own suitability or otherwise for the post he holds P. Grachev said that "there is nothing criminal" in his actions, that he "has done everything possible" in his post and that "the president supports him."

Regarding his recent statements to State Duma Deputies Kovalev and Yushenkov, which caused a scandal in the mass media, P. Grachev stated that he admits they were sharp. But he also asked for understanding for himself, the Russian military chief, who can see how Kovalev has found a place for himself "in the criminal Dudayev's palace," in the camp of those who have encouraged the drugs business and the reckless selling off of oil from which a tiny handful of leaders of the criminal regime have grown rich. Nor could the defense minister watch quietly as Deputy Yushenkov "used the tactic of setting" the Defense Ministry leading personnel against the rest of the army.

The defense minister told journalists that at the end of this month there will be a special meeting at which there will be a detailed account of the progress of the operation which has been carried out in Chechnya. He said it ended at 1500 hours on 20 January when the Russian Army completely fulfilled the task which had been set it. Since then the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been engaged in restoring the constitutional system, and the Armed Forces are rendering it the necessary support.

Grachev Comments on Military Role in Chechnya

LD2501172195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovsky; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A mechanism of transfer of army functions on restoring the federal constitution to Chechnya and priority measures on its social and economic revival dominated the agenda of a National

Security Council meeting on Wednesday chaired by President Boris Yeltsin himself.

Defence and Interior Minister Pavel Grachev and Viktor Yerin made reports on the situation in Chechnya and a final stage of the military operation there.

Grachev told reporters on Tuesday that the army had fulfilled the task of disarming illegal armed formations and routing the main rebel force with interior ministry troops now expected to take over. If need be, the army will provide air support as well as artillery and tanks to the security forces, he said.

"If necessary, the armed forces will block populated centers", Grachev said though adding that it would be up to police up to carry out mopping up operations. IF Note: The question of Grachev's competence as defence minister was to be discussed by the State Duma later in the day on Wednesday. "There is nothing criminal about my actions", the minister said and spoke of relying on Yeltsin's support. He described as exaggeration media reports about Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's discontent over the defence ministry's handling of the military operation in Chechnya. The minister said Chernomyrdin was constantly briefed both on the military campaign and developments in Chechnya. "Up till now, he has given no negative assessment of army operations there", Grachev said.

Council members congratulated the minister on a successful completion of the campaign, one Council source told Interfax.

For his part, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made a report on postwar reconstruction of the Chechen economy and infrastructures estimated to cost Rbl [rubles] 5-6 trillion.

At a meeting with Chechen elders on Tuesday, Chernomyrdin stressed it would be impossible to start postwar reconstruction before bringing an end to the regional violence.

Chernomyrdin who is responsible for a negotiated solution to the crisis and the elders had agreed that "Dudayev and his regime have no political future unlike the Chechen people who are expected to shape it", senior government spokesman Valery Grishin told reporters.

The premier minister spoke of wanting to hold talks with those who carried a genuine clout in Chechnya and were capable of ending the bloodshed. He also spoke of attaching great significance to the meeting with elders and hoping for a solution to the Chechen problem.

The Council was also expected to discuss a proposal from leading Russian deputies on imposing a state of emergency in the Chechen republic.

The two-hour meeting involved Federation Council (upper house of parliament) Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko, Vice Premier Sergey Shakhrai, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Civil Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu,

Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Chiefs Yevgeniy Primakov and Sergey Stepashin, Chief of the Federal Frontier Service Andrey Nikolayev and Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov. Also attending were Senior Presidential Aide Viktor Ilyukhin, Presidential Aide for National Security Yuriy Baturin and First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets.

Grachev Criticizes Ruehe's 'Opportunistic' Reaction

LD2401182795 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT
24 Jan 95

[Video report by Aleksandr Gerasimov]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting between Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and a high-ranking Finnish officer was perfunctory and was supposed to demonstrate that not all West European countries are as categorical in their treatment of Grachev as was Mr. Ruehe, head of the German military department. According to the Russian minister, Mr. Ruehe has tried to upset relations with him for purely opportunistic reasons.

[Begin Grachev recording] He should not have acted like someone who wants to get the defense minister of Russia to stand to attention, speaking in military terms. I believe that such a reaction on Mr. Ruehe's part to our internal political matters cannot serve as an example of mutual relations between heads of military departments of the two countries. [end recording]

However, Pavel Grachev has made an attempt to clear up the reasons for his moral and political conflict with Deputies Sergey Kovalev and Sergey Yushenkov. The minister apologized, albeit in a military fashion.

[Begin Grachev recording] I only regret one thing, so to say: I got carried away, I did indeed. I was rude. However, I expressed my attitude to him, or to them, in a correct way. [end recording]

It is possible however that the attention of the public and the press will switch very soon from the defense minister to Viktor Yerin. According to Pavel Grachev, the Armed Forces have now destroyed most of Dudayev's bandit formations and have thus fulfilled their aim. Now the command of the Chechen operation will be handed over to the Ministry of the Interior. Tomorrow, the Security Council will make it official.

[Begin Grachev recording] The Ministry of Interior, assisted by the Armed Forces, will take command of the remaining operations. Assistance will be provided mostly by artillery units, the Air Force, and some tank forces, and maybe Air Defense Forces and others. We will sort it out on the spot.

Grachev is rather reticent on the issue of the hearings in the State Duma tomorrow on the defense minister's fitness for his post. He is sure that he has done Russia no

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harm. Probably the minister's good relations with the country's top leaders inspire his confidence.

[Begin Grachev recording] Whatever decision the State Duma takes, I trust that the president will support me. [end recording]

Further on Grachev Comments

LD2401213395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1934 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—The Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev believes "it is very strange that at such a difficult moment for Russia, when the question of its territorial integrity is at stake, our 'peacemakers' receive assistance from foreign defense ministers". He was speaking in an interview in Moscow Tuesday.

On statements the German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe made in an interview for the newspaper BILD, Grachev said: "True, Mr. Ruehe can make any statements, including those meeting time-serving interests. But in any case he should not assume the role of a person who wants to make the Russian Defense Minister stand to attention".

Grachev said "such a response to our internal political affairs can by no means serve as a model relationship between the defense ministers of the two countries".

He said that he understood the West's emotional response to the events in Chechnya. He is certain, though that "it would be easy to guess what kind of response the West, including Germany itself, would invoke should anything like Chechnya emerge on its territory. (endall) 241934 germanos/ks 24/2134

Yushenkov To Sue Grachev for Defamation

LD2501172995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov, in an interview to our radio station today said that he has decided to sue Defense Minister Pavel Grachev for slander and defamation. Sergey Yushenkov stressed that the stream of slander from Grachev has not ended, and the media has been repeating and circulating these fabrications for the past three days.

Armed Forces Very Critical of Possible Grachev Resignation

LD2501155595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1335 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—Russia's Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Vladimir Churanov said that the Armed Forces are very critical about the possibility of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's resignation.

As he spoke at a news conference in Moscow, Churanov said that troops in Chechnya were particularly angry about the rumors Grachev may be dismissed.

Churanov, who is in charge of logistics affairs, has said that the material supplies for Russian troops fighting in Chechnya did conform to standard levels. He said that logistics structures would have to be reformed [sentence as received].

Churanov said that troops moved into Chechnya had food supplies for five-six days. He strongly dismissed reports that soldiers had had no chance to eat for several days. "We have no problems with food supplies for our troops", Churanov said.

The daily ration of each soldier in Chechnya includes 300 grams of meat, 50 grams of butter and 100 grams of sugar—5,250 rubles' worth.

Churanov said that the Mozdok-Chervlenaya railway line and the Severnyy Airport in Grozny had been repaired to deliver food supplies. However, 80% all of cargoes are delivered by truck.

Apart from the bathing complexes in Beslan and Mozdok an additional 17 field baths have been deployed and a bath and laundry train has arrived.

Deputies Assail 'Slander Campaign' Against Grachev

MM2501204195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Verbatim" rubric: "Deputies' Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The editorial office has been forwarded the text of a statement signed by members of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee for Questions of Geopolitics—V. Zhuravlev, V. Ustinov, and others. It states, in particular:

"At a grim hour for the motherland, when something most precious—the power's military might—is being subjected to a serious trial, we must also take bitterly into consideration something that is, you might think, unexpected: Contrary to all the traditions of our state, the Russian Federation's minister of defense has come under fire on its very own territory. The scale of the slander campaign against Army General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev is not only not slackening but, on the contrary, is intensifying as the personnel of the combined units which he directs are persistently and purposefully overcoming the deeply echeloned system for conducting military operations unleashed by D. Dudayev's criminal regime.

"The immorality of the actions of persons who permit themselves to stab in the back a military leader on the battlefield is obvious and, consequently, deserves resolute condemnation. Along with the legitimate question—whom does this benefit?—at the same time we cannot

fail to draw very close attention to a manifestation of a clearly criminal-political matter: Who trained and armed combat formations inside Russia that are capable of operating professionally and efficiently under conditions of modern warfare, and when?

"The comprehensive investigation, which all citizens of Russia have a right to expect, will undoubtedly requite everyone according to his deserts. But it is already an immutable and indisputable fact that D. Dudayev, the fledged bird of prey, flew out from under the wing of Aviation Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov and enjoyed his assistance, including military-technical assistance, for a long time. All materials published to date prove that the latest arms, including heavy arms, flooded into the Chechen separatists' hands at the beginning of fateful 1992, when real power in the Russian Government was handed to Ye. Gaydar and his team.

"We resolutely proclaim to the motley chorus of hysterical politicians speculating on their own country's misfortune: Hands off Russia's minister of defense, a serviceman whose personal exploit in the Afghan war was marked with a hero's Gold Star! Consider, gentlemen, that the heroic soldiers and officers fulfilling their constitutional duty in the Chechen Republic are already pronouncing your names with disrespect verging on hatred and damnation.

"To disgrace oneself before Russia is the worst fate that life can hand down to a person and a citizen—particularly to politicians still endowed with people's trust."

Russia's Choice Criticizes Yeltsin 'Silence' on Grachev

LD2401214395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1934 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—The president and prime minister "should have publicly reacted to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's unprecedented statements" with respect to Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev and chairman of the State Duma committee for defense Sergey Yushenkov. This statement was made by the executive secretary of the parliamentary faction Russia's Choice, Valentin Tatarchuk, in an interview with INTERFAX Tuesday.

At a news conference in Mozdok last week, Grachev called Kovalev "an enemy of Russia," whom it was impossible to stigmatize more, while he described Yushenkov as "a vile little toad."

In an interview with INTERFAX Tatarchuk remarked that he found the top leadership's prolonged silence rather strange, to put it mildly. The international community paid much attention to the case, while Germany said it did not want Grachev to visit.

Lobov Says Dudayev Has Chance To Emerge 'Unscathed'

LD2501212495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2052 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—"Dzhokhar Dudayev has a chance to come out unscathed, but this chance is only if he hands in arms," Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov told journalists after a Security Council session Wednesday.

However, "there still are no signs that the rebellious general has changed his mind," Lobov said. "Therefore, the amnesty guaranteed to those who give in arms will not be extended to him," he added.

According to Lobov, if armed resistance continues, Dzhokhar Dudayev will face a criminal trial "as the main perpetrator of the armed rebellion and bloodshed."

Lobov said he had information that Dudayev had about 30 tanks, many portable rocket launchers, antiaircraft installations and Grad rocket launchers.

Dudayev has 1,500 to 2,000 militants who act in groups of 30-50 persons, mainly at night, Lobov said.

Lobov remarked that the federal troops had been "extending the area under their control in Grozny without major clashes" over the last three days. The federal troops now control two-thirds of Grozny's territory, he added.

Lobov, Stepashin, Grachev Comment on Plans for Chechnya

LD2601123495 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the Security Council discussed questions connected with the conclusion of the first stage of the military operation in, and the political future of Chechnya. Over to Aleksey Tokarev:

[Tokarev] Speaking at a news conference after the meeting, Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov disclosed that, until general elections could be held, an interim administrative body was likely to be set up. This body would be called the Committee of National Salvation or National Accord. In this respect we should recall the Gorbachev leadership's unhappy experience of forming similar committees in former USSR republics back in 1990.

Yesterday, however, Sergey Stepashin, head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS], told the press of the establishment of a special FCS directorate for Chechnya. Eventually it will employ up to 800 people. A network of command centers set up by this directorate in Chechnya will have the task of carrying out operational work to confiscate weapons and deal with crime. Mr. Stepashin felt it appropriate to recall similar work carried out by secret service agents to disarm gangs after the Great Patriotic War, in the Ukraine, and in Lithuania.

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Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who visited injured servicemen after yesterday's Security Council meeting, spoke to the press about his views of the army's future in Chechnya. Under Grachev's plans, an individual Russian Army would be stationed in Chechnya and neighboring Caucasus republics, along the lines of the 14th Russian Army which keeps the peace in the Dniester region.

It is in the context of these pronouncements that one needs to view the negative assessment of the possibility of talks with Dudayev, shared by all the Russian leaders. Mr. Stepashin said that the office of the Russian procurator general would soon be instituting criminal proceedings against Dudayev.

However, according to the head of Chechnya's Council of Elders, Dudayev remains the only leader of Chechnya who has control over the situation and the ability to influence field commanders.

All these predictions of the future lead one to agree with the conclusion drawn by General Stolyarov, deputy chairman of the interim commission for monitoring human rights in Chechnya. Yesterday, at a news conference held at the Duma, he said: We are sowing the seeds of hatred in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, attempts to rebuild Chechnya's economy are starting even though the foundations for peace are not yet ready. These are being laid by the Army and counterintelligence service—and for this reason they are not strong.

Lobov Denies Rumors of Division of Chechnya

LD2501212395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2012
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—The Wednesday sitting of Russia's Security Council did not consider any projects to divide Chechnya into the northern and southern parts, "Large and Small," Security Council Oleg Lobov declared to journalists in Moscow.

Thus he refuted rumors spread by mass media that "this division is allegedly possible due to upcoming partisan activity of Dudayev's fighters who are being driven out of Grozny." "The Russian president believes that it is inadmissible to draw any new borders within the Russian Federation," Lobov underlined.

Responding to journalists concerning results of the Security Council sitting Lobov said that according to available information "Russian servicemen seize more and more hirelings from the countries of former Soviet republics and foreign countries." In his opinion, while considering prospects of a partisan war Dudayev "greatly stakes on foreign countries."

Duma Commission Member Says Russia 'Lost' Chechen Conflict

LD2501163295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1523
GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The events in Chechnya are threatening to develop into a large-scale conflict which may spread to contiguous regions in North Caucasus.

This was stated today at a news conference at the State Duma by General Nikolay Stolyarov, member of the provisional observation commission on observance of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens in the Chechen Republic.

Together with other member of the commission, deputy Bair Zhamsuyev, he visited Ingushetia and a number of inhabited localities in Chechnya on January 19-22.

The members of the commission visited in particular the Ingush village of Arshty which had been bombarded. "We saw there shell holes, killed old people and children," Nikolay Stolyarov said.

Neither in Ingushetia nor in Chechnya did the deputies see any manifestations of an inter-ethnic strife, Bair Zhamsuyev noted. "I cannot regard the events in the Caucasus as an inter-ethnic conflict, as a war between the Russian and Chechen peoples," the member of the commission pointed out.

Nikolay Stolyarov expressed a viewpoint that irrespective of the results of military operations in Chechnya, the Russian side had lost this conflict. "We have become isolated in the Commonwealth of Independent States, unleashed war in the Caucasus and sowed hatred for decades," he emphasised.

More on Filatov Briefing on EU, Chechnya, Media, Army

MM2501122195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 25 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts: "Everything Necessary Will Be Done for Those Who Are on the Front Line"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Filatov, leader of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff, has held a news conference for Russian and foreign correspondents.

The international aspects of the crisis in Chechnya were the main theme of the conversation that took place. Filatov examined Russia's chances of joining the European Union [EU] in detail, closely linking them with the problems of overcoming the Chechen crisis that have arisen.

First of all he noted that throughout the past year experts from this European organization have been working energetically in Russia, studying the chances of its joining the EU. A result of this work was a fairly voluminous document providing the answers to almost 20 questions. They not only comprehensively characterize our state but also give certain guarantees that Russia could not only be accepted into the European community but could also become an equal and permanently acting participant in it.

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But Filatov stressed that an emotional explosion occurred as a result of the development of the crisis in Chechnya, especially after the military phase began. In principle the reaction to events in Chechnya shows that the EU leadership reaffirms Russia's integrity and correspondingly understands the need to impose law and constitutional order in the Chechen Republic. At the same time it can now be sensed that the methods of solving the conflict are not accepted. According to Filatov, what is happening in Chechnya is stirring up and disposing the European community against Russia.

The Russian Federation Presidential Staff's leader nonetheless expressed the hope that the special commission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which should already have started working directly in Chechnya, will familiarize itself with the situation on the spot and "will remove the many questions."

The chief of the Presidential Staff firmly rejected the fears that have appeared because of the Chechen crisis regarding the curtailment of the reform process and society's possible return to totalitarianism. In this context he reassured the press that there would be no attempts to put pressure on it. But, bearing in mind its enormous public role and importance in shaping public opinion, especially in crisis situations such as Chechnya, new methods of cooperation between the official authorities and the press must be found. The Presidential Staff's leader described the recent instances of the mass media carrying public and fairly harsh assessments as "a bad sign."

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office was naturally concerned by other problems associated with the situation in Chechnya. Your correspondent asked Filatov two questions:

[Pelts] There have been many reproaches leveled against the Army that its actions can hardly be called delicate. Please tell us whether, when the decision to use troops there was being made, it was appreciated that their weapons and the nature of their actions are not designed for "delicate work," especially in city conditions?

[Filatov] Yes, all that is correct. But we must still bear in mind that we had to operate not only against gunmen but also in the midst of the peaceful population. I do not want to blame anybody here. We must blame the fact that we did not train the kind of forces in our country that could have operated in such conditions. That is our misfortune. After all, our Internal Troops are young, although that is what they are there for. At the same time they are not adapted to fighting against well-equipped—including with armored vehicles—armed formations of the kind Dudayev had. Therefore the Army's involvement was inevitable.

[Pelts] It is known that so far only Army subunits have been operating in the first echelon on the front line. They are taking the main losses and bearing the brunt of the

struggle. At the same time their support, including material support, leaves something to be desired....

[Filatov] Everything necessary will be done for those who are on the front line. There can be no doubt about that.

Shumeyko Comments on Chechnya, Borders, Security, Army

LD2601122095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1154 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—Yesterday's meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation considered mainly issues of not war but peace in Chechnya", Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council, told a news conference here today.

One of the important tasks in Chechnya before elections is the establishment of a provisional government in the republic relying on the Committee of National Reconciliation, and the restoration of oil extraction which will allow to cover expenses for the creation of conditions for a normal life of the local population and the return of refugees.

The speaker drew attention to the need to set up a zone with a special passing regime along the whole state border on the Chechen territory.

He noted in this connection that "transparent frontiers inside the Commonwealth of Independent States have many negative aspects for Russia". Vladimir Shumeyko believes that it is necessary to strengthen borders of the Russian Federation just as any independent state.

According to the speaker, it is necessary to adopt a new law on security in keeping with the Constitution which will clearly outline the status and powers of the Security Council.

He informed that both the president and members of the Security Council shared the viewpoint that the council should not be a body of operative management. The Security Council must resolve "global problems of security in its different forms" including economic, ecological and military ones.

The chairman of the Security Council did not agree with the negative assessment of the condition of the Russian armed forces. Despite all "populist reforms carried out in the past few years, the Army have not 'disgraced itself' but on the contrary, has shown that it exists and is capable of efficient fighting," he pointed out.

Vladimir Shumeyko spoke against an early call to military service saying that even Tsarist Russia drafted into an army youths of no younger than 21 years of age.

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Asked about bases where Chechen militants are planning to retreat, Vladimir Shumeyko, referring to reliable sources, confirmed that there were two such bases in Abkhazia. He supposed that an open discussion of this issue, including talks with the Abkhazian president, would help resolve this problem and would not allow militants to use them.

Statement on Security Council Meeting on Chechnya

LD2501174695 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1322 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—The press service of the president of the Russian Federation transmitted to ITAR-TASS the official report on today's meeting of the Security Council that says:

"The Russian Federation's Security Council today met in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin.

"The meeting considered the progress in implementing measures to disarm illegal armed units, restore constitutional legality and law and order, and ensure the social and economic revival of the Chechen Republic.

"The Russian Federation's Security Council noted that the military phase of disarming the illegal armed formations was mainly complete. Further actions to disarm the illegal armed formations in Chechnya have been entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in close cooperation with contingents of troops of the country's Armed Forces. Combined and other units of interior troops and units of special militia and special units of the Interior Ministry will be used for this purpose.

"A new stage in restoring constitutional legality, law and order, and peace in Chechnya has begun. Its aim is to ensure the social, economic, political, and legal revival of the republic and create conditions for holding free democratic elections.

"The President of the Russian Federation gave specific instructions on the questions examined."

Moscow Welcomes International Relief Aid to Chechnya

LD2401183395 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 1734 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—Russia welcomes international relief aid to Chechnya, which is in a disastrous condition, a Russian Foreign Ministry official has said.

Grigoriy Karasin said that Russia was grateful to the United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF for its decision to send relief supplies to Chechen civilians.

Karasin said at a briefing in Moscow that UNICEF had already earmarked \$500,000 for the purpose and sent a

planeload of relief aid - about 27 tonnes. The cargo was brought to Beslan airport on January 21. It includes children's vaccines, medicines, foodstuffs with a high protein content and blankets. Another two planes are expected to arrive shortly, one of them this week.

Karasin said that there was a favorable response from Russia to the British government's decision to extend one million pounds in relief aid to those affected in Chechnya. "Within the next few days 400,000 pounds will be transferred to the International Red Cross in response to its appeal and will be used for emergency food supplies," Karasin said.

Karasin said Russia was satisfied with Ankara's measures to help Chechnya, where 21 tonnes of relief supplies was delivered from Turkey.

"All this is a very useful addition to what the Russian government has been doing. The Ministry for Emergency Situations has sent 2,700 tonnes of relief supplies to Chechnya already", Karasin said.

Barkashov on Support of Policy in Chechnya

954F0991A Moscow *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian* No 3, 15-22 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Barkashov, leader of Russian National Unity, by correspondent Dmitriy Balburova; place and date not given: "President Yeltsin's New Policy: 'We See Ourselves as a Defense Ministry Reserve'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Events of the past month leave no doubt that the president of Russia has chosen a new ideological and political platform for himself. Henceforth, the support of the president in the State Duma will be the Zhirinovskiy faction and the nationalists from the ranks of communists and agrarians who have sided with it. His policy is welcomed by Barkashov, Limonov, and Nikolay Lysenko. Nevzorov has been elevated to the level of the country's chief propagandist. The president now has new allies, to which, incidentally, certain letters to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI testify also. Some, because the majority of our readers are against war.

[Barkashov] All newspapers have trumpeted the smashing of the Russian troops in Chechnya, virtually. But there have been no failures. Albeit slowly, the operation is being carried out in planned fashion. Were Grozny seen as a hostile city, it would have been wiped off the face of the earth in four hours. Our troops have been forced to operate selectively, squeeze the militants from their rat holes, and expose themselves to bullets. Imbeciles and amateurs of the Gaydar and Yushenkov type are unwilling to understand this.

[Balburova] Is an adjustment of Russian National Unity's policy in connection with the prolongation of the operation possible?

[Barkashov] Only in the direction of stronger support for the executive. All political forces of Russia have adopted a destructive position of condemnation in deference to their shallow interests. It is disgusting to listen to their fuss about nothing. Territorial integrity is the state's most important task.

[Balburova] Even in so bloody a fashion?

[Barkashov] This blood is saving Russia from even more blood. Everyone has for some reason or other forgotten that the hostilities were brought about by the anarchy of Dudayev's gang formations, these inhuman types who are now defending Grozny, and they, in turn, are being defended by Kovalev, Panfilova, Gaydar. They themselves, therefore, are inhuman. Killing and raping Russians is o.k., but punishing killers is not?

[Balburova] You have declared not only moral but also practical assistance for the government.

[Barkashov] We see ourselves as an operational reserve of the Defense Ministry and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. We have 10 territorial subunits with 150 companions in arms each and tens of times more sympathizers in Moscow alone. In Russia altogether Russian National Unity has 15,000 companions in arms ready to carry out any order that I give. We will demand of the government more decisive measures to strengthen legality and order. According to my information, there are in Russia 80,000 criminal Chechens, against whom preventive measures, up to and including temporary internment and deportation, should be adopted. In addition, it is essential to place television under strict control.

[Balburova] Comment on the participation of UNA-UNSO [Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense] fighters in the Chechen conflict.

[Barkashov] These are pawns in the game of the United States and the Vatican, which are interested in the breakdown of Russia. Statute 8690 on America's national interests says plainly in black and white: the dismemberment of the USSR into 20 parts. This is a boon for America. UNA-UNSO are executing it like lackeys. In addition, these so-called nationalists are simply foolish people, they have just one principle—hatred of Russia. And that's all! The Russians are to blame for everything.

[Balburova] So Russian National Unity has no allies in Ukraine?

[Barkashov] It has. The ordinary Ukrainian people.

[Balburova] What can you say about the resignations of the deputy defense ministers?

[Barkashov] They should have been kicked out sooner. No one has canceled unity of command in the army, and Gromov and Lebed decided to make political capital. Gromov's statements are simply cheap since he knows that there can be no other losses. I have an associate, a lieutenant colonel of the KGB, who served with Gromov

in Afghanistan, and he says that this general destroyed a whole battalion there, and now he has taken up criticism.

As far as Lebed is concerned, I might recall that he did not lift a finger when Russians were being killed in the Dniester region, and the local authorities had only to arrest this villain Bergman, and Lebed was immediately threatening to bring tanks onto the street. Lebed has, generally, never been an honest person; in October 1993 he was a political informer and took to "singing" about his Dniester opponents. Lebed is the classic type of traitor, without honor or conscience, and it is not for him to point out who should be going to Grozny—the army or the Spetsnaz.

Gromov and Lebed may be tolerated in a stable prosperous country, but under the present conditions they should be gotten rid of as soon as possible.

Survey: Yavlinskiy, Yeltsin, Rutskoy Popular Politicians

LD2201160595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1419 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 22 (INTERFAX)—Leader of the Yabloko parliamentary faction Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and former vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy are now the most decent candidates for the Russian presidency, said respondents participating in the poll conducted by the Invariant Regional Center of Economic and Social Research in Voronezh (the south of the European part of Russia).

Total of 1100 respondents said that if the presidential elections had taken place at the moment they would vote as following: 17 percent would vote for Yavlinskiy, 16 percent for Yeltsin, 11 percent for Rutskoy, 5 percent for Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaydar and 3 percent for State Duma parliamentarian Nikolay Travkin.

Two percent of respondents (in each case) said they would like to see as the Russian President present Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, ex-USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Party for Russian Unity and Concord, Deputy Premier Sergey Shakhrai, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, Commander of the Russian 14th Army, General Aleksandr Lebed, parliamentarian Ella Panfilova.

One percent of respondents said they would vote for Federation Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko. St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak would receive the same number of votes.

None of respondents said they could vote for Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov or leader of the Russian National Union Sergey Baburin.

Total of 16 percent of respondents said they would not take part in the presidential elections. Total of 7 percent

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said they would vote for somebody else and 9 percent failed to give a definite answer.

If former vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy and President Boris Yeltsin met in the second round of the presidential elections, 28 percent would vote for Rutskoy and 26 percent for Yeltsin, the poll revealed. In such a situation 29 percent would not vote for any of them. If Rutskoy had to confront LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy he would have more success as he would canvass 32 percent of votes in Voronezh against 7 percent voting for Zhirinovskiy. Total of 46 percent of respondents said they would not vote either for Rutskoy or for Zhirinovskiy.

Regional Party Chiefs on Tactics, Politics

954F0953A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 1-2,
1-15 Jan 95 p 4

[Ye. Kopyshv report: "Plenum of the UCP-CPSU Council"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] The reports "Preparations for the 30th UCP [Union of Communist Parties]-CPSU Congress" (rapporteur O. Shenin), "The Second Congress of Peoples of the USSR" (A. Melnikov), and "The Organizational Strengthening of the UCP-CPSU" (Ye. Kopyshv) were received and discussed at the plenum of the UCP-CPSU Council.

The Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were admitted to the UCP-CPSU on a full-membership basis, as were the Armenian Workers Union and the Belorussian Workers Union "For Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice" (DSPS) as associate members.

Eighteen persons, representatives of practically all the parties and movements that are a part of the UCP-CPSU, took part in discussion of the items on the agenda. A brief account of their speeches follows.

V. Tyulkin, secretary of the Russian Communist Workers Party Central Committee, proposed that a representation quota be established for the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress signifying an equal number of delegates from each party, regardless of its size. And, furthermore, that the same number of mandates be allocated all the Communist Parties of Russia as any republic party and that they then be divided evenly among the Communist Parties of the Russian Federation. In his opinion, the communist movement of Russia continues to suffer from the ailments of the CPSU: social opportunism and reformism. It is necessary as a preliminary, therefore, to break off relations and then to unite. He believes that a deviation to the right has shown through in the activity of the UCP-CPSU under the pressure of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. He sees no need for making the Third Communist Party of the Russian Federation Congress a unification congress. He proposed that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation consider the question of membership of the Russian Communist Union.

L. Samarskaya, secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, notified the parties' council of the serious situation in defense industry. He gave notice of the hunger strike of 65 workers of the Spetstekhnika Plant, and workers of a further two enterprises are on the verge of this protest. As far as the unification of Russia's communists is concerned, the Communist Party of Russia is not prepared for this. Many leaders are incapable of renouncing leadership. And although at the local level communists have long been operating jointly, as a rule, the contradictory instructions from the parties' centers are hampering concerted work. He advocated the equal representation of each party at the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress and proposed the preservation of a single party card.

A. Prigarin, secretary of the Union of Communists Party Central Committee, supported the basic propositions of O. Shenin's report. He sees a return to socialism not via a bourgeois-democratic stage but only in the course of a new socialist revolution. On 29 November 1994 the leaders of the All-Russia Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Russian Communist Workers Party, the Union of Communists, the Leninist Position in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Russian Party of Communists signed a document on the creation of the Russian Communist Union. Its rules specifying the creation of regional structures for the coordination of joint activity were adopted. The document "General Ideological-Political Position" was adopted as a step toward a unified program. He believes that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation cannot be the single center in the Russian Federation of unification of the members of the CPSU of Russia. An all-Russian conference of members of the CPSU is being prepared. The multiplicity of Communist Parties in Russia is, on the whole, a normal phenomenon, in his opinion.

A. Saliy, secretary of the republic committee of the Communist Party of Tatarstan, presented information on the experience of party work in the masses on defense of the gains of the socialist economy, the friendship of the peoples, and our spirituality, statehood, and defense capability. On the basis of the experience of the work of the communists of Tatarstan he called for joint work in parliament and in the preparations for elections and the organization of strikes and stoppages. As far as the attitude toward the elite is concerned, the bankers and entrepreneurs who sympathize with us will after the working people have come to power work in their positions under the control of the communists. These are mainly people who, having clever hands and minds, have organized their own work. At the present time 70-80 percent of them are working under the control of the mafia and are turning to the communists for protection. He called on the communists of Russia for unity. [passage omitted]

T. Khabarova, coordinator of the Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU, supported a unified party and a single party card and opposed the abandonment of individual membership of the UCP-CPSU. A multiplicity of communist

parties is a basic proposition of Trotskiyism. The modern Communist Parties of Russia may exist perfectly well within the framework of one party as platforms. It is essential to establish a deadline for the reregistration of members of the CPSU, after which the party documents of those that have not reregistered should be deemed null and void. It is essential to declare the operation of the 1977 Constitution in relation to the condition of 1985-1986 and to bring the programs of the communist parties into line with it. [passage omitted])

A. Chekhoyev, deputy chairman of the UCP-CPSU Council. The main condition of the restoration of the Union is the creation of a single communist space, of which Soviet Socialist Russia would be a part also. The war with Chechnya is leading to its disintegration. If Russia collapses, the revival of the USSR will be pushed back. The present regime is no longer capable of controlling the masses but the opposition is not prepared for this either. Only the leaders and their closest associates are aware of disagreements in the programs of the Communist Parties. Locally, however, the communists are demanding organizational unity.

The proportional representation of the parties at the congress and their equal representation in the directive bodies are needed. If in a vote on certain issues, however, a threat of the pressure of parties with large representation arises, this could be regulated by way of a ballot, each party being accorded one vote. The UCP-CPSU Rules provide for this.

V. Vishnyakov, deputy chairman of the UCP-CPSU Council. According to the current UCP-CPSU Rules, primary party organizations could join the UCP-CPSU. The formation of its structures was not prohibited. This process developed and forced the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee to announce that it was joining the UCP-CPSU as an associate member and, subsequently, as a full member. A law on public associations, where no provision is made for international organizations, is being prepared in the Duma currently. This would be a blow to the restoration of the CPSU. If the law is adopted, we can conclude the history of the CPSU. Nor will it be possible to raise the question of party property. The UCP-CPSU ligament cannot be eliminated. For the Ministry of Justice we are the UCP, for the communists, the CPSU.

The concept "Toward a Renewed Union of Soviet Peoples" downplays the role of the party as the pivot of the unification of the republics. The breakdown of the USSR began with the rejection of the USSR Constitution and the attempts to substitute the Union Treaty for it. Now the Union Treaty may be discerned in the congress' concept. We need first to unite the republics politically under the leadership of the CPSU, then to come to grips with the economy. [passage omitted]

I. Nikitchuk, secretary of the city committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, city of Arzamas-16. We come here for new ideas, practical

recommendations, and work experience. But there is time after time a discussion of the programs and disagreements of Russia's Communist Parties. This is not understood at the local level. Some people are living in their exclusive world at a time when the country is dying, people are dying, the army is being destroyed. Nuclear weapons were developed in Arzamas-16. Today the institute is falling apart, the mass layoff of employees lies ahead. The city is full of Americans. Unless it has its own nuclear weapons, there will be no sovereignty for Russia or the Union. Practical steps for the restoration of the USSR need to be taken quickly, therefore. But we are continually arguing about who is the greater Leninist. Let us rather assemble a unification congress, at which the communists themselves will decide who will be in the leadership of the new party. It is important today to develop the local press and support the all-party newspaper. We were with our newspaper victorious at the elections to the city Duma. As we approach the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress, we should preserve the GLASNOST newspaper. Our communists have collected and instructed me to present to the newspaper GLASNOST R1 million, which I now do.

Yu. Izyumov, chief editor of GLASNOST, thanked the communists of Arzamas-16 for their help and called on all the participants in the plenum to help find the funds for the material support of the party press and its distribution and the supply of information. [passage omitted]

S. Chernyakhovskiy, member of the UCP-CPSU Council. The concept "Toward a Renewed Union of Soviet Peoples" speaks of the restoration of a new, renewed Union with a multi-structure economy. This is the concept of the CIS, even G. Yavlinskiy would sign it.

The amendments to the rules revise the decisions of the 29th CPSU Congress. Everything now comes down to the role of parties, not the communists. A right wing composed of Ye. Ligachev, A. Melnikov, A. Chekhoyev, and Ye. Kopyshchev has taken shape in the UCP-CPSU leadership. They are reviving the relapses into Gorbachevism. As far as the 30th congress is concerned, I support the proposal concerning the equal representation of the parties. I support the propositions of O. Shenin's report and propose that all documents be brought into line with the report. I support the idea of the unity of the communists. But following the Second Russian Social Democratic Workers Party Congress, only Trotskiy advocated unity, V.I. Lenin did not succumb to this. It is being proposed that we create a unified party with platforms. What we have currently in the communist movement of Russia is better than this proposal. I recognize the right of the nations to self-determination. At the same time, on the other hand, a new nation—the Soviet people—had taken shape with us, and the right of this nation to self-determination within the borders of the USSR is higher than the right of any individual nation. [passage omitted]

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V. Romanov, secretary of the Samara Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, reported that the 32d oblast party conference with the participation of representatives of the Volga regions had been held on 3 December 1994 in Samara.

All the present presidents are advocating integration, but an analysis of exports shows that the Russian regime is rapidly reducing supplies of oil and gas to countries of the former USSR and accomplishing two tasks thereby: satisfying the requirements of the Western monopolies and preserving itself. And there will be no fundamental change in the situation as long as the Yeltsin regime is in power. Let us evaluate soberly, therefore, what we want and how we will achieve this. Speakers have proposed, first, political integration, then economic. Do some people really think that if tomorrow a miracle occurs and Soviet power is established in Russia, the people of Ukraine will immediately deny L. Kuchma their trust? Nothing of the sort. Yet the need for economic integration is felt by each most fervent domestic entrepreneur.

We have had a continuing sharply worded debate in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. We who took part in the 20th All-Union Party Conference and the 29th CPSU Congress uphold the viewpoint that the party cannot allow one leader to lead 10 million or 19 million communists. Leaders are required to reflect precisely what the communists feel. And a process of mutual enrichment is under way within the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee is increasingly reflecting the vocabulary and feelings of the communists.

It is wrong to say that there are in Russia six communist parties. There are just two real parties with serious influence locally. In the good times here in the oblast there were 240,000 communists, before August 1971, some 170,000, today, 5,000 members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and 60-70 members of the Russian Communist Workers Party. All these years we have operated together. The unity of the communists is an extreme necessity. The objective prerequisites—the behavior and mood of the communists in joint actions locally—do exist. There is insufficient recognition that there is no way back: Another 18 months to two years, and control of 70-80 percent of Russia's fixed assets will have escaped into the hands of foreign capital.

The resolutions of the plenum of the UCP-CPSU Council "Preparations for the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress," "The Second Congress of Peoples of the USSR," and "Organizational Matters" were adopted on the results of the discussion. Revisions to the rules of the UCP-CPSU in connection with its forthcoming registration were confirmed, and an initiative of the Russian Communist Workers Party on the organization in May 1995 of an international meeting of communist parties of participants in the war against Hitler Germany was approved. A statement on the events in the Chechen Republic was adopted.

The UCP-CPSU Council Political Executive Committee was instructed to make editorial emendations to the UCP-CPSU Program and to draw up for the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress a document on the coordination of the joint actions of the republic communist parties at the current stage.

Shenin on Communists' Tasks

954F0951A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 1-2,
1-15 Jan 95 pp 1, 5

[Report of O.S. Shenin, chairman of the UCP-CPSU Council, at UCP-CPSU plenum on 12 December 1994: "On the Eve"]

[FBIS Translated Text] GLASNOST has already reported on the UCP [Union of Communist Parties]-CPSU Council plenum held on 12 December 1994. We offer readers the report on the preparations for the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress of O.S. Shenin, chairman of the UCP-CPSU Council.

We have mentioned repeatedly in our documents the fall in industrial production, unprecedented in the history of world industrialization, on one-sixth of the planet. A fall which is, what is more, in spite of all the statements of the ruling regimes concerning the coming stabilization, continuing and coiling ever tighter the spiral of economic and social catastrophe.

A trend which had been anticipated theoretically, but which had not hitherto struck home—the super-rapid penetration of the intra-Union market of Western goods and international corporations—has been manifested particularly visibly against this background as of late. The inhabitants of large cities have long been feeding themselves mainly with food of other than domestic production, and those that still have something left in their pockets have been forced to purchase consumer durables that also were made overseas. Not to mention output for the national economy. Whole plants are standing idle. Western companies, relying on bribes to government and local officials, are brazenly and shamelessly compelling the purchase from them of aircraft and computers, agricultural equipment, and communications facilities.

It may be concluded that the Marxist proposition concerning capitalist production, which strains for the sake of maintaining the rate of profit, despite all obstacles, after new markets, is being manifested more visibly than ever in our country.

This proposition is not new, but its effect is becoming increasingly visible for the broad people's masses and, what is no less important, for those who are managing our industries, enterprises, and organizations and for all business people who take the future of our fatherland keenly to heart. The latter, incidentally, are seeing on the basis of their own experience WHAT is meant by capitalist competition and are recognizing HOW and WHY they are gradually being deprived of their own prospects

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also. These people are beginning to understand that the West's work against the Soviet Union and, subsequently, against Russia and our other republics also in the name of its egotistical interests is not a myth, not an invention of the communists, but harsh reality. They are gradually coming to the conclusion that a strong state defending its national interests is essential, that the interdependence of the peoples in the Soviet Union was historically conditioned and natural, and that, finally, without this Union their business and professional interests will not be defended.

I consider, therefore, that the prerequisites for not only the working people and broad strata of the intelligentsia, the bulk of whom are already disenchanted with the so-called "democratic ideals," but also those whom the regime considers its social base—representatives of various business circles—acting on the side of the communists or in a bloc with them are gradually taking shape in society.

Losing support, the authorities are becoming increasingly nervous. In Russia, for example, the West and its "Russian vanguard"—the comprador bourgeoisie—are endeavoring at all costs to implement stage two of privatization, when the enterprises are bought up not for vouchers but for cash. But some of the central and local authorities, who understand into whose hands the enterprises could "escape," are beginning to have misgivings about this stage. The example of the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant, where foreign capital already has the controlling block of shares, is there for all to see. Whence the feverish government reshuffles and the nervous search for new ideologems providing if only some protection of the selfish interests of the "privatizers" and insurance against the inevitable anger of the people.

At the last plenum we spoke about three games at which the authorities might attempt to play—social democratic, nationalist, and authoritarian. Sentiments in favor of gambling on these (if necessary) have emerged even more in the past six months. We have made an assessment of these games. I shall today give my opinion of one further game that has been manifested as of late—the monarchical game.

However odd at first glance, the idea of the imposition of a monarchy in Russia has, by all accounts, serious roots in the higher, command structures.

The experience of the restoration of the monarchy in Spain is being studied in earnest. The Russian authorities like mainly the way in which Franco guaranteed himself lifetime leadership of the country until the future king had "gained experience." The king's undertaking not to prosecute the dictator and his supporters following their departure from political life is attractive also.

Something else is perfectly clear as well: The monarchy could appear for some people to be the last chance to preserve the results of the bourgeois counterrevolution

that has taken place in the country. The way in which the queen of Britain, who merely reigns, it would seem, but does not rule, was received in Moscow at least indicates that the ruling circles are viewing this opportunity most seriously.

Whence it follows that it is essential that we communists, together with exposure of the essence of the possible social democratic and nationalist maneuvers of the authorities, expose also the possibility of the monarchical gambit. We hold all the cards, so to speak, in the performance of this work. And they should be used not only against monarchical but also the entire set of bourgeois ideas. There is nothing that can be done against real facts, after all.

Having reflected the interests of the highest bourgeoisie stratum, the Romanov dynasty brought the population of Russia to the brink of indigence and starvation and subordinated the state to the interests of foreign capital, having enmeshed it in multi-million debts and having given up key branches of industry to foreign owners, was unable to train the army for the defense of its territory or for fighting a victorious war, and set an example, instructive in all respects, of moral self-degradation. All this has been written about in a multitude of books, a large part of which belong to authors who are by no means sympathetic toward socialism.

The narrowing of the social base of the ruling regimes, a reflection of which is the ever increasing number of "rescue scenarios," forces us at today's plenum, it would seem, to discuss one further issue of both a theoretical and practical nature.

I am talking about the disagreements and divisions within the ruling regimes themselves and about how we should treat this.

Everyone is well aware of the numerous instances of, literally, the vulpine fighting between the representatives of the ruling upper strata in all republics of the Union without exception. In some places (Azerbaijan, for example) this fighting goes as far as attempts at a military coup, elsewhere (in Belorussia, for example) it is confined as yet to the primitive attacks of one side and the just as primitive sabotage of the other. The struggle for power and for influence on the authorities has been stepped up in recent days in Russia.

It is essential, at the program level included, that we recognize that under the conditions of the country's coming capitalization policy will be made, in addition to class and social groups, whose representatives are parties and public movements, by such subjects as sectoral and regional pressure groups, banks, religious- ecclesiastical societies, the special services, mafia clans, monarchical associations, elite clubs, and so forth.

When the classes are "silent" and the authorities lose their support, it is these para-political forces that begin to "make policy," directing in their own interests the

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groupings that form the regime. The groupings themselves seek for themselves in these subjects a support and guarantees for the future.

Such events in Russia in recent months as Black Tuesday, the reports of the power ministers in the Duma, the clashes at the Moscow City Hall building, and a number of others are a clear reflection of this activity.

How are we to treat these forces if it is considered that in their struggle within the regimes they are prepared to use, more precisely, play (in their own interests, of course), the energy of the communists also?

Of course, we should take advantage of the mere fact of the rivalry of a variety of exclusive political subjects for an explanation to the working people of what in reality is meant by "democracy." It means only one thing—the complete removal of the people from politics.

Subsequently this will require a precise knowledge at each moment in time as to which subjects in the center and locally have the greatest influence on the alignment of forces within the authorities. Such an analysis is essential inasmuch as there are among the participants in the political process those with whom agreements would not besmirch our honor in the least.

I believe that within the framework of the policy of the creation of a substantive opposition we are simply duty bound to strengthen ties to the sectoral lobbies of the military and high-technology branches of production, mechanical engineering, and the agrarian sector. I am sure that the banks connected with these branches would in the present situation agree to cooperation, seeing us as the sole guarantors of the defense of national interests.

A common language could be found with the church and the elite of a number of regions. In a word, it is time to stop "hiding our heads in the sand" against the harsh realities of our times and to learn to play on the political stage in accordance with its tough laws.

There is one further aspect of the current political process. The events surrounding Chechnya, the problems with Crimea and the western oblasts in Ukraine, which persist, and the regional tension in Tajikistan show that the conductors of the collapse of the Soviet Union are continuing, as we predicted repeatedly, their activity aimed at the further comminution of our territory.

And they are operating, what is more, according to the standard script, finding in the regions interested clans, introducing to their consciousness the corresponding ideology, and organizing provocations. The events in Chechnya, which are undoubtedly connected with the oil market, are excruciatingly reminiscent of the pattern of the collapse of the Union.

What further arguments are needed to convey to the public consciousness the long-obvious truth that what is operating with us in the guise of "democracy" (I do not

refer to those people who were simply deceived) represents an antistate and antipopular force serving only one end—the destruction of any statehood on our territory!

I believe that the behavior of the radical democrats in Russia in respect to the events in Chechnya should be the subject of a single-minded campaign of exposure in the communist press. It is very important to bear this in mind since the "democrats" intend to cynically convert the Chechen tragedy into their trump card for the moment of possible elections.

And, finally, an extremely important observation regarding the current moment.

The policy of the recently elected presidents of Ukraine and Belorussia has shown that the West will not allow a single republic generally or their leadership in particular to pursue an independent policy. Whatever the candidates promise at the elections, the far abroad will have sufficient funds for influencing the republics in its interests. And the ruling regimes will surrender rapidly in the face of the tough conditions of the IMF and pursue an economic policy that is the direct opposite of what they promised.

This dependence on the West of the so-called "independent" states has been manifested in even greater relief in the past months in Russia.

The attempts of the president of the Russian Federation to if only somehow emphasize Russia's national interests have suffered a complete fiasco. Having listened to the allegedly tough notes in Yeltsin's voice on a number of issues, the West, through the mouth of Clinton, unambiguously showed Russia its place at the Budapest conference and made it understood that it would not be paying heed to its opinion even on a problem so fundamental for any state as that of the security of its own borders.

Of what further state interests of Russia in the Balkans and the Near East will the complaisant democratic TV commentators venture to speak if NATO does not deem it possible to accommodate Russia in guarantees of the security of its own borders? What we communists spoke about in rebuffing the democrats at the end of the 1980's, what was spoken about in the documents of the Emergency Committee, what we have all continued to speak about in the past three years has come to pass.

The aggressive and hostile NATO bloc is approaching our borders in earnest. And, most likely, even people formerly fooled by democratic propaganda no longer harbor any illusions that this bloc would, if necessary, act against Russia.

It is clear that all that has been enumerated unambiguously poses the question of the Union state in a practical plane.

Concerning the Union state. The separation of territories from Russia or another republic was out of the question

in the USSR. The Union state could not have been treated as big and now even small states are at this time treating our republics. The USSR ensured accelerated scientific and technological progress on the majority of territories, thereby guaranteeing the country's prospects and independence.

We will not now speak about the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union—they are covered sufficiently fully in our documents.

A trip that I have just made to Tajikistan persuades me yet again that it is time to transfer our work on the creation of the Soviet Union to a specific practical plane. The people, who have gone through plenty and who have learned from their own experience what life outside of the Union does for them, spoke literally unanimously throughout our trip connected with the 70th anniversary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in support of the reconstitution of the Union. I noticed the same mood during my recent trip to Krasnoyarsk. But the mood of the people has always been clear to us. Now the masses at large have only been reinforced in their opinion in respect to life in the Union state. What is particularly important, though, is the change in the consciousness also among the regional elites, which were in the first stage after 1991 "implanted" by independence, as it were. The majority of them also, it may be concluded, are prepared for accelerated integration. The reconstitution of the USSR is thus becoming a reality.

This new reality has been spotted by the ruling regimes also. We know of plans, we spoke about them at the previous plenum, to intercept this process. The question arises, therefore: Who will head the integration, whose content will be imparted to it?

This process can and must be headed by the communists.

We alone are the "bearers" of the corresponding international ideology, have the experience of the real building and leadership of a Union state, and possess the moral right in the eyes of the present generation to declare this since we have never wavered on the question of the crime of the Belovezha pact and the collapse of the USSR.

But we must tell the people clearly that the Union state cannot be nonsocialist! Proceeding from the requirements of socialism as socialism of the 21st century, of course.

If the peoples want to live in a Union state, they must renounce certain temptations that capitalism would allegedly afford them. Either a Union socialist federative state with all the benefits that it would bring the peoples or existence in so-called independent states with all that accompanies this—there is no other way! I believe that we must tell the peoples about this formula plainly and unambiguously.

Many republic Communist Parties currently have quite strong positions in the representatives organs of power

and exert an influence on the government. But political conditions prevent them, as it were, conveying the above-identified formula publicly to all. I consider this wrong. The time for maneuvering is passed.

On our side is an objective trend and the strengthened will of the peoples to unification. The Communist Parties and party organizations may already, if we may put it this way, from a position of strengthened forces plainly identify their reference points. I repeat, there has been a turnabout in all influential circles of society also. The day when they begin to cross over to our side is not far off. But they should know our conditions even now.

One further condition of ours concerning the future Union state—this is acceptance of the formula "Union of peoples, federation of territories." It should support in the future the federative, not state-republic, arrangement of the future Union. The previous state and political arrangement accomplished its mission—gave free rein to the national emancipation of the peoples of the former Russian Empire.

The 21st century will no longer permit the luxury of the breakdowns and conflicts of large states—the interdependence of the peoples on the planet will be too great. We must, therefore, plainly tell both the peoples and the elites about this formula, remembering, of course, the laws and realities of the current transitional period on the territory of the USSR.

Concerning the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress. Everything that has been enumerated confronts us with a number of urgent questions of party building. The current political situation and the natural trend toward unification in a single state demand of us, it seems to me, a fundamental breakthrough in the achievement of the unity of all Communist Parties and party organizations.

No one is questioning national and regional distinctiveness. And no one is preventing the parties and organizations having in their programs and action plans special sections reflecting this distinctiveness. But the vision of the ends and tasks and the means of the actions must be uniform.

Some unification per the Comintern type is under our conditions, I am convinced, out of the question. At the modern stage this would be a crime before the communist movement of the Soviet Union. It would essentially be an erosion of the communist movement, it would be a step toward realization of the plans of the "democrats" and the Gorbachevites.

We can and should now talk only about a united party, otherwise we will be late for H hour, when, on the money of the West and the comprador bourgeoisie, united democratic, conservative, republican, and other parties providing for the functioning of some amorphous confederation will arise in an instant.

The forthcoming 30th UCP-CPSU Congress is of particular significance, therefore. In my opinion, it should

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formalize organizationally and ideologically the completion of the creation of such a united party in principle.

Concerning in this connection the representation quota for the congress. There are, as we know, several viewpoints on this matter. To make the representation proportional to the numbers of communists? Or should the party be represented, as should be the case in a union of equals, by an equal number of delegates? If the basic propositions of today's report are accepted, there can on this matter be only one solution—the proportional representation of the parties, that is, depending on the numbers of the communists. Only such an approach will ensure the creation of a truly ideologically united party and demonstrate to the peoples the future model of the Union state. After all, with the adoption of the formula "Union of peoples—federation of territories" the question of the diktat of one republic or one party is automatically crossed off and the possibility of division is removed.

If, however, the Union of Communist Parties is preserved such as it is, the representation from the parties must be equal. For no party has the right to impose its decisions on the congress.

And I would like to say this also about certain questions of party building in connection with the preparations for the congress.

The plenum has today to consider certain changes to the rules and then to submit our proposals to the congress. I believe it essential to supplement the draft that you have with a provision entitling the UCP-CPSU Council and the Control and Auditing Commission, at joint meetings, possibly, to adopt decisions on expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU. Not, I specify, from the ranks of the republic Communist Parties but from the CPSU. This will enable us to rid ourselves of all kinds of turncoats and avoid accumulating the already enormous burden of responsibility for the actions of people who have nothing in common with the CPSU, those who earlier actively took part in the disintegration of the party, pushing it into the political backwaters, and who have now lined up to shower dirt on the CPSU, but who preserve the appearance of affiliation to our party.

Concerning a single party card. If the intentions expressed by all 19 Communist Parties present at the May coordination conference concerning the creation of a unified party of the Soviet Union are serious, if this is not a tribute to populism, the question of a single party card for all the parties that are part of the UCP-CPSU needs to be decided. I believe that even the parties that are not part of the UCP-CPSU should think about the future and, consequently, not reject a single party card for all.

Concerning the program. In my view, there is no need to alter the UCP-CPSU Program adopted at the 29th CPSU Congress. It is in need of certain editorial emendations, possibly. At the same time it would be expedient to

prepare a separate document for the moment when realization of this program is possible. What will this be? An action program, a political declaration, a manifesto? We need to discuss and adopt the decision of the plenum.

And, finally, concerning the press. "There is no means of fostering strong political organizations other than by way of an all-Russian newspaper." This is from V.I. Lenin's work "What Is To Be Done?" We have adopted decisions on the newspapers GLASNOST, PRAVDA, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. We have no wish to offend others, but it is these newspapers that may now be considered all-Union.

We are all required to ensure the publication of the weekly GLASNOST, defend the property of PRAVDA by all possible measures, and render SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA the utmost support. I am sure that everyone understands how this needs to be done!

Reporter Predicts Yeltsin Fall Before 1996

954F0992A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 3, 15-22 Jan 95 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Burtin: "War. Preliminary Results"]

[FBIS Translated Text] War is an event that is too big and terrible in the life of the country that wages it for things to return afterwards to the way they were and for it not to leave a profound and crucial vestige in the historical destiny of this country.

That is the way it has been with almost all wars in the new and most recent history, and since the time that war stopped being the occupation of armies alone, but turned into a catastrophe that affects all of us. Our own country is the closest example. The Crimean War broke the feudal system; the Japanese War had as a consequence the revolution of 1905; and the First World War—the February and October Revolutions of 1917; the Second World War generally changed the whole map of the world; and the Afghan War once and for all forced the Brezhnev regime into an impasse and thereby gave a push to perestroika.

The present war in Chechnya, although it is still at the very beginning, has already achieved quite a lot. Its results include not only mountains of corpses of Chechens and Russians, Grozny's charred ruins, and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The political results are also no longer of a lesser magnitude.

First of all, it is perfectly clear that Russia has now already finally lost Chechnya, and that it literally chucked it out from itself. If Chechnya is taken to mean not a territory (which, in principle, at the cost of thousands of soldiers' lives, can really be "cleared" not only of "gang formations," but of the whole population), but the Chechen people, then this people has for many generations been torn away from Russia, at least spiritually. Whereas the three-year breakaway of the Chechen

Republic was in a significant measure confined to the leadership and was conditional, carrying the easily distinguishable imprint of temporariness, now, after the new genocide that the Moscow authority arranged for the little nation for the second time in half a century, all of the bridges for its reconciliation with this authority have been burned and cannot be reestablished.

What is more, the war delivered a truly terrible blow to that "integrity of the Russian state" for the sake of whose preservation it was allegedly unleashed. It does not take a great quickness of wit to understand: When one nation does not give up force (even if the matter does not reach the point of carpet bombing), then not only it, but all of the other nations that populate such a country inevitably begin to feel that they are in a prison and, of course, they strive for freedom. Everyone still remembers how Gorbachev—in the name of the integrity of the USSR—through bloodletting in Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius, intensified the centrifugal tendencies that led to a full dissolution of the Union. Yeltsin is following him step by step, with the only difference being that the scale of violence employed by him is many times greater. The turbulent Caucasus and the increasingly loud protests of the other republics already serve as an answer to him today.

The war has put a real price on everything: For Yeltsin and his government and the regime that he heads, and the people that fill the proscenium of political life. The evaluation criterion is flawless, because the most profound principles of morality lie at its foundation. And it is extremely clear. If you are sincerely against this war (and sincerity and insincerity here are as visible as on an X-ray machine), it is possible to agree with you or argue with you, but you are within the bounds of human society, you are a human being. But if you are for this war and for its continuation under any pretext, this means you are a murderer (or a mental accomplice of a murderer), and no kind of verbal camouflage, even if you are Shakhray three times over, can save you from such an assessment. But if you are floundering between these two positions, without resolving to say either yes or no, then you simply do not exist, and no one will listen to you anymore.

Everything is now measured and will be measured in the foreseeable future by this main measure. And the main political watershed follows strictly along this very line.

The war has polarized Russian society sharply. On one side is Yeltsin with his Security Council, with his advisers, guards, ministers, and generals, and on the other side—an overwhelming majority of the people of the country, including soldiers and officers who do not want to be killed in this senseless and disgraceful (on our part) war.

The result is a fundamental regrouping of political forces. We see among Yeltsin's closest allies today all of the leaders of Russian fascism who unconditionally support the Kremlin's Chechen policy. It is here (if you

judge not by words, but by the voting in the Duma) that the leadership of the former communist opposition takes sides—the behavior of Zyuganov and Rybkin is indicative. Despite the concealed bickering at the power pie and some ideological diversity, politically and practically, all of these people are to a great degree similar. And no kind of the most refined chemical analysis will now distinguish, for example, the very intelligent Kozyrev from General-Sergeant Major Grachev, or the main bonebreaker for national affairs, Yegorov.

The democrats form the other political pole. Just two or three months ago, when Gaydar was only Yeltsin's educated alter ego and highly respected cultural figures criticized the very idea of a democratic opposition, it was difficult to write the word "democrat" without quotation marks with respect to these people. Today, the situation is considerably different. The war seems to have shaken up many of them, brought them to themselves, and forced them to look at everyone and everything with open eyes: at the authority that they supported, at the system that they helped it to create, and at their own role. And it has turned out that everything is not lost yet, that there are people in this environment who, as before, are capable of actions, and even of deeds. Sergey Kovalev, Sergey Yushenkov, Ella Pamfilova, Anatoliy Shabad... the list is far from complete. Once again, the protesting words of the dissidents and writers could be heard: Yelena Bonner, Larisa Bogoraz, Pavel Litvinov, Lev Kopelev, Vladimir Voynovich, and Anatoliy Pristavkin. Memorial has joined in, and Democratic Russia has awakened from its lethargic sleep....

It is still a very long way off from a united front of the democratic opposition. But, today, its membership includes not only Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and a small number of persistent people of the 1960's, and long-standing and indefatigable critics of the post-August reality, but, in fact, also Yegor Gaydar (true, he is still avoiding the final step in this respect) and practically the entire press, besides the semiofficial and fascist organs. When Leonid Petrovskiy was doing his mortally dangerous work in Grozny with representatives of democratic factions, this, perhaps, was not accidental, but the sign of a certain trend, although not yet distinguishable in an organizational form.

The war broke the fragile, relative, but still some kind of stability of the new Russian system. It was not long ago, last spring and summer, that the impression set in that, with all of its organic defects that excluded the possibility of a healthy self-development, this system could maintain the status quo for a rather long time. It has become clear today that this is not so. In addition, this is what is remarkable: The interests of the ruling clique itself are performing as a destabilizing factor.

It is perfectly obvious that the war was undertaken not because of Dudayev's separatism, but for the sake of the war itself. It was needed by its organizers as an ideal means of retaining the two main acquisitions of the

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perestroika epoch that they usurped—power and property. However, the commander in chief of the “war party” and his government ended up in obvious isolation—both in the country and in the world. Their social base continues to shrink. No one any longer believes in the ability of this authority to resolve any of the economic and other problems, no matter what the fiscal optimists of the Anatoliy Chubays or Aleksandr Lifshits type are singing. The regime is supported mainly by its force departments (which under these conditions, however, are not too reliable themselves) and increasingly tough control over radio and television, but the main thing is the traditional disunity and passivity of the Soviet people and our lack of developed effective non-violent forms of civil protest.

The rapprochement with Zhirinovskiy and Nevzorov is dealing the final blow to the reputation of the “reformer president” in the eyes of those who still harbored any illusions on this account. At the same time, for Zyuganov and other leaders of the former “irreconcilable opposition,” the alliance with the authorities, which betrayed the expectations of a majority of the people, threatens the loss of a big part of their non-nomenklatura supporters. But “Patriotism,” which is making its “dash to the south” with the bodies of peaceful residents and Russian soldiers and which, moreover, is leading to the disintegration of Russia, has turned to the practice of such Russophobia that even the most loyal followers of Igor Shafarevich, perhaps, will recoil from it.

Yeltsin’s team is losing not only the Chechen campaign (given any military outcome of the matter), but its historical destiny as well. The operation, which was undertaken by it to prolong and consolidate its authority, promises a directly opposite result. It is still not apparent now, after what move and at what minute the flag of Yeltsin and his government will fall, but there is a feeling that this will occur much sooner than June of 1996. Yeltsin today is somewhat like Gorbachev after Foros, living, but not long for this world. He may still stop the slaughter, even now, and thereby not aggravate his grave guilt before the people. But it is hardly likely that this will occur: He is mentally too weak to exploit such an opportunity. But it is possible to move ahead on the road he has taken only in the direction of a military-police dictatorship; that is, with a declared war and with his own people. He is already headed in that direction, even though it is incorrect, with a stumbling gait. What an inglorious end for the conqueror of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency].

There is also no way back for Russian society. The prewar situation, whose memorial will remain “The Treaty on Social Accord”—this manifest of nomenklatura democracy which promised, it seems, a certain durability—is now absolutely irretrievable. But “forward” means for us to stop the war, to rise up against it with the whole world, and to extinguish the flame of interethnic hatred and vengeance, before it takes over the whole house. This is the first national task, before which all of the rest are now receding.

Yeltsin Rehabilitates Ex-POW's Sent To Gulags

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of the Nazi death camp in Oswiecim [Auschwitz] to be marked Friday, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree rehabilitating over a million of Soviet World War II POW's who found themselves in Stalinist gulag after being freed from Nazi camps.

The decree is called “On the restoration of lawful rights of Russian citizens—former Soviet POW's and civilians repatriated during the Great Patriotic War (Russian name for WW II) and in the post-war period”, the press service of the Russian leader said on Wednesday.

The document says that the Soviet imprisonment of the POW's contradicted “the basic human rights” and qualifies it “as political repressions by the (communist) party and state leadership of the former USSR” against Russian citizens who were taken prisoner during the war or lived on Soviet territories occupied by the Nazis.

The decree provides for the POW's all the privileges enjoyed by World War II veterans in Russia.

Over 1.5 million Soviet POW's were repatriated after World War II and an overwhelming majority of them were sent to gulag for surrendering and on suspicion of espionage. Most of them died there.

It was only in the years of Mikhail Gorbachev that authorities stopped demanding from citizens to disclose in various questionnaires whether they or their relatives had been taken prisoner during the war or had lived on Nazi-occupied territories. The affirmative answer could cost a person employment or a foreign trip.

‘Text’ of Yeltsin Edict

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[By ITAR-TASS; all quotation marks as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—Russian President B.N. Yeltsin has signed a decree “On restoring the legal rights of citizens of Russia, who were former Soviet prisoners of war and civilians repatriated in the period of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period.” The Russian head of state’s press service today issued the full text of the decree “On restoring the legal rights of citizens of Russia who were former Soviet prisoners of war and civilians repatriated in the period of the Great Patriotic war and the postwar period”:

“For the purposes of restoring historical justice and the legal rights of those citizens of Russia who were captured and surrounded in battle while defending their fatherland, found themselves in temporarily occupied territory, and were repatriated in the period of the Great

Patriotic War and in the postwar period; and considering the conclusions of the Russian president's commission on rehabilitating the victims of political repressions and in accordance with the Russian Federation law "On the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions," I decree:

1. To recognize that the actions of the party and state leaders of the former Soviet Union and coercive measures implemented by the state bodies with regard to certain citizens of Russia ran contrary to principal human and civil rights and constituted political repressions. This applies to the former Soviet servicemen surrounded and captured while fighting to defend their Motherland; civilians repatriated during the Second World War and after the war, and individuals from the occupied territories who, for political reasons and without any justification, were found guilty of state, military, or other crimes; were sent to "frontline assault brigades," exiled, and deported; were subjected to check-ups in transit prisons, special purpose marshalling points and sorting camps, in special reserve units, "labor battalions" of the USSR People's Commissariat for Defense and the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; who were involved in forced labor combined with imprisonment, were assigned to enterprises with particularly severe working conditions, and were subjected to any other deprivations or any other form of restriction of their rights and freedoms.

2. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is to ensure that the former Soviet servicemen listed in Paragraph 1 of this edict who have not been recognized as participants in the Great Patriotic War are issued with Certificates of Participant in the Great Patriotic War on the basis of records in their military identity cards and registration cards certifying that they were prisoners of war or trapped behind enemy lines, archive certificates, on their having been checked and filtered or other documents confirming these circumstances.

3. The Ministry for Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation is to arrange examination of the former Soviet servicemen listed in the Paragraph 2 of this edict to be carried out by medical-occupational expert commissions according to procedure established by the current legislation.

4. The Government of the Russian Federation is to consider the question of extending the conditions and terms of compensation payments enjoyed by persons subjected to Nazi persecution as set out by the Resolution No. 899 of 2 August 1994 "On confirming the statute on conditions and terms for compensation payments to persons subjected to Nazi persecution" to former prisoners of war, with the costs being passed on to the Fund for mutual understanding and reconciliation or seeking other sources of financing.

5. This decree does not apply to the former Soviet POW's and civilians who served in the frontline units and special formations of the German Fascist troops or

the police, or to other persons not subject to rehabilitation under the Russian Federation law "On the rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions."

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Interior and the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service are instructed to draft the necessary legal acts regulating the implementation of the present decree, in cooperation with all Russian Federation ministries and departments concerned in the matter and subject to approval by the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation.

7. Federal bodies of executive power and executive power bodies in the members of the Russian Federation are instructed to take the required measures to implement the decree.

8. This decree comes into force on the date of its signing."

Economic & Financial Issues

Yeltsin Arrives in Lipetsk City; Optimistic About Economy

LD2601095395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0931 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Nikolay Zagnoyko and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lipetsk January 26 TASS—Boris Yeltsin believes that the 1995 "will yield us much more good results, and stabilisation of the Russian economy is possible by the year end". He shared his conviction with journalists who welcomed the Russian leader at the Lipetsk airport this Thursday.

The president plans to inspect a processing factory as well as the Novolipetskiy iron and steel combine during his one-day working visit to the city.

More Remarks on Economy

LD2601110595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1035 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Nikolay Zagnoyko and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lipetsk January 26 TASS—Boris Yeltsin believes that the year 1995 "will yield us much more good results, and stabilisation of the Russian economy will be possible by the year end". He shared his conviction with journalists welcoming the Russian leader at the Lipetsk airport this Thursday.

Summing up the results of the last year, the chief executive noted that, although "they are positive on the whole, we are not satisfied with them all the same". The year 1994 "was not lost" for reforms in Russia, he noted.

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According to preliminary information, inflation rose by 15 percent, and the industrial slump also amounted to 15 percent. "However, this is 50 percent less than in 1993," the president stressed.

Yeltsin said that the rise is noticeable in many industries, including production of consumer goods, as well as the steel and processing industries.

Asked by ITAR-TASS about his plans for trips across Russia, the president said that he intends "to visit regions every month if there are no emergencies".

The Russian leader noted that he had been in Lipetsk when he had worked in Sverdlovsk: the cities were engaged in "socialist emulation" at that time. According to his opinion, the Lipetsk region is in a relatively favourable position now. "The region fares well financially and is self-sufficient," the chief executive continued.

The president said that he plans to see "how the 'coupling' countryside-processing industry works". According to his information, the Lipetsk region organised well the operation of the processing industry.

"I want to go there to inspect manufactured consumer goods and, of course, the Novolipetskiy iron and steel combine, the giant of Russian industry."

Yeltsin added that "despite the fact that things go well in the Lipetsk region on the whole, there are also problems here. One of the most pressing is ecology. Shortcomings in this sphere tell on human health and on the quality of manufactured goods".

Russia Unable To Meet 1995 Grain Demand

LD2501154295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1335
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (Interfax)—Due to the 13.2 hectare reduction of its winter crop areas, Russia is likely to harvest 3-4 million tonnes less than it should this year. Winter crops yield 25%-30% more grain than spring crops do, chief of the plant-growing agency of the national Food and Farming Ministry Ivan Gridasov told an all-Russian agricultural conference in Moscow Wednesday. According to Gridasov, the country may be expected to take in 82 million tonnes of grain in 1995 (81.3 million in 1994 and 117 million in 1990).

The Gridasov agency explains the drop in grain yields and grain production by the poor use of mineral fertilizers. In 1994, it says, the Russian farmers applied only 1.2 tonnes of mineral fertilizers to 1 hectare of crop areas. They applied 3.7 tonnes, or three times as much, in 1986 through 1990.

Also, Gridasov said, crop areas were reduced by 4.7 million hectares in the past year, or by 6.8 million hectares against 1990.

As a result, Russia will hardly be able to meet its demand for grain (95-110 million tonnes) on its own in 1995, Gridasov said.

Davidov Says Chechnya Harming Russian Economic Standing

LD2501194495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—The continuing hostilities in Chechnya harm Russia's international financial and economic standing, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Oleg Davydov told INTERFAX Wednesday.

He said that nobody expected the military operation in Chechnya to be so protracted. As a result, he explained, it attracted close international attention, was criticized, resulting in economic consequences.

Davydov listed the EU [European Union] decision to put off the signing of a provisional agreement on trade with Russia and the recent discussion by EU foreign ministers of the possibility of economic sanctions against Russia as examples of such consequences.

He believed that Russia's economic rating declined and quotations on its securities were falling as a result of the Chechen events. Davydov explained that this weakened Russia's hand in talks with international organizations on the Russian debt issue.

He said that Russia intended to pay back the debts to all the creditors in one form or another as the Russian economy stabilizes and strengthens.

Davydov added, however, that creditors should not push Russia too much - which could undermine its economy to the point of insolvency.

He believes that Russia now has to press for postponement of payments and soft conditions for servicing its foreign debt and use more extensively the unconventional ways for making debt repayments, such as issuing promissory notes and sale and rent of unused real estate.

The Russian foreign debt is estimated at over \$110 billion.

Urinson on Career, Ministry Activities

954F0957A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Jan 95
p 9

[Interview with Yakov Urinson, first deputy minister of economics, by Aleksandr Bekker under the rubric "Opinion"; place and date not given: "Yakov Urinson: A Feeling for Investment in the Tips of Your Fingers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yakov Moiseyevich Urinson was born in 1944 in Moscow. He graduated from the department of economic cybernetics of the Moscow Institute of the National Economy imeni Plekhanov. He is a doctor of economic sciences and a professor. He has worked in the

Central Economics-Mathematics Institute and the Main Computer Center of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], traveling the path from specialist to its leader. Subsequently, he was the director of the Center on Economic Market Conditions under the Government of the Russian Federation. Since September 1993, he has been first deputy minister of economics of Russia. He has many scholarly publications, including in foreign countries.

[Bekker] You are called Gaydar's man, although, it seems, you were promoted by Chernomyrdin to be leader of the Center for Economic Market Conditions of the Government with the rank of minister and then moved to the Ministry of Economics as first deputy minister.

[Urinson] To be precise, I have worked in the Main Computer Center of the Gosplan since 1970. When Gaydar was in charge of the Government, he used this as a base for the creation of the Center for Economic Market Conditions of the Government, and he appointed me director of it. Indeed, it was Chernomyrdin who appointed me to the rank of minister, and he was the one who sent me to the Ministry of Economics. The term "Gaydar's man" is true in the sense that I do indeed share his reform ideology, I have known Yegor Timurovich since long before 1992, and I have worked fairly closely with him.

[Bekker] But why does Chernomyrdin not accept Gaydar? Remember, in the "large" Council of Ministers, he spoke in a loud voice about the "laboratory chiefs" who leap into the role of prime minister.

[Urinson] I have not noticed that Chernomyrdin has a negative attitude toward Gaydar—either when I myself was working under his leadership or when Yegor Timurovich returned to Chernomyrdin's government in September 1993. In my opinion, there have been fairly constructive relations between them. As for my promotion by Chernomyrdin, it developed out of the practical tasks the prime minister had entrusted to me and which I tried to carry out as well as I could. I can say without flattery that I have always found Chernomyrdin to be a leader with whom it was pleasant to work. Unlike many superiors who came, to use the expression of Chernomyrdin himself, "out of the overcoat of state regulation," he has, in my view, a unique quality—a readiness and ability to listen to specialists. When he was still working in the Gazprom [Main Administration of the Gas Industry], we did calculations in the computer center concerning the rigging of wells, and we figured out the problem of optimal distribution of pipes and the criterion for the minimum expenditure of metal when laying the pipes. And none of the leaders took our mathematics seriously. Viktor Stepanovich's deputies did not want to hear about optimization and Lagrange multipliers. Only Chernomyrdin was interested in this and literally delved into the calculation technique. The prime minister has retained this ability to listen to an expert, regardless of his rank, to this day. Recently, it

seems, in one of your articles you mentioned and negatively assessed the first document he signed in the rank of chief of the Council of Ministers, a document about freezing prices. But you do not know what it was like then, at the beginning of 1993. Literally on that very evening Yasin and I went to see the prime minister in Volynskoye. Several other people were also there. We demonstrated and proved to the prime minister that he had been deceived. That this measure would do nothing and would lead to the opposite results. And Chernomyrdin immediately countermanded "himself."

How does a leader of the Soviet type think? I make the decision—you carry it out. Right or wrong—the post-mortem will tell us. But Chernomyrdin does not rely on external, formal authority. And he listens to all viewpoints. There was a Government presidium on the new price liberalization. There were various positions. I got hot under the collar and said that we needed to use the trial and error method. The prime minister reacted immediately: "What the hell do you mean by trial and error when the country is following us. We must calculate everything and weigh the consequences." But Chernomyrdin's manner of communication is such that I have never heard of him raising his voice to anybody, although I will admit that I personally have given him occasion for this. On the contrary, when I start to get mad, Chernomyrdin calms me down.

Therefore, I do not know where these "laboratory chiefs" jumped from. Perhaps it was not Gaydar they had in mind. Yegor was never in charge of a laboratory.

[Bekker] Gaydar's initial idea was to drive out any Gosplan spirit from the Ministry of Economics. In general he wanted to eliminate the ministry as a socialist planning staff. Does it seem to you that now the Ministry of Economics is repeating the functions of the Gosplan to some degree: determining who should be given investments and in which areas? Does it turn out that they got away from it and have also come back to it?

[Urinson] I do not think so. In the first place, Gaydar had respect for the technological aspect of the work of the Gosplan and never concealed this. When developing along with Andrey Nechayev the ideology of the ministry's work, he set the task of preserving the technology and quality of the activity but completely rejecting centralized, directive, targeted planning. He wanted to change over to economic analysis, macroeconomic marketing, prognosis, and the development of regulators that would contribute to achieving various economic objectives. In my view, a good deal that was useful was done in this direction by Minister of Economics Nechayev, although because of objective factors we was certainly not always successful. I remember well how Gaydar's government—all without exception—worked day and night like an emergency team. Therefore, Nechayev did not have such a considerable time reserve that he could radically change the content, principles, and methods of his work. In October 1993 when arriving at the building

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on Okhotnyy Ryad, I was surprised to see that we had lost a high-quality Gosplan organization that would be quite suitable even today. In the second place, elementary production discipline had disappeared. In the third place, we had lost many, in my opinion, outstanding specialists in the branch and bookkeeping departments. They had simply been "bought out" by banks, exchanges, companies, and joint ventures. If we could only attract them back....

Well then in October 1993 Gaydar and I tried to retain the classical Gosplan workers who remained and create all the necessary conditions for their work. At the same time, we had to orient their "brains" in a different direction. Nechayev started to do this and then, under Lobov, this process was frozen. Now Yasin and I are trying to "push this through." That is, to direct the knowledge and experience of specialists from the Ministry of Economics toward finding a niche in the market for the producer. For example, Nikolay Yevgenyevich Smetanin is now actively raising flax in Tver Province. He is extremely knowledgeable about agriculture, trade, and market conditions. Having this voluminous information, Smetanin is helping businessmen of the oblast to find those areas of demand where domestic flax can be sold. And he is prepared to suggest the costs of selling the commodity on the domestic and foreign markets and, consequently, helping to figure out the structure of production. As you can see, this is somewhat different from the old methods of the Gosplan and the departments: Produce such and such an amount of sheets at such and such a price, and I will give you such and such a quantity of machine tools and wages for your work force.

Thus, the Ministry of Economics must enter into relations of the enterprises as a kind of consultation center. It should help the commodity producers to orient themselves in the market situation and determine the maximum outlays with which the enterprise can still survive, where its niche is in the market inside the country or abroad, and what kind of cooperation it can find. The specialist from the ministry must function at the juncture between micro- and macroeconomics: He must know the situation in the regions and understand what is going on with the budget, what the price conditions will be, and what generally awaits the country on the financial front.

[Bekker] Could you please tell us more details about the regional aspect of the ministry's work.

[Urinson] Today, people speak only about the depressed regions. But each region is a world unto itself. There are 89 components of the Federation, and one must understand what is happening in each of them. In this case we must also act as a macroeconomic consulting center. It is necessary to arrange interaction with committees on economics in the localities, where there are intelligent people. They must be given information for consideration: what is awaiting the region, its neighbors, and the country as a whole, if only next year. I am convinced that the most terrible thing is that the new leaders of the

regions have grown tired of discussions about reforms and proclamations like "long live market relations." They have been in favor of reforms for a long time, but they want to know specifically how these reforms will be manifested—at their level, in their terminology, and in their system of coordinates. I always derive a great deal that is useful when speaking with heads of administrations of krays and oblasts, regardless of their political leanings. This helps me to prepare predictions of the country's development and government decrees, for example, regarding Novosibirsk, that same Tver Oblast, or Ivanovo.

Or take Altay Kray. We have been discussing its problems for a long time. This was something new to me. At first it was simply determined that Altay could be the grain producer for the entire region of Siberia, and it could produce high-quality grain. But then it became clear that the kray could and would produce grain, but there were no processing capacities—elevators, mills. So first it was necessary to create an infrastructure. In addition, taking into account the needs of other Siberian oblasts, it was necessary to orient Altay toward particular grain crops and provide a long-term prognosis regarding electric energy and transportation rates; it was necessary to provide a breakdown of financial resources that the state could allot to Altay.

[Bekker] Another year of reforms has passed. What decisions would you gladly rescind, and what mistakes would you try to avoid?

[Urinson] If I had it to do all over again, I would remember how in the summer of 1992 a group of economists headed by Yasin wrote the program for deepening the reforms, which Yevgeniy Fedorovich Saburov venomously called a program for exacerbating the reforms. I was responsible for the section on macroeconomic prognosis, performing all the calculations in the Center for Market Conditions.

[Bekker] That was apparently when the "selective structural policy," "growth points," and five priorities of the economy appeared....

[Urinson] Gaydar came up with the term "selective structural policy." And there were many arguments. Yegor Timurovich put forth the idea of "steam engines," that is, key branches that were supposed to pull the economy. He set the task of finding these "steam engines." Naturally, with all his daily affairs, he did not have time to go into this thoroughly, and I took the initiative from him. Now I can say honestly that I squandered the idea. You mentioned the five priorities. That was my brainchild. At the top of the list, there was the TEK [fuel and energy complex], second was the food problem, the third priority was housing, the fourth—transportation, communications, and information, and the fifth—conversion. We wrote these priorities down in the heat of the moment. Then for each branch we gave a description of how we saw one complex or another—

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metallurgical, machine building—in light of the priorities. In this sense there was good material there. But then, when we came to our senses, when we started to calculate, it turned out that the priorities would take 85 percent of the GDP. What the hell kind of priorities were these? We began to figure it out. In general, everything could be understood: there were no nails, there were no horseshoes, the horse had died, the state was burning. You could choose any priority you wanted to, but, if at that particular moment in that “market” mechanism there were not enough screws, the whole mechanism would grind to a halt. Therefore, today we have submitted a new document to the Government. The ideology of the structural policy in it is different. It consists in the fact that it is necessary to form mechanisms that will reveal the priorities and, thus, contribute to the concentration of resources on them.

[Bekker] Can you already envision these mechanisms? What are they?

[Urinson] I will try to list the mechanisms according to levels: at the federal level, at the level of the components of the Federation, the kray, the enterprises. We think that the entire structural-investment policy should consist of several principles. Planning discipline—definitely. Investments should go for specific projects that have been selected with irreproachable expertise. But not like many assume today: We will discuss the structure of the economy, and then we will redistribute the money among the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the Ministry of Defense, and the Committee on Chemistry. The ministry itself will determine whom to give it to. Project financing and competition of projects, and not competition of ministries—that is my firm position.

The second thing we “crammed” into the president’s edict on stimulating private investments was that each ruble of state investments would be backed up by four rubles of private investments. The state’s priority will be with social projects: If there is money in the budget, it should be invested only in places where the private investor would never go. Mainly—housing for military servicemen, mothballing of nuclear power plants, ecological safety, Kizhi, the Tretyakov Gallery, fundamental science. After that, all types of production infrastructure: airports, main railroads. Everything related to current expenditures must be financed by the Ministry of Railways itself, but the state must pay for the “main lines,” otherwise the rates would get out of control. Let me illustrate my position again: The current policy, say, in the sphere of public health, could be excellently implemented through insurance medicine, but large hospitals for rehabilitation of cancer patients would be financed from the state budget. Naturally, within the limits dictated by the budget, we have earmarked in it for this year R15.9 trillion—that is all, no more no less. But, within the limits of the R15.9 trillion, most of it should go for the aforementioned social projects. And at least R1-1.5 trillion absolutely must go for stimulating private investments. There are production facilities you cannot live

without today. For instance, the power plants in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The state must invest money in the Buryatskaya hydroelectric power plant.

[Bekker] We have heard that song before. Your money will go into “incomplete construction,” as sure as you’re born.

[Urinson] You understand, not a single region nor a single consumer of electric energy is prepared to support this hydroelectric power plant. Until we have monopolized the electric energy market, we will keep falling into the same trap. I understand that targeted infusions are no more effective than any other state capital investments, but for now there is nothing we can do about it. This has been developing over decades, and you cannot solve this problem in a year. Moreover, the funds remaining in the budget will go for production facilities only on a competitive basis. A tender of projects. It could be organized in various ways. For example, by adding state investments to private ones. As I have already said, in a proportion of four to one. And the state rubles would be like a guarantee that the state would contribute to the implementation of the project.

[Bekker] If private business is interested in a project, it can invest in it without your ruble. But, if the project holds no promise, you will not attract the investor with the ruble.

[Urinson] If private business is not interested in it, the state is not interested in it either. There are two ideologies. You know them. You can put in place certain intelligent people from our ministry and the Ministry of Finance who through the “Khachaturov coefficient” or with the help of complicated modern methods can select effective projects. But the selection is done by a bureaucrat. And he will invest money in the project. Oho, it did not work out. Well, so what? The maximum the bureaucrat risks is his job. But the state has lost the money. We now have a different ideology. If this is a profitable project in principle, the ministry must work on a method for evaluating its effectiveness. We are declaring a competition. If the project is accepted for implementation by a company or consortium, it means that it has calculated its advantage. But, if it has been mistaken, it will be responsible with its own authorized capital. If the private businessman has accepted a project, then the state will add a ruble. In the first place, because this ruble will not bother him, the private businessman; and in the second place, because this is better than doing nothing: We will be supporting high technologies! When the Government doles out the last crumbs of budget money for an investment project, it is showing that it believes in it and that the country clearly needs the project.

[Bekker] It seems to me that no entrepreneur would wait until the Government holds a tender for the projects the state needs. Private business is not expecting anything from you; it knows where to invest and it knows which projects it needs. Everything proceeds in turn.

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[Urinson] No problem. We are not saying that we will carry out only those projects that are in the portfolio of the Ministry of Economics. Bring your own, we will look them over with interest. And if it is what we need-good luck. We now have a very difficult situation with the investment program as with the entire budget. Under these conditions, if out of the annual volume of investments of R15.9 trillion we allot even R1 trillion for competitions, that will somehow stimulate effective projects.

[Bekker] And what are the criteria for effectiveness?

[Urinson] Today, in my opinion, a project can be considered effective if the money is recouped in less than 10 years and it produces products at a price that is half as much as for similar imported products.

[Bekker] How are the basic capital investments from the budget distributed?

[Urinson] Actually, there is about R10 trillion left for new investments since about R5.3 trillion is for old debts to builders. And this is for this entire immense country. Today we are fulfilling the program for housing for military servicemen by 30 percent. I have seen how people with children are living in tents on the shore of the Baltic Sea. What do high-speed main lines have to do with this? In general, housing for military servicemen is a sacred cause. No matter how much money you have on the budget line, I think that these projects should be financed. Economically this is normal since housing construction holds behind it a long chain of branches that have no work.

[Bekker] And if Hero of Socialist Labor Peskov from Rostselmash comes up to you and reminds you about the 45,000 down-and-out workers and shows you a permit from one of the deputy prime ministers?

[Urinson] From the budget—not a kopeck. Everything that can be paid for, whether it be a combine plant in Rostov or a brick plant near Moscow, will go only through competition at best. Today the enterprises obviously do not have sufficient capabilities to emerge from the crisis. There is amortization. We have calculated: With a normal situation, we have R112 trillion worth of amortized resources. Further: We have exempted from taxes up to 50 percent of the profit that is used for development. How does every letter to the Ministry of Economics begin? "My enterprise is remarkable, it can produce the most effective commodity in the world. Give me money from the budget for this." Listen, if you are a joint-stock company, issue another batch of shares, collect the money. If Mavrodi has plucked you like from a bush, do you really think that even the best commodity will get you anything?

There are investment resources. It is another matter that a favorable climate is required in order for resources to go into production. And when our inflation is remaining at 15 percent, what kind of nut would decide to invest. If

we really do reduce inflation to 2 percent per month and if bank credit costs 20 percent annually by the end of the year, then the money will go not into exchange speculation but into investment. And the problem of nonpayments will also be solved.

[Bekker] Your scholarly colleagues—Abalkin, Glazyev—say that you are burying the economy, forcing the enterprises to eat up their fixed capital. They insist that capital investments must be made and capital must be updated even at the cost of inflationary infusions.

[Urinson] I do not believe in that. To me that is nonsense. What does it mean—even at the price of emissions? What is that, printing money? There was one meeting of the commission on inflation issues and one scholar got up and said: "We have everything: bricks, construction organizations, workers. Just give us money. Construction will begin to develop and the Ministry of Finance will collect taxes." I do not understand that logic, the more so when a scholar speaks. I answered: "All right, we will issue the bills. But then every brick and every worker will cost more, but your capital investments will not increase—that is obvious." In a word, money issued like this is not investment, it is paper.

[Bekker] Not so long ago you said that investments were on their way: "I feel it in my fingers." Where do you get that kind of sensation?

[Urinson] Do you recall what happened last summer? As soon as we dropped to low levels of inflation, everybody began to look for investment projects. Even our largest banks, which were supposed to be operating on the powerful interbank market, started to move. The ministry began to come to us: Tell us where to invest. In Tula Oblast they built a plant in a half year. A private businessman took the technology for manufacturing insulation materials from basalt and started working at breakneck speed. They started making window frames. Sausage and tomato plants have begun to appear in the country. Money has appeared, just a little, but it has appeared. Pay attention: Light industry and the food industry have become livelier. With a stable inflation rate, not even 1-2 percent but 2-4 percent, all market agents immediately begin to find "their own" projects. And another process occurred. In our GDP the share of the services sector has already exceeded 50 percent. Previously, this sphere had not been developed: The demand was gigantic, but the supply was minimal, and, naturally, the profitability of investments was immense and so the money came here. With a more or less balanced demand on the services market and with inflation curbed, the banks, of course, will look for ways of investing capital in investment projects as is done throughout the entire world.

Portfolio investments have come to us: According to figures of the State Committee on Administration of State Property, during the summer and fall on average each month \$500 million were invested in shares of privatized enterprises. The market quotations of the

shares increased sharply. This was a hopeful sign: With the creation of a favorable investment climate, direct private investments will also come. Everything indicates this. There are already quite a few enterprises that are operating normally, beginning with light industry and ending with machine building and conversion—producing the same petroleum equipment. The enterprises are accumulating money. Gerashchenko has estimated that they have about R20 trillion in free residual capital. The citizens have begun to save one ruble out of five. And savings are the first step toward private investments.

[Bekker] Of this 20 percent savings, the population is investing more than half in foreign currency.

[Urinson] And do you recall how it was last summer—they kept their investments in rubles and it was more advantageous to keep them there. It is not only a matter of conditions that have been created for investments in the country. A person will take his hard-earned money not to Mavrodi but to a bakery in his neighborhood. To someone he trusts.

Mavrodi delivered the pensioners from despair, and not because they like him. When an acquaintance begins to build a little plant, issues securities for his business, and promises to return the money with interest, you are more likely to trust him.

[Bekker] Perhaps you are right, but now everything is starting all over again. For the fourth month, inflation has been in the double digits. Chechnya requires unanticipated expenditures, and this means that we have to start the Goznak [State Mint] running at full capacity.

[Urinson] When Sergey Glazyev writes that it is worthwhile to finance industry and the GDP increases by 10 percent, I basically do not understand this. Even if we stand on our heads, there is no way the GDP will grow by 10 percent in 1995. I recall last year: Beginning in March the money supply increased more rapidly than the rates of inflation. And I told everyone: "Boys, this is not terrible, let it grow a little bit faster, this difference will go for investments." I thought all along that inflation would go down, the infrastructure would begin to develop, the auctions would work, there would be ChIF [Voucher investment funds], and securities. And there was no reason for superfluous emissions of money except for investment. This was a fundamental mistake. In the first place, inflation did not continue to go down for very long, and, in the second place, the ChIF's did not turn out to be mature enough, and, in the third place, there were not enough good projects. This caused us to get burned by international organizations as well. We told them: "Invest in coal," but they told us: "Give us worthwhile projects." But we did not have a system for planned financing. As a result, the money went on the foreign currency exchange and not into investments.

[Bekker] When Shokhin resigned, many considered you for the post of minister of economics. Do you feel as though you were bypassed?

[Urinson] I know that I was one of the candidates for this position. But I would not feel that I had been bypassed even if a person with whom I fundamentally could not work had been appointed to this position. Of course, Shokhin was a great loss, he was an excellent deputy prime minister and minister. He had a unique memory, a broad world view, and an incredible ability to work. Both he and Dubinin are irreplaceable losses. I clearly understand this. But, when Yasin came to be minister I breathed a sigh of relief. This is a person with whom I am completely compatible both ideologically and on the human plane. I have no jealousy. I am glad that another powerful person has appeared in the Ministry of Economics. I have long been familiar with Yasin's style of work. He does nothing to stand in my way. It is thought that Urinson is abrupt, rude, and it is impossible to agree with him. But some people were relieved when Yasin took over: he is mild-mannered, and we can agree with him. We tried, but we did not succeed.

[Bekker] You have already tried?

[Urinson] What do you mean. An attempt was made to reach agreement with Yasin regarding high-speed main lines, the Temple of Christ the Redeemer, and other matters. If I skirted a number of questions, I said: Yes, on the whole I am "in favor," but there is no money. But Yevgeniy Grigoryevich with all of his intelligence states directly: No, I am basically against it. Who usually caves in? The person without convictions, the one who plays the market.

Agrarian Union of Russia Holds Third Congress in Moscow

LD2401201295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1707 GMT 24 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Filatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Participants in the third congress of the Agrarian Union of Russia decided to change it from a social and political organization into a pyramidal confederation of bodies of economic and financial self-government.

According to many speakers who took the floor at the forum, the move was made for the purpose of raising the Union's profile in the conditions of a transfer to a market economy.

They proposed that agricultural collectives, associations, farmers and other manufacturers form agroindustrial co-operatives and unions of manufacturers at a district level.

The latter may include both co-operatives and state-run enterprises and organizations based at a given district. The new unions or associations are to work in close contact with bodies of state power.

The district-level divisions of the union are to organize highly effective management of agricultural production

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at the district's territory; encourage introduction of advanced, highly effective technologies and development of co-operative production; foster organizing enterprises specialized in advanced processing of agricultural produce, trade and production services. They are to combine efforts of the government and economic entities aimed at developing communal services system in rural districts.

Similar unions are to be formed at regional, territorial and republican levels on a voluntary basis, which will be self-governing bodies of economic management.

At the topmost level, the unions and associations are expected to form a body which will work in close cooperation with the Russian ministry of agriculture and provisions.

Aleksandr Nazarchuk, Russian minister of agriculture and provisions, delivered a speech at the congress and praised the above-mentioned reorganization plans.

Vasily Starodubtsev was re-elected chairman of the Council of the Agrarian Union at the congress.

Military & Space Issues

Defense Ministry Denies Knowledge of GRU Defector

LD2601113195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1040 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Jan [ITAR-TASS]—Representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry today denied a report by the British newspaper *SUN* that a high-ranking Russian intelligence agent defected to Britain last weekend.

The London *SUN* reported today that last Friday such a step was taken by "34-year-old GRU Colonel Firzet Djabozov", who possesses important information about key nuclear installations and the nuclear submarine fleet, for which London allegedly offered him a certain amount of money in cash, a pension, and the opportunity to begin a new life under a new name.

"There is no officer listed under this name among the employees of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff," an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told laconically at the information and press department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Romanenko Denies Black Sea Marines Being Sent to Chechnya

LD2501155395 Moscow *Mayak Radio Network in Russian* 1500 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General Romanenko, chief of the Coastal Defense Troops of the Black Sea

Fleet, has denied reports that the fleet's marines may be sent to Chechnya. He said all the personnel of the 810th Marine Brigade are currently at their permanent bases.

Lobov Argues for Thorough Reform of Army

MM2501164795 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian* 25 Jan 95 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by Army General Vladimir Lobov: "Army General Vladimir Lobov: How To Reform the Russian Army"—first three paragraphs are *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA* introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has long been talk of reforming the Army. But there were no extraordinary circumstances to push this problem to the top of the pile of the most pressing problems. The events in Chechnya have reopened the Army's wound. It has become clear that no reform has been carried out in the Armed Forces and that the Defense Ministry leadership has neither borne in mind the new tasks set in the Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine nor taken account of the potential of the new equipment and weapons which have come into service in units and combined units, nor of many other things. The Army structure has remained fossilized virtually since the thirties and has not just restrained but has fettered actions by its personnel.

But does this mean that nobody in the Army has noticed this and tried to rectify the situation.

No. There have been people who have tried to take cardinal measures to improve the Armed Forces. Today we give the floor to one of them, Army General V.N. Lobov.

The historical experience of Russia, which has undergone more than one military reform, persuades us that each one took place at a crucial stage of development and reflected the fundamentally new substance of the state's domestic and foreign policy tasks as well as the actual evolution of the military.

This was the case under Ivan the Terrible and Peter I, following Russia's defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and after the end of the grim war against Japan in 1905. In the Soviet period military reform was carried out in 1924-1928 after the civil war and a wide-ranging reorganization of the Army took place during the Great Patriotic War.

Each reform made it possible to correct previous mistakes, and as a rule achieved its aim. But a new need for changes would arise and, if they were late, the price of procrastination was always the same: the blood of soldiers and the bitterness of defeat. It seems that we have started to experience this bitter taste in recent years....

Even at the end of the eighties it had become abundantly clear that not only the state's political, economic, and legal system but also its military system was in a state of crisis. Unfortunately the concept of reform prepared by

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the military leadership at the time did not envisage cardinal changes and therefore could not renew the Armed Forces decisively and comprehensively. This is the military legacy inherited by the Russian Army. This task must be tackled now and tackled without delay, otherwise the country could suffer great and needless losses.

Military reform is a large-scale and complex phenomenon which cannot be encompassed within the framework of one article. I will therefore broach only certain problems so that readers can get an idea of their essence.

Above all it is a question of the Army's structural organization. Its organization has remained virtually unchanged for over half a century, it is still the same as that which developed during World War II: "battalion-regiment-division-army." Each of these units has its own tasks on the battlefield, its own area of responsibility for the front and depth of its operations, so to speak.

But during all these past years forces have actively been stocking up with new combat equipment and weapons. We used to talk with pride of how the firepower of regiments and divisions had increased severalfold. Let us take the primary military subunit—the squad. Twenty years ago its strength used to be seven soldiers with assault rifles and one armored personnel carrier with a machine gun.

A squad's arsenal now consists of an infantry fighting vehicle IFV], which has a rapid-fire gun, a machine gun, and an antitank rocket launcher, and the various weapons of the three-man IFV crew and the seven-man assault force. The power of a platoon, company, battalion, and regiment, from which divisions and armies are built up, has correspondingly increased.

The old organizational framework has become an impediment preventing us from unlocking the full potential of new equipment and weapons and using the tactical methods of conducting warfare which are appropriate to them. It must be changed.

The "division-army" structure is cumbersome, unwieldy, and hard to control. Its drawback is the mushrooming noncombat unit and administrative apparatus. By switching to a different organizational structure, for example the "brigade-corps," firepower and the potential combat front [front boyevogo primeneniya] can be almost doubled with the same personnel. Units will become more dynamic, maneuverable, and autonomous, which will drastically change the picture and the nature of warfare.

Another aspect of this problem has been caused by a change in the world situation. During the years of bloc confrontation the Army was trained to conduct large-scale, wide-ranging combat operations in conditions involving the use of nuclear weapons. It had a numerical strength and strategy and tactics and was equipped and trained in line with this task.

Times are now different. A world war in the present generation's lifetime is unlikely, and unless the disarmament process is curtailed it will be practically impossible. On the other hand the likelihood of localized conflicts has sharply increased, which is what we are observing in the Persian Gulf, in the Balkans, in Central Asia, and now in the Caucasus.

The things needed to conduct localized wars are completely different strategies, tactics, and ways of organizing forces, plus weapons for them. Everything is far from unequivocal here. The "Desert Storm" operation against Iraq initially gave rise to the opinion that all tasks can be achieved by aviation. But the conflict in Chechnya showed that aviation is not always effective in certain weather and climatic conditions.

Neither is there justification for the reliance on airborne troops as the basis of mobile forces; they have no heavy weapons, which are essential when storming fortified areas. Which formations should be made the basis of the new Army's structure is the primary task, whose solution will determine the state's military strength.

All the foregoing concerns the need for changes which comes, so to speak, from below, from the position on the battlefield of the soldier, subunit, and military unit, from their technical equipment, and from the capabilities of their weapons. But the need for reform has become pressing in exactly the same way "from the top."

The inordinate number of Soviet generals has been the subject of caustic jibes not only in the world but also in our own country. It is not even a matter of our having an abundance of marshals who have never seen combat and armchair commanders who have never even led a regiment in training attacks. The Armed Forces command and control apparatus has become a cumbersome bureaucratic machine which lavishes vast sums on itself but which is not in keeping with troop operation methods in modern warfare.

Let us start right at the top, where the Defense Ministry and General Staff are parallel neighbors. People say: That is how things in our country have developed historically. We have a poor knowledge of our own history, because in fact everything was the other way round.

The prototype General Staff first appeared in Russia in 1812. It comprised only five people, including the war minister. The staff was headed by a grand duke as the czar's most trusted person, who could go to him at any time and report essential information. It has always been like this. During military campaigns the grand duke led the Army as supreme commander in chief through the General Staff and reported to the emperor, who was in overall charge of the war.

In the Soviet period the situation changed. The post of war minister became a nomenklatura post: He was chosen by the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the

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Supreme Soviet; in other words he was a political figure. So as to keep on top of the situation and avoid making make inaccurate reports in the Politburo, the minister started to surrounded himself political figure. So as to keep on top of the situation and avoid making make inaccurate reports in the Politburo, the minister started to surrounded himself with deputies, a secretariat, and other aides, whose actual task was to glean the necessary information from the General Staff.

We recall, incidentally, that when the Great Patriotic War started, the General Staff immediately became directly subordinate to the supreme commander in chief, and the war minister seemed to just disappear.

In our view, this is the structure that should be revived today. It would be expedient to make the General Staff directly subordinate to the supreme commander in chief in the shape of the country's president. There is no doubt that the chief of the General Staff should absolutely be a trusted appointee [doverennoye litso] of the president.

Why the General Staff rather than the Defense Ministry? Because our General Staff is a unique entity—it is entirely in control of the situation not only in the Army and Navy, but in the Internal and Border Troops and all the other armed formations which, in the event of a threat of war, would be transferred to the regular Armed Forces. The General Staff is equally in charge of the situation across the country.

The defense minister, in our opinion, should be a civilian. His main function is to ensure state control over the correct use of the funds allocated from the budget for the purpose of strengthening our defenses. He should represent the Armed Forces' interests in the Federal Assembly and other organs of state power, and take part in political events.

In accordance with this administrative plan it would be expedient to draw up a strict list of official military ranks. In peacetime the Armed Forces should have one Army general who is the chief of the General Staff (in wartime he would be promoted to marshal on merit), his deputies and the commanders in chief of the branches of service would be colonel generals, district commanders would be lieutenant generals, and corps commanders would be major generals. And the ranks would continue down the line, from brigade commander (colonel) to platoon commander (lieutenant).

Having thereby reduced our number of generals and the administrative wing not by 10 percent but many times over, we would free up large amounts of funds, which would make it possible to lay down proper pay scales for the entire officer corps.

The experience of recent decades, when attempts were made to reform the Army, and my personal conviction based on that experience show that a concept for military reform can only be drawn up by an independent organ set up by the president.

What this group—which would be formed from General Staff officials who would no longer be answerable to their immediate superiors and would work in an atmosphere of strict secrecy—would be instructed to do is another matter. It goes without saying that this organ would comprise not random selections but the best-qualified people who had proved their worth and were completely in control of the situation. They would be headed by a man who enjoyed the president's absolute confidence.

Once again I would add the rider that these are just individual fragments—notes on military reform, rather than a concept for it. I would like to convince readers of the same thing that I am convinced of—the organizational development of the young Russian Army means starting with thoroughgoing transformations. And these need to be initiated now—while we enjoy a relatively peaceful situation in the world and Russia's position in the world community is relatively solid.

About the Author

Army Gen. Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov has shared the fate of many military reforms, whose lot can hardly be called a happy one. Lobov has commanded a platoon, battalion, regiment, division, corps, army, and military district. He is a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Academy. That is the tip of his career iceberg. But there is also hidden side—his colossal work on military history and military science, and his agonizing meditation on what has stopped the Army developing in line with the demands of the age.

In the memorable spring of 1985 he was recalled from Almaty, where the headquarters of the district he then headed was located, to the topmost office in the Kremlin. The laconic explanation was: "You have been appointed chief of the General Staff."

He understood—it was time for action. Without any fuss, but persistently and consistently, he started implementing overdue transformations, paving the way for future root-and-branch military reform.

It is not hard to guess the circles where the reformer—who was nicknamed the "generals' foe" behind his back—made enemies. The all-powerful military-industrial complex generals did not like his ideas either.

There was nobody to protect Lobov—his fate was sealed. Soon after, a plausible pretext was found to send him into what was seemingly honorable exile—to head up the Warsaw Pact Staff.

But life is strange. August 1991 happened. A man able to get a firm and responsible grip on the military tiller was needed. Gen. Lobov headed the General Staff once again.

History went on to repeat itself almost exactly. Whereas his first dismissal maintained a semblance of propriety, everything now was petty, futile, and shameful.

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Returning from a foreign trip, he found his job occupied. He was told that he had been dismissed from military service by a presidential edict.

Soon after, Lobov had a chance meeting with the president. Boris Nikolayevich, as usual, grinned broadly and greeted him warmly:

"Vladimir Nikolayevich, why don't you look in more often? Come in, let's talk."

Lobov realized that the president did not know about his dismissal, he had been lied to....

Rumor of Defense Ministry Reform Examined

95UM0212A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 3, 15-22 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, State Duma deputy, Yabloko Faction: "In Search of a 'Switchman'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is strange at first glance that at the height of the bloody crisis in Chechnya, talk has once again started in Moscow about reforming the Ministry of Defense. When the war is going on and spreading, is it time to talk about a separation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, the subordination of the latter directly to the president, and the appointment of a civilian to the position of minister? But in a certain sense, these high-level considerations that are filtering in to the press are quite symptomatic.

To resolve the problem "with a little blood and a powerful strike" proved unsuccessful once again. Instead of a swift and impressive military action—a grave and inglorious war that is already dragging on for the second month. In addition, the outcome of the operation from the standpoint of an officially assigned task—the disarmament of illegal military formations—is insignificant. (According to official operational summaries, in a month of heavy fighting, 340 (!) firearms were confiscated and several dozens of heavy weapons were destroyed.)

In complete contrast to the purposes of the "Chechnya campaign," the political and economic stability of Russia, its statehood, constitutional law and order, federal mutual relations, and prestige in the near and far abroad—all of this has suffered enormous damage under conditions where the hopelessness of the situation has become more and more obvious—and a search is starting for the "switchman," a scapegoat. And, as always, the first thing you can lay your hands on is the Army. And from this comes the usual surge of discussions about "radical reform" of the military department, although the catastrophic situation in the Armed Forces has been known to everyone over the course of the last three years.

It is possible that even less significant considerations stand behind this. To simply dismiss Grachev for the failure of the operation would mean also to directly admit the guilt of the political leadership that sanctioned

the military action and directed all of the "phases" of its execution. But to distance oneself from it under "reform" might seem to some to be a much cleverer move.

Meanwhile, the Army in itself is not only and not so much the protagonist as it is a victim of the Chechnya venture. After August 1991 and October 1993, the third and most disastrous blow was delivered to the Army. It stands to reason, the lack of talent of the high command, the foolish bragging of the minister of defense, and the complete unpreparedness and lack of coordination of the operation, plus the traditional indifference and ruthless treatment of its own soldiers, cost the Army additional sacrifices and deprivations.

However, it is not the Army that is to blame for the carnage that is occurring, but the politicians and their appointees in uniform who charged the Army with the execution of tasks that are alien to it. Given the whole gravity of the situation in the Armed Forces, given all of the failures of military reform in the last three years, the Army is capable of defending the country from aggression from outside and thereby of performing its true purpose.

The politicians unleashed this war, they irresponsibly misled the Army, and they must immediately stop the senseless slaughter—through an agreement on an unconditional cease-fire and through the subsequent resolution of all questions by means of negotiations. The Politicians are obliged to pull the Army and the whole country out of this bloody swamp to which they brought it.

As for reform of the Ministry of Defense, this question was pressing long ago (and it is overdue), but it should not be done at the present moment, not without rhyme or reason, and not in order to save oneself from someone under a plausible pretext, or to put the whole blame on somebody as an afterthought. The reform of the Ministry of Defense, including the institution of a civilian minister and his staff, are necessary for the establishment of democratic political control over the Armed Forces and military policy on the part of the president and parliament. This is necessary for the conduct of a real military reform that would save the Army, and the defense industry, and that would guarantee the Army a worthy place under the new political and economic conditions.

The subordination of the General Staff to the president would disorganize the Armed Forces even more. The president is already the commander in chief according to the Constitution, and in wartime he is called on to direct the troops himself through the General Staff. But in peacetime he should manage through a civilian minister of defense who would answer for general military policy, the elaboration and purchase of weapons and equipment, and questions of manning and social problems. The General Staff conducts operational planning, it draws up specific military needs, it ensures the combat readiness of troops, and it directly manages their activities in peacetime and in wartime.

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But this is not enough. There is a need for an extensive revision of the entire mechanism for making state decisions, correction of the defects in the system of dividing authority in the country, a "demonopolization" of power, and consolidation of the rule-of-law state. Without this, there will be no guarantees against authoritative arbitrariness, with all of its pernicious consequences. And this is a much broader question than the Army and even the Chechnya crisis. This relates to all aspects of Russia's state policy.

Debt to Defense Industries Discussed in Moscow

LD2401191595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1737
GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—According to the Defense Ministry, the state owes defense industries nearly 2.2 trillion rubles for supplies of weaponry and 1.1 trillion rubles for research and development.

Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin said so at a meeting with a group of State Duma members and directors of defense factories in the Far East who discussed the 1995 defense contracts and payment of state debts for the contracts executed in 1994.

Kokoshin said that 1994 debt payment was a major issue in the discussion of the 1995 budget in the second reading.

He told Interfax that the country's national security called for urgent steps to keep the workforce in the Far East and for making conversion credits and investments available to the Far East, notably the Primorye Territory. Kokoshin also said that the Far East needed a system of special easy transport tariffs so as to avoid a break in ties between that part of Russia and its center.

Commission Demands Government Secure Chemical Weapons

LD2401215895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1934
GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—The Russian National Security Council's Interdepartmental Ecological Security Commission demanded Tuesday that the government should step up security in production, storage and destruction of chemical weapons.

A commission decision called for a legal framework for elimination of the consequences of earlier tests and destruction of chemical waste and for making a list of potentially dangerous dumping grounds of earlier years.

Colonel-General Stanislav Petrov said that the stock of chemical waste amounted to nearly 40,000 tonnes in Russia. He argued that most storages of chemical weapons posed no ecological danger but the storages of a certain kind of chemical poison built in the 1950s needed an overhaul.

Petrov emphasized that as little as 26 percent of the funds needed to destroy chemical weapons in 1994 had been made available. The financing planned for this activity in 1995 covered just half of the needs.

Chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission Aleksey Yablokov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Interfax that the annual increases of the incidence of diseases were largely attributable to environmental pollution everywhere, in particular in Moscow. "Once 60 especially dirty spots where large amounts of experimental waste have been buried are dealt with, 50 new ones emerge the next year," he said.

Topol-M Development Does Not Pursue Military Superiority

MM2501094395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 25 Jan 95 p 3

[Gennadiy Khromov "Expert's Opinion": "What Ill-Considered Claims Lead To"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is well known, Russian military policy is based on the tenet of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence rather than a desire to outflank anyone, overtake anyone, achieve military superiority, or ensure a nuclear first-strike capability. On the basis of these doctrinal provisions, our country, on the one hand, by retaining its grouping of strategic nuclear forces, and, on the other, by working out the appropriate international agreements in the arms control sphere, seeks to ensure conditions which would make it possible to deter a potential aggressor. And the United States too, it seems, holds similar views and modes of behavior regarding nuclear deterrence.

This makes it all the more baffling as to why certain organs of the Russian press constantly carry articles which mention, seemingly en passant, the idea that Russia wants to "overtake America" in the sphere of nuclear missile weapons. Articles of this kind can only provoke the other side to take retaliatory measures, which runs counter to the growing partnership between Moscow and Washington.

Quite apart from technical blunders and distortions of the essence of the START Treaty, some quite absurd ideas are encountered. For instance, the idea that, by developing the silo-based Topol-M missile, Russia will allegedly "shut down" Ukraine's missile industry. After all, production of combat strategic missiles there has already been "shut down" in line with international agreements—the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Ukraine joined as a nonnuclear state.

Of course, any new development in the sphere of missile weapons, even if it is an enforced measure (and the development of the Topol-M missile, in particular, was just such an enforced measure inasmuch as the START II Treaty permits only single-warhead missiles and we currently have no single-warhead silo-based missiles), is pursued with consideration for all previous experience,

including foreign experience. Consequently, it is quite natural that missiles better than those previously developed in the seventies and eighties are appearing. But this is a consequence of scientific and technical progress, by no means of a desire to overtake somebody at all costs.

'Mir' Cosmonauts Continue Geophysical Experiments

LD2401162795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0933 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Flight Control Center, 24 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Aleksandr Viktorenko, Yelena Kondakova, and Valeriy Polyakov are continuing their stint in space on board the "Mir" orbital complex.

In accordance with a program of geophysical experiments, photographs of separate sections of the earth's surface are being taken today using the videospectrometric apparatus set up on a stabilized platform of the "Kvant-2" module. The main aims of this work are to research the planet's geological structures and to determine the ecological situation in major industrial centers and areas where oil and gas are being extracted.

During the day the crew will carry out a series of technical experiments to assess the effect of the noise level from the equipment operating in the compartments of the piloted complex.

The cosmonauts underwent thorough medical examinations yesterday. They are all healthy and feel well.

Deep-Sea, Space Survival Experiments Completed

MM2401161195 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by A. Filippov and G. Usanov, identified by caption]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Filippov over video of experiment participants] Two unique pages were added today to the annals of Russian science. First, the "Spasatel-250" ["rescuer"] experiment has ended, and second, the first stage of the ground-rehearsal for a Mars flight has been completed. Taking part in these experiments were research crews from the Russian Ministry of Health Institute of Medical and Biological Problems.

The "Spasatel-250" experiment consisted of an experimental dive in a bathyscaphe to a depth of 250 meters. It lasted 25 days. Beside Mikhail Shishenko, Viktor Lavrov, and Petr Kireyev quails eggs, guppies, and vineyard snails journeyed in the submersible. Scientists were studying the effects of super-high pressures on the ocean bed on this large crew with a view to developing a microclimate for future underwater ocean bases. According to the medics, the crew feel absolutely fine. The same goes for the vineyard snails. But the guppies died. They could not stand the pressure of 25 kg per square centimeter. This also affected the quails eggs. Not a single bird hatched on time.

Now to the second experiment. Vasily Lukyanyuk, Vladimir Karashtin, and Igor Nichiporuk had been rehearsing Mars flight methods in an interplanetary craft mockup since 1 September. On instructions from the European Space Agency they spent almost four months refining methods for ensuring psychological compatibility among interplanetary flight crews. They carried out their task to perfection.

Nuclear & Scientific Issues

Yeltsin Signs Decree on Nuclear Industry in Krasnoyarsk

LD2501202895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1906 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday signed a decree "On State Support of the Restructuring and Conversion of the Nuclear Industry in the town of Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Territory", the president's press service said.

The document aims to stabilize the social and economic situation in Zheleznogorsk and to provide state assistance to the mining and chemical plant of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry.

The restructuring and conversion of the defence-related production at the mining and chemical plant provides, in particular, for going ahead with the construction of facilities to recover spent fuel of nuclear power stations. The plant is also authorized to accept spent fuel from foreign nuclear power stations for its temporary safe keeping and further reprocessing.

Ministry Hopes To Reverse Nuclear Energy Production Slump

MK2401113095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Atomic Energy Ministry Plans To Halt Slump in Atomic Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In 1995, Russian nuclear power engineering is planning to generate 108 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, or 5 percent more than last year. According to information from the Ministry of Atomic Energy, nuclear electric power stations generated 98 billion kilowatt-hours in 1994. The overall production slump in nuclear power engineering in 1994 reached 22 percent. Defense production at nuclear complex enterprises fell by a factor of three and was worth 1 trillion rubles [R]. The amount of civilian products produced was worth R6.6 trillion.

Smolensk Nuclear Power Station Capacity Halved

LD2501185295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1320 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—The capacity of the Smolensk nuclear power station was reduced by half today. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed today at the "Rosenergoatom" concern that this decision was made for economic reasons. The fuel remaining at the station was sufficient for normal work only until the beginning of February. And the station does not have the funds to purchase fuel rods.

At the present time the consumers' fuel debt to nuclear power stations stands at 1.6 trillion rubles. For its part, the stations are owed fuel, equipment, and materials totalling 1.5 trillion rubles. The only way out of this situation is to reduce capacity. As has already happened at Leningrad nuclear power station, it has not been ruled out that in the near future other nuclear stations will also be providing less electricity.

Yeltsin Notes Russia Facing 'Brain Drain'

LD2501162595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1521 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—President Boris Yeltsin congratulated Russian college students on the occasion of St. Tatyana's day which marks the birthday of Moscow University.

Yeltsin's press service said that on January 25 Yeltsin received a group of students and postgrads who had won "presidential stipends," in the Moscow Kremlin.

In Yeltsin's view, presidential stipends "epitomized the state's concern for talented and creative-thinking youth."

Yeltsin dwelt on the intellectual's role in modern society and stressed the need to encourage the formation of an intellectual elite.

According to Yeltsin, Russia "faces the brain drain problem and could come to exhaust its cultural, scientific and technical potential." But, Yeltsin said, "most college students, young experts and scholars prefer to stay to work in their own country and pin their hopes on Russia."

This allows Yeltsin to hope that "Russia will remain a great power and will be sure to find a befitting place in the world community of nations."

Media Issues

New Director on Plans for Russian Public Television

LD2501193395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1738 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—Vladislav Listyev, newly-elected director of Russian Public Television, plans to make it "the most watchable, powerful and competitive".

In the field of news programmes, Listyev expects to offer a strong competition to NTV independent television and Russian channel. "As for entertainment programmes, let other TV companies try to compete with us", said the popular anchorman, who until now headed the VID Independent TV Company.

Listyev, 38, admitted that he felt flattered with the offer to head the newly-created Russian Public Television Company. But he still cannot appraise the scope of difficulties he is to face at this post, he noted.

Listyev began his TV career on Ostankino channel in 1987 as anchorman of the programme "Vzglyad", the most radical programme at the time.

Federal Assembly

Yeltsin Vetoes Demonstrations Bill Passed by Duma

LD2401181195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1736 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (INTERFAX)—President Boris Yeltsin has vetoed the federal bill "On assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, processions, and pickets", passed on December 23, 1994, the presidential press service reported Tuesday.

In a letter to Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the State Duma, Yeltsin notes that "the significant shortcomings of this federal law do not allow one to regard its preparation as complete."

Yeltsin proposed a number of amendments to be taken into account when the bill is re-examined:

"Supplement article nine of the federal law with provisions that make it necessary to regard territories, directly adjacent to the buildings occupied by the federal bodies of state power and the bodies of state power of Russia's autonomies and local authorities as areas where the holding of public events is prohibited."

As the message says, "the holding of public events in places directly adjacent to the mentioned items will not contribute to the proper working conditions of local employees (noise from loudspeakers at a public event, possible public unrest), more than that, as experience shows, it will quite often create a threat to the personality of deputies, judges, and employees."

Yeltsin also suggested replacing the words "any time of the day" in part one of article 10 of the federal law with the words "from seven to 23 hours local time."

"This amendment is prompted by the fact - Yeltsin writes - that when events listed in this article are held at night time, firstly, the basic sign of holding events - publicity, is lost, secondly, it takes reinforcements and interior bodies to ensure public order at night time, and thirdly, the chance of breaching the constitutional right of the citizens not taking part in an event to rest is high."

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Yeltsin also proposes to exclude from the law point six of part two of article 20 on more powers for law enforcement bodies. In his opinion, this clause is clumsily worded "since when there is a ruling from a local governing body or a governor, there is no need for interior body representatives to adopt yet another decision to cancel a public event."

Yeltsin noted that point three of article 32 of the law introduces changes into the Penal Code of the Russian Federation. "However, in keeping with the Penal Code, only the socially dangerous action envisaged by the Penal Code is considered criminal. Consequently, amendments to the Penal Code should be introduced only by a special law, pertaining to the criminal law branch."

For this reason, Yeltsin proposed that amendments be introduced into the penal code once the bill "On assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, processions, and pickets" becomes law.

Duma To Hear FSK Report on Soros Foundation

LD2501153795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1335 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (Interfax)—Alla Gerber (Russia's Choice faction) proposed in the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, that the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) join parliamentary hearings with a report on the Soros Foundation in February. The move was passed with 241 votes in favor and four abstentions.

Gerber demanded that the FSK make it clear "what it meant by accusing the Soros Foundation of spying now that the Foundation has worked for several years to save fundamental research in Russia."

Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin quoted the Soros Foundation as welcoming the decision to consider its activities in parliament.

Kozyrev Tells Duma Relations With West Remain Good

LD2601095895 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0900 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our relations with the Western partners have proved to be enduring, Chechen events notwithstanding, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told the State Duma's international committee.

The minister thinks the main factor is that not a single Western country questions Russia's integrity and that the issue of introducing economic sanctions against Russia over the Chechen affair has now been removed from the agenda, despite public opinion to the contrary.

This means that common sense prevailed in Europe and the United States, Kozyrev stressed. As for international delegations visiting the region, there is no need for any such visits right now, the minister thinks. Assistance will

be needed as and when military operations give way to peace-time construction. In Kozyrev's view, the main issue is to create conditions for democratic elections in the region.

During his meeting with the deputies, Andrey Kozyrev asked for more money to finance the Russian Foreign Ministry this year.

State Duma Adopts 1995 Budget After Further Vote

LD2501134895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1325 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The Russian State Duma revoked the 1995 draft budget on Wednesday and passed it under the second reading.

263 lawmakers voted for the document.

Earlier in the day the Duma lacked eight votes to pass the budget.

More Details on Budget Approval

LD2501145395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1329 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—The State Duma today adopted at the second hearing the draft of the 1995 federal budget, with 263 deputies voting in favor of the document.

The chamber has approved the outline of the federal budget, with expenditure totalling 243.100 trillion rubles, and income totalling 168.900 trillion rubles. The maximum level of deficit has been set at 74.200 trillion rubles, or 30.5 percent of the federal budget expenditure.

This morning the deputies voted twice on this draft, but rejected it both times. After the break Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays addressed members of parliament and said that the Cabinet has agreed to an amendment to the federal budget, lowering the rate of the special tax from 3 to 1.5 percent. According to him, this will increase the budget income by more 5 trillion, which will provide for the financing of the agricultural sector and put considerable additional resources in the social sphere.

After this explanation the deputies went back for another vote on the draft of the budget, and its outline was approved by a majority of deputies.

Deputies Accuse Kovalev of Going 'Beyond' His Powers

LD2501212195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2012 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin announced

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after a long discussion of the performance of Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Sergey Kovalev by the State Duma today that "making a decision of the issue will be put off for Friday on proposals of several parliamentarians."

An Interfax correspondent reports that Sergey Kovalev had said in the State Duma that he would be in Chechnya on that day.

The initiator of the discussion, Yuriy Kuznetsov of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) faction, proposed that the State Duma recommend to Russian President Boris Yeltsin that "he refuse from the service of Kovalev and that the law on the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights be adopted after this." [sentence as received] The State Duma rejected the law in the second reading at the end of 1994.

Several parliamentarians, including Viktor Ilyukhin (the Communist faction), Nikolay Kharitonov (the Agrarian faction) and others, accused Sergey Kovalev of failing to defend human rights in October 1993 "when the authorities were shooting defenders of the Supreme Soviet."

Leader of the LDPR faction Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said that "Kovalev has placed himself beyond law by defending bandits, thieves, rapists and rebels" and proposed that Kovalev resign.

Parliamentarian Vadim Boyko (the unregistered Liberal Democratic Union of December 12 deputy group) said he believed that Sergey Kovalev "has gone beyond his powers and is now acting not as a defender of human rights but as a politician."

Members of the Russia's Choice faction, including Alla Gerber, Nikolay Vorontsov, Yuliy Rybakov and Larisa Mishustina, have spoken in defense of Sergey Kovalev. They said that "due to such a man as Sergey Kovalev many parliamentarians now enjoy the freedom of expression and many other liberties won during the years of fighting against the totalitarian regime of the USSR."

Chechen Crisis Shows 1993 Constitution 'Ineffective'

LD2501130595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1102
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (Interfax)—The Chechen crisis has demonstrated that the acting Russian constitution does not offer acceptable ways out of the current crisis, the vice speaker of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov told Interfax Tuesday. He stressed that actually key rights are concentrated in one branch of power, the executive, which restricts the possibility of finding conciliatory mechanisms to resolve concrete problems.

Earlier he told the coordinating council of the two houses of the Federal Assembly and legislative bodies of federation members that if the Constitution had been agreed

upon instead of being imposed there would have been no need for the Public Accord Pact.

The vice-speaker of the lower house attending the session also spoke critically of the 1993 constitution. "Many articles of the constitution have proved ineffective," Artur Chilingarov said.

Meanwhile, the deputy chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Mityukov told the session that the constitution has guaranteed relative stability and thanks to it the country lived without an acute political crisis for a year.

Regional Affairs

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Military Operation 'Effectively Over'

LD2501134995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1327
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 ITAR-TASS—The military operation in Chechnya is "effectively over", but the interior troops which will take over in the rebel republic are to "closely interact" with the Army, the press service of the Russian president said on Wednesday commenting on a meeting of the Russian Security Council.

"The military stage of disarming illegal armed units has been effectively over. Further activities to disarm the illegal armed formations were entrusted to the Russian Interior Ministry which will closely interact with formations of the Armed Forces," the press service said.

"A new stage of the restoration of constitutional lawfulness, order and peace in the Chechen Republic has begun. Its aim is to ensure the restoration of social, economic, political and legal revival of the republic, the creation of conditions for holding free and democratic elections there," the press service said.

Government Issues Statement on Conflict

LD2501164995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1624
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The Press Service of the Russian Government issued the following statement on Chechnya on Wednesday:

"According to reports from commanders of the Federal Armed Forces, over the past 24 hours, the federal troops continued to rebuff attacks of small groups of illegal armed formations in Chechnya, retain districts of Grozny under control, blockade streets and clean up the city and adjacent settlements. Aviation conducted aerial reconnaissance, transported troops and cargoes and evacuated the wounded. In some places militants were reported to have mined fords across the River Sunzha.

"Interior Ministry troops carried out special operations in Grozny and near the villages of Nikolayevskaya,

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Ishcherskaya, Assinovskaya and Novyy Sharoy. Units of the Defence Ministry, the Interior Ministry troops and Russian law enforcement bodies continued preparations for establishing commandant's districts within the boundaries of the Leninskiy, Oktyabrskiy, Zavodskoy and Staropromyslovyy administrative districts of the city. Work is underway to set up a garrison prosecutor's office.

"The Federal Border Service and the troops of the special Caucasian border district carried out measures aimed at strengthening the border with Ingushetia and Dagestan, and conducted aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Vladikavkaz, Makhachkala and Sochi."

Dudayev Denies Russians Control Grozny

BR2501133995 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 25 Jan 95 p 1

[Telephone interview with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by Ole Stig Andersen in Grozny on 24 January: "Dudayev: The Russians Are Not in Control of Grozny"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday afternoon [24 January] INFORMATION succeeded in obtaining an interview by satellite telephone with Chechen President Dudayev.

[Andersen] Are you yourself in Grozny at present?

[Dudayev] Of course. I am managing the situation. The government is working on uninterrupted. We are preparing ourselves for a long and obstinate fight, a long and obstinate fight. Russia must become a rule-of-law state, with full democracy and justice, or it must be completely destroyed. There is no middle way.

The Russian Government is not in control of the situation today and this applies not only to the aggression against Chechnya, but to the whole country. Yeltsin's repeated declarations that the bombardment will cease mean nothing. Every time there has been a declaration things have simply become worse.

[Andersen] Have the Russians used chemical weapons?

[Dudayev] Fragmentation bombs, incendiary bombs, vacuum bombs, missiles and all manner of other artillery are being used—they have used all the weapons in Russia's arsenal, and on 18 January when our government delegation was engaged in negotiations with Chernomyrdin for an end to the bombardment, on this very day there were air battles. It is a case of a targeted bombardment on a scale the world has not seen before.

The peaceful civilian population is being murdered. They attack bazaars and markets, hospitals, homes, boarding schools, convalescent homes. They have left nothing.

Thousands and thousands of corpses of Russian soldiers and officers clutter the roads and streets. They do not

gather them together. And the Chechens are trying as best they can to bury them. But it is very difficult because of the artillery bombardment.

They do not allow the humanitarian aid that is being sent here to pass. They share it out among themselves. The worst thing of all is that today there is no one in control of the situation in Russia.

I proclaim the world the responsible party. It is a tragedy for the world that the war party, an undisguised group of criminals, have seized power in Russia.

We are directing our recriminations against Clinton and Kohl. And the other members of the Security Council. Without their approval this would not be happening.

[Andersen] How many do you think the Russians have involved in this action?

[Dudayev] Here in Chechnya are concentrated around 250,000 of the Russian Armed Forces, of all types. But under international rules there must already be international checks on military actions involving more than 10,000 men.

[Andersen] What is the most important thing the West can do?

[Dudayev] In the present situation: that the West recognize the Chechen republic. So that it can be covered by international law. So that Russia with its threats does not succeed in frightening everybody into believing that it is simply its internal affair.

[Andersen] What will be the consequences of these events?

[Dudayev] If there are no forces which will assume the responsibility for Russia starting to follow a legal path and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, then I declare to the world that this war will last for at least half a century. It will spread like a fire. Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Georgia, and so on are already taking part. And the war will gradually spread north.

The international community can and must question Russia's position as a permanent member of the Security Council, because it is a threat to world peace.

People should block investments, credits, technology, financing, and every kopek which goes to Russia. And the next thing the international community should do is to draft a document on the decolonization of the peoples which today find themselves as colonies inside the Russian empire.

If it does not do this Russia will destroy its ethnic groups, such as Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Abkhazia, Moldova, Transdnestr, and the Crimean peninsula. And the Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia. And

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then on to Europe, to Poland, as is customary, and so on. With everything that is hidden in Russia's arsenals and ideology.

Finally I would like to say that those people who today are defending are first and foremost defending themselves. I wish you success in this.

Dudayev Set To Meet Cossack Leader

LD2501190895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1718 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Grozny, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—An Interfax correspondent has reported that federal troops did not undertake any offensive operations in Grozny Wednesday. According to the Chechen command, pro-Dudayev militants repelled Russian units equipped with armored vehicles near the village Chernorechye, located about five kilometers from the center of the city this morning. The Russian units suffered slight casualties and retreated.

Fierce fighting has continued in Grozny for every block. The road leading to the Minutka square is heavily shelled with artillery systems. If it was risky, but possible, to get from Chernorechye to the bus station yesterday, then today it is absolutely impossible as the square and bus station are constantly shelled with Grad rocket launchers.

Snipers continued to shoot in the very center of Grozny, along the engagement line—the river Sunzha. According to pro-Dudayev militants, most victims on both sides were from snipers' bullets. Russian troops do not undertake attempts to cross the river, the Interfax correspondent said.

In the meantime, the First Deputy Ataman (Cossack head - IF note) of the Great Donskoye Cossack Troop, Petr Kosov, told the Interfax correspondent that he had tentatively agreed to meet Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev Thursday [26 January]. According to Kosov, their meeting will focus on the future of prisoners of war from the military unit No. 11879 stationed in the Aksayskiy district of the Rostov-on-the-Don region. The unit was stationed within the Cherkassk Cossack district, and there were Cossacks among the prisoners. Kosov failed to name the venue and time of the meeting. He also did not consider it appropriate to let the Interfax correspondent see a list of prisoners.

Stepashin Outlines Intelligence Tasks

LD2501181895 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Sergey Stepashin, the head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, reported at a short news conference that took place in the Lyubanka today that his department's main tasks in resolving the Chechen crisis remained the same as before: Gathering information and fighting terrorism. Stepashin

said that these functions of the Counterintelligence Service were approved at today's Security Council session. Stepashin also reported that a head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service in Chechnya was appointed by presidential decree, with effect from today. This directorate is already operating and it has a staff of 62.

[Begin Stepashin recording] We are planning to develop a very large directorate of around 700-800 people so that there is a small district department in each large district. And a district department that is able to deal not just with operational, agent work, but can act directly in confiscating weapons, detaining bandits, and so on. There will be several companies operating under commandants, armored vehicles and so on, like those that operated—we do not talk about Chekists nowadays, but I will allow myself to use the word—to disarm bandit formations in the western Ukraine and the Baltics. I am not about to continue these historical analogues, believe me. I am just talking about operational tactics. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The Federal Counterintelligence Service is, according to Stepashin, also taking on a number of unusual functions with regard to work with the local population. The counterintelligence head began to carry out such work during his most recent trip to the conflict zone.

[Begin Stepashin recording] I can say frankly that the local people, the Chechens and the Russians, the people who live in the Chechen Republic, are coming to us. They are coming to us, are telling us a lot, show us a lot, are asking for help, support and so on. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Sergey Stepashin stated firmly that a state of emergency would not be introduced in Chechnya since there was no need for this.

Justice Minister on Legality of Conflict

MM2501123195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 95 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Russian Federation Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev by Aleksandr Aleshkin; place and date not given: "Valentin Kovalev: Actions of Organs of Power Have Legal and Moral Basis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Aleshkin] In connection with the events in Chechnya, certain political figures, including some from the president's recent closest entourage, are denying that he has the juridical right to use the Armed Forces to restore constitutional order in his country. What is the Russian Federation minister of justice's view of this problem?

[Kovalev] The legal aspect of using the Armed Forces in the Chechen conflict generates no doubt. According to the present Basic Law, the president is the guarantor of the unity, territorial integrity, and stability of the state. The present Law on Security makes it incumbent on the

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president to coordinate the activity of the law-enforcement organs and the Armed Forces in ensuring the country's security. Finally, the military doctrine, which envisages the participation of the Armed Forces in the elimination of internal sources of military threats, was ratified by a decree of the president dated 2 November 1993.

What are these threats? They are listed in the doctrine. I will name some of them. Illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, and other organizations aimed at destabilizing the country and violating its territorial integrity and carried out with the use of armed coercion. The creation of illegal armed formations. The growth in organized crime and smuggling activity on a scale threatening the security of citizens and society. The illegal proliferation on the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment for the purposes of sabotage and smuggling operations involving drugs.

All this and a great deal else takes place in the Chechen Republic. Therefore there are no legally based doubts as to the use of the Armed Forces to resolve the Chechen conundrum, and there can be no such doubts. The actions of the president and the federal organs of power in establishing constitutional order in one of the components of the Federation have the necessary legal foundations.

I would like to specially emphasize that there is no state conflict between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, since the Chechen Republic is a component of the Russian Federation. Still less can we talk of an interethnic conflict. Its nature is different: This is a case of illegal armed formations confronting the federal organs of state power. Illegal armed formations must be disarmed irrespective of their nationality and location—whether they are in Chechnya, the Volga region, the Urals, or in Siberia.

But aside from the legal aspect, there is after all also the purely human side to this problem. A small group of political adventurers has overthrown the legitimate authorities by armed force, completely destroyed the economy, plunged the majority of the population into poverty, and deprived of their rights hundreds of thousands of Russians living in the republic. And they have been groaning under the tyranny of the criminal Dudayev regime. How could this call for help have been ignored? The highest, inalienable right and duty of a human being is not to leave someone else in trouble.

[Aleshkin] By the way, about human rights. The opposition has blatantly monopolized concern about their observance. It does not tire of shouting about the violation of human rights. What is more, in its interpretation, it is the federal authorities and the Russian Armed Forces who are guilty of all mortal sins, whereas Dudayev's men are innocent victims. In accordance with the president's edict, you head the Interim Oversight

Commission for the Observance of Citizens' Constitutional Rights and Freedoms and you have the full information at your disposal. What can you say about this subject?

[Kovalev] Yes, as chairman of the commission I traveled to the Chechen Republic together with acting Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko and other senior officials, and I familiarized myself with the situation on the spot. I declare that certain political forces are deliberately and specifically discrediting the actions of the Russian president, the federal authorities, and the Armed Forces, and actually justifying the actions of the armed bandit formations, bestowing on them the aspect of noble fighters against the imperial evil. In the current harsh reality this type of assessment is of a destructive nature.

A large number of cases testifying to the exact opposite is in the sights of our commission: the bestiality of the illegal armed formations toward not only Russian servicemen, but also the civilian population.

Robbery, looting, and killings have become the normal way of life for the gunmen. Note, by the way, that this is the case not only now, during the combat actions, but during the whole time they have been in power. A great deal has been said about this. But Dudayev's men are behaving with particular cruelty and sadism now.

The civilian population is being used as a "living shield" during combat operations. There have been reports of attacks on medical personnel. Doctors and nurses are being beaten up. One of them had her spine broken. Hostages taken among Russian servicemen are being subjected to torment, torture, and outrage.

We have submitted numerous cases of the violation of human rights by Dudayev's men for investigation by the General Prosecutor's Office.

At the same time, our commission knows of cases of another sort. I have visited Russian Army units and subunits. I can assure you that the morale of our troops is high, and the best qualities of the Russian officers and men have been displayed during the combat actions. First and foremost this means readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of performing one's constitutional duty. There have been many cases where they have perished while leading local inhabitants away from the shelling. The soldiers share their bread with them.

To the credit of our officers and men it must be said that high morale is being maintained in the Army—despite the hostile, if not totally insulting, statements being made about it. I believe that those who are currently trying to discredit the Russian Army are bringing serious responsibility upon themselves. It is the duty of all patriotically minded Russians to give moral support to their Army, which is performing its constitutional duty and protecting the integrity of the Russian state.

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[Aleshkin] Valentin Alekseyevich, a new phase, the most important phase, in the Chechen conflict is approaching—the constructive phase. What place will your commission, and the Ministry of Justice too, occupy in it?

[Kovalev] Yes, the military phase is largely over. The Armed Forces are preparing to depart for their permanent stationing locations. The internal troops and the law-enforcement organs are assuming the functions of maintaining law and order. So far, constitutional legality and local organs of power have been reestablished in five rayons. A government of national revival headed by Salambek Khadzhiyev has been formed and has started functioning.

What is the commission's role in this phase? It has been determined by an edict of the president dated 28 December of last year. It says that the commission will operate until the process of reestablishing constitutional legality in the Chechen Republic is completed.

This means that both the commission and the Ministry of Justice as a whole will do all they can within their sphere of competence to ensure that the constitutional rights and freedoms of the republic's citizens are fully ensured.

First and foremost, of course, this means restoring the destroyed economy, recreating living conditions suitable for human beings, and involving all the citizens in the republic's rebirth within the Russian Federation.

I believe that in the process of reestablishing constitutional legality we must rely on the organs of power which Dudayev dispersed by armed force. At the same time, there can be no question of any placemen from Moscow. The organs of power must be formed on the basis of the choice of the citizens of Chechnya, and they must enjoy authority and support among the population. The opinion of councils of elders and the stance of the clans and society as a whole will undoubtedly be taken into consideration when positions in the organs of executive power are being filled.

[Aleshkin] One of the binding conditions for the transition to peacetime is the disarming of the bandit formations and confiscation of the weapons the population has accumulated. How is this process going?

[Kovalev] This is a most complex task, but it too must be resolved. There have been instances of weapons being handed in voluntarily. In accordance with a decision adopted, weapons are being bought up from the population. A State Duma decree on amnesty for people who voluntarily hand in weapons is in force. The provision in the law on weapons concerning respect for national customs and permission to carry weapons which are an attribute of the national costume is being observed.

[Aleshkin] Is there confirmation of instances of the participation of mercenaries on the side of Dudayev's formations?

[Kovalev] Yes, there is. But not on the scale the press is talking about. Specifically, a group of Jordanian citizens in possession of firearms and a large quantity of ammunition has been detained. Mercenaries are banned by the norms of international law. These individuals will be punished in accordance with Russian Federation law.

Chechens Seen Preparing for Partisan War

LD2501171895 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to reports from the Russian Defense Ministry, the leadership of Chechnya is trying to reinforce the personnel of the illegal armed formations. Moreover, in Chechnya's mountainous regions fighters are disguising themselves as refugees and moving to the adjacent republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia.

In Grozny itself and outside it, there are groups operating that are not subordinate to Dudayev. They are not only engaged in looting and theft, but also fighting among themselves for spheres of influence.

The Russian Government press service reports that the illegal armed formations are intensively preparing for a long partisan war. They are equipping new bases in remote areas and setting up munitions and foodstuffs stores in various places. The local population, fearing provocations from the fighters, are placing guards at the most important installations.

General Denies Black Sea Marines Involved

LD2501194595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1718 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—Major General Vladimir Romanenko told INTERFAX that the KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI newspaper report of Black Sea marines being sent to Chechnya was untrue. He said none of the officers or men of the 810th Marine Brigade left the area where they are usually stationed.

He said that the marines cannot be sent to Chechnya unless the presidents of Ukraine and Russia decide so. If the presidents do, the marines will go there.

Romanenko said that the newspaper report harmed the Russian-Ukrainian relations by spreading political psychosis and mistrust.

He added that the marines are now exercising in Sevastopol's Kamyshevaya and Kazachya Bays.

Army Commander Describes 'Unique' Problems

AU2501131595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Jan 95 p 14

[Report by Moscow correspondent Felix Alekseyev: "'Goofing' Was Needed in This War; The Military Commander of the Chechnya Operation Has Stepped Out of the Shadow"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The odd and absurd troop movements were actually maneuvers to deceive the enemy. The Chechen president had excellent intelligence and outstanding communications equipment and, to disorient him on the eve of the attack on Grozny, a stage was necessary that General Aleksandr Kvashnin calls "goofing." "The troops started walking around residential areas and proceeding in a manner that was incomprehensible to the enemy," the general says.

During the last few months, media attention centered on the "Chechen prosecutor," Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Yegorov, and the "triumvirate of power"—Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin, and Federal Counterintelligence Service Director Sergey Stepashin, whom President Yeltsin had entrusted with supervising the operation aimed at "disarming unlawful groups, renewing constitutional civil rights, and liquidating General Dudayev's separatist regime in the Chechen Republic." The direct commander of the operation, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Kvashnin, 48, a tanker, has remained in the shadow thus far. Kvashnin was assigned responsibility for the federal troops after Moscow realized that Commander of the North Caucasian Military District General Mityukhin, who had previously served 17 years in Germany, would not be up to the task.

As soon as Kvashnin arrived at the front, on board the defense minister's aircraft, he recalled several divisional commanders, including Afghan war veterans, who had not succeeded in breaking the resistance of Dudayev's fighters. The troops advancing in the direction of Grozny had found themselves in a situation that even the strategists in the Defense Ministry's offices could not have foreseen. For example, they completely ignored the aspect of psychological warfare.

The Chechens succeeded in completely demoralizing the 19th Division from Vladikavkaz. Dudayev's radio stations were working on the officers' minds by addressing them by name, telling them where their wives and children were, and what would happen to them in the event of an attack on Grozny. General Petruk, the divisional commander, was unable to take even the 1,500 meters that separated him from the railroad station that he was supposed to conquer.

Kvashnin describes the problems of this war as unique. On the one hand, it is a civil war, which is immensely unpopular. On the other hand, Russian soldiers had to come to terms with the fact that they were facing their own former colleagues with, moreover, the same equipment. The Chechens had been preparing for war for three years. They had Grad rocket systems, artillery, a perfect communications system, and good troop organization. Purely military difficulties also appeared from time to time. Conquering a city with a population of 400,000 with a 50,000-strong army, of which not more than 6,000 men can be in the front line, is a very difficult task in itself. And sparing the city in the process, as was

originally demanded, is totally impossible, all the more so as there are petrochemical plants in the city with thousands of storage tanks containing explosive substances. The general considers the fact that Dudayev's followers managed to set on fire only two tanks as a success for the troops that he commands. The threat of explosions and fires comparable to the erstwhile catastrophe in the Kuwaiti oil fields has been averted meanwhile, according to the general. Everything is under the [Russian] army's control.

"It was a tragedy. But 18-year-old children proved to be heroes," says General Kvashnin. And what price had to be paid for it? According to the general's data, as of 20 January, the Russian Army's casualties were 523 dead and 250 missing (taken prisoner or missing in action).

Asked what would happen next, the general replies that the army has already accomplished the main and most difficult task—assuming control over the city. In his opinion, his troops will "smoke out" Dudayev's followers from the suburbs of Grozny within two weeks and will probably conquer the southern guerrilla bases, which are not of such significance from the military point of view, within two months. But it can be deduced from General Kvashnin's words that the army would now like to wash its hands. The time is now coming in Chechnya to pass the baton to the Interior Ministry's police units.

'No Problems' With Troops' Rear Supply

LD2501140695 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1358 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—"We have no problems with the rear supply of the troops, which are now on a mission in Chechnya, and we are ready for possible combat operations in highland areas," Colonel General Vladimir Churanov, recently appointed Russian deputy defense minister in charge of rear supply, stated at a press conference today.

He said that material reserves intended for five to six days of isolated combat operations, as well as reserves for longer fighting, had been created beforehand. According to Churanov, thousands of tonnes of food and other cargoes are brought to the region every day.

At present the calorific value of a daily ration of servicemen in Chechnya is 5,000 kilocalories. For every soldier a daily allowance includes 300 grammes of meat, 50 grammes of butter, 100 grammes of sugar, cookies, cheese and six eggs. Every soldier constantly has with him four or five dry food packs.

There are 110 cooking centres in the region, where hot food is cooked. Churanov refuted reports of some mass media organs that soldiers are allegedly not being given enough food and are having problems with clothes and equipment.

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He maintains that soldiers have, as they should, an opportunity to have a bath once a week. There are 17 bath centres in the area of combat operations. There is even a bath and laundry train, where some 1,500 people can have a bath within ten hours. Some 2,000 sets of clothes are washed there every day.

Opposition Leader Moscow's 'Creature'

MK2501124095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 5 22-29 Jan 95 (Signed to press 24 Jan) p 4

[Report by Dmitriy Balburov under the "Bottom Line" rubric: "Opposition's New 'Star'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week it was Ibragim Suleymenov who suddenly came to the attention of Russian television channels.

He was introduced to journalists as a major general of the Russian Army, member of the disbanded Chechen parliament, and a prominent opposition figure, who was arrested by Dzhokhar Dudayev's guards 9 February of last year on charges of conspiring to stage a coup d'etat.

Ibragim Suleymenov's figure raised great doubts from the outset. He preferred not to expound on the circumstances of his liberation, citing the will of God. Before his appearance in Moscow, his name was mentioned in the press only five times, twice of these in connection with military operations in Abkhazia (at the time, Colonel Ibragim Suleymenov, chairman of the Chechen parliament's defense and security committee, headed an initiative group for conflict settlement) and only three times directly in connection with the Chechen crisis. On 16 December 1993 Ibragim Suleymenov was introduced as "a leader of rebellious field commanders" who blocked the presidential palace in Grozny. Then Suleymenov disappeared from the Russian mass media's focus of attention for a long time.

Lots of people called themselves leaders of the Chechen opposition: Umar Avturkhanov, Salambek Khadzhiyev, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Beslan Gantemirov, Ruslan Labazanov, and even Moscow's notorious criminal authority, Khoza Suleymenov, who often made trips to Chechnya to visit his crony and accomplice, Labazanov. The wide audience of readers, however, knew nothing about Ibragim Suleymenov, who is, by the way, Khoza's distant relative.

A prominent member of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow remarked ironically that "someone at the Federal Counterintelligence Service will get a promotion for Ibragim." Suleymenov's metamorphoses are noteworthy. He arrived in Grozny shortly before the "Chechen revolution" with the rank of Soviet Army lieutenant colonel in the capacity of a deputy commander for political affairs. Following Dzhokhar Dudayev's "ascent to the throne," Suleymenov became a

colonel and entered the newly elected parliament. Before it was disbanded, the parliament had time to promote Suleymenov to general.

Some Chechens in Moscow are certain: It was not by chance that Suleymenov emerged in Dudayev's inner circle. One of them even said bluntly that the colonel was a creature of the Russian special services, which at the time competed with the USSR's KGB. Subsequently Dudayev slipped out of control, however, while Suleymenov joined the opposition. With the help of Suleymenov, Moscow could control Ruslan Labazanov's group, which was then bracing for a guerrilla war with Dudayev. The town of Argun, Labazanov's family nest, was to become its stronghold.

These are all suggestions, however. A much more substantial fact is that the emergence of Ibragim Suleymenov, who is expounding at news conferences in Moscow on crimes committed by the Grozny regime (which are beyond doubt), was quite propitious for justifying a destructive military action in Chechnya.

Opposition Leader on War on 'Criminals'

LD2601124095 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Government press service reports that Dudayev's fighters are looking for new sources to obtain money. To this end, the press service says, Chechen agents are being sent to Russian towns to establish contacts and to sell drugs available in Chechnya. Chechen radio conversations confirm this. In return for drugs, Chechnya hopes to obtain money to pay mercenaries and buy weapons and ammunition.

[Begin recording] [Salambek Khadzhiyev, chairman of the Chechen Government of National Rebirth, identified by caption] This whole war is going on between, I would say, the Russian Army and criminal Russia. Whether you like it or not, this fact remains: a basic part of criminal Russia is giving powerful support to Dudayev via all possible and impossible channels and a war is going on against the Russian Army. Of course, no people wants such misfortune, but it hurts me as a Chechen that this is being done by our hands. Our hands are attempting to blow up the state, to conquer the state so that criminal structures gain the upper hand.

This is the beginning of the struggle against the criminal circles, everyone will see this area of lawlessness. A trial of strength is going on today on the whole, how strong are they, how capable are they of putting up opposition to the authorities. But we know one thing, that so long as there is an authority it must act and protect the people. Of course the criminal sector is now trying to dismiss this authority, to blow it up from its foundations and take power with its own hands. [end recording]

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Stance of Republics, Regions Analyzed

954F1014A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in
Russian 20 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Petrov under the "The Chechen Confrontation and Around It" heading: "The Regions Are Not Silent: The Closer to the Central Power Structures, the More Approval"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Yeltsin once again has managed to achieve a seemingly impossible thing: to create real accord in society, a touching unity of the most diverse, frequently polar socio-political forces. This unity has occurred in connection with the events in Chechnya, which have caused an almost universally negative reaction—passive or active.

One can have a different opinion of the results of numerous public opinion polls showing outright rejection (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo), very authoritative international organizations and member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will not pass over this decision of lawmakers of the Estonian Republic, negative (Krasnodar), 50-50 (Kostroma), or even rather positive (Rostov-na-Donu, Stavropol) reaction of the population to the actions of authorities in Chechnya; one cannot, however, fail to notice that the overwhelming majority of political parties and movements in the regions took either an actively negative or a restrained wait-and-see position with respect to the actions of the president and the government. One can count the exceptions on one's fingers: the public council under the president's representative in Tula Oblast (where, by the way, the administration and the Duma joined ranks), the RKHDD [Russian Christian Democratic Movement] in Perm Oblast, the KP RF [Communist party of the Russian Federation] in the Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast, the DDR [Democratic Reform Movement] and the Republican Party in Amur Oblast, the DVR [Democratic Russia's Choice] in Bryansk Oblast, and Cossack organizations in Kuban and some other regions.

The noteworthy fact is that the positions of the regional branches of national parties, which in essence frequently are simply local parties, quite often diverge from those of the party leadership on the federal level. In addition to already mentioned DVR and KP RF, one may point out as an example the Perm branch of PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], which advocated jointly with the DDR peaceful settlement of the conflict.

In the voice of the anti-presidential chorus, incommensurable in its strength with the "renegades," the tone is set by two otherwise polar forces: communists (KP RF, RKRP [Russian Communist Workers Party], VKPB [All-Russia Communist Party of Bolsheviks], and agrarians) and "national-patriots" (RNS [Russian National Union], RNE [Russian National Unity], the Russian Party, the Officers Union, Cossack organizations outside the Kuban, Workers' Smolensk, Kirov, and so on), on

the one hand, and the "democrats" [the DVR, DP [Democratic Party], DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], PES [Economic Freedom Party], Memorial and other human rights and Greens-environmental organizations], on the other. Absolutely everywhere the most active opposition to the policy of force in Chechnya comes from soldiers' mothers committees and other women's organizations.

One may treat the position of party leaders—whether out of insight or cynicism—as "earning political capital on the Chechen events," but one thing is inarguable: Even if all of them act out of purely opportunistic considerations, even in that they serve as a barometer of the public mood.

One cannot say that these moods manifest themselves actively everywhere (for instance, there are very few rallies going on in regions, and as a rule they are organized jointly, collectively, by numerous political forces from among those enumerated above and attract tens to hundreds of participants). What is noticeable, however, is that where they do take place, they are always negative with respect to military operations in Chechnya.

The heat of the wave of indignation over the government's reckless military gamble is not yet too high, especially in the regions more distant from Chechnya, but one can expect it to increase, since everyone, even the relatively indifferent, are concerned with the problem of participation of "home" military units in the conflict, "home" killed and wounded. In many regions, the military and state authorities take pains to explain that units from their regions do not participate in the punitive operation against Chechnya. Volunteers are a different matter. (In Bashkortostan, for instance, where pro-Chechen attitudes are very strong.) In Ufa, emotions were flying high, while at the same time a few tens of kilometers away from it, at the RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Defense field engineer brigade's base, a detachment of 100 volunteers was formed to go to Chechnya.

Participation of local military units from a particular region acquires special significance if the ethnic factor is superimposed on the regional one. For instance, the All-Ossetia People's Council Styr Nakhas protested against "official Nazran's slanderous statements" that Ossetians are fighting on the Russian side in Chechnya, and demanded of the North Ossetia authorities to recall such if they do indeed exist.

A characteristic incident happened involving an officer from Cheboksary, who died at the time of the failed storming of Grozny by the "opposition" on 26 November. President of Chuvashia Nikolay Fedorov and a local state Duma deputy sent cables of condolences to the family, also expressing their nonacceptance of the Russian leadership's position in the Chechen question. "In the event of collision between the principle of territorial integrity and potential death on a massive scale," says Nikolay Fedorov, "we have to sacrifice

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territorial integrity." An analogous incident took place in Khakassia, where after the first casualty was brought back from Chechnya, the public began putting pressure on the republic leadership, demanding the denunciation of use of force in Chechnya.

Especially noteworthy is the position of ethnic republics that are part of the Russian Federation. It is unequivocally negative with respect to the actions of Russian troops and is especially strong among Caucasus and "other Muslim republics"—Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan. Actually, a sharply negative position was also taken by Karelia, which attests to the importance of the status factor rather than simply ethno-confessional kinship. Lately Yakutia and Tuva joined the list of the republics that have already called for withdrawal of troops and political settlement of the conflict. Deputy Prime Minister of Buryatia and Federation Council deputy L. Nimayeva accused the Russian Federation president and government, which began military operations without the Federation Council's concurrence, of violating the Constitution. Kazan continues active attempts to take part in the settlement of the conflict. The meeting of heads of the Volga region republics and Karelia in Cheboksary [5 January] took the same position. Inter-parliamentary negotiations are expected to begin in Makhachkala any moment. Vladikavkaz also insists on the need to continue negotiations.

The events in Chechnya echoed not only in the republic capitals, but also in the regional centers. Here are just some headlines from the local press: "Today Bloodshed in Chechnya, Tomorrow in Bryansk," "It Does Not Take Much Brains To Use Force" (Lipetsk), "The March on Chechnya Is the Last March" (Ulyanovsk). Overall, however, the oblast press is much more restrained with respect to events in Chechnya than the central and republic press, because it is to a considerable extent under the control of local administrations. In a number of regions, the press has been silent altogether, which, of course, is a cause for concern. Central television, radio, and newspapers, however (the mass media were listed by the population in precisely this order as sources of information in the public opinion poll in Kostroma) despite all the efforts of the authorities, fortunately, make up for the forced passivity of the locals.

The Chechen crisis, like an X-ray, "examines" the elite—both central and local—on the subject of the presence or absence of elementary human honesty and integrity. It has reaffirmed the worst part of the Marxist postulate regarding class conscience. With extremely few exceptions, the separation line in the civic position with respect to events in Chechnya runs along the affiliation with power structures. It is not that important what the cause is—elementary conformism or "statist views," which assume the primacy of expediency over elementary morality and ethics, but almost all who are close to power—from "democrat" ministers and heads of administrations to the lowliest bureaucrats and courtier

scholar-analysts—expressed in unison the approval for everything that is being done in the name of the RF president. There were, however, exceptions—the more valuable because they were rare. [begin bold]The general rule, however, permits one to draw a conclusion of not only great moral elasticity of concrete pegs in the state machine but also of a certain defectiveness of the entire social organization that puts, as in the past, citizens' views in direct correlation with their job.[end bold]

There were substantial differences in the reaction to the Chechen events between representative and executive branches of authority in the regions. Within the former, actions ranged from the refusal to discuss the problem of Chechnya as such (the Kostroma, Smolensk, and Tomsk Dumas), and in the event of discussion—refusal or inability to pass a particular decision (the Kaluga and Perm Dumas) to declaring the actions taken by federal authorities unconstitutional and calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (the Moscow, Altay, Tambov, Tver, Yekaterinburg, and other Dumas). Heads of administration occupied the remaining part of the spectrum: from passive wait-and-see to full support of the military actions (Moscow, Murmansk, Vologda, Tula, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg) or support with some reservations (Nizhny Novgorod).

In the regions outside republics neighboring Chechnya, reaction to the events of the population as a whole remains so far quite restrained. In the capitals and a number of regional centers in those places where the Chechen diaspora is sufficiently strong, rallies, picketing, and other mass protest actions were held. All of them were very small in attendance, although they were characterized by a rare unity of the most diverse socio-political forces—from "democrats" to "communists" and "nationalists." This, however, does not mean at all that the population is indifferent to what is happening in Chechnya. What is happening so far is more of a rather restrained at this point but at the same time quite definite rejection of the actions of the national military and state leadership. Practically all public opinion polls indicate an unequivocal preponderance of supporters of peaceful settlement in the conflict, although depending on the region and the way questions were formulated, the spread of the results is quite great.

As the conflict is turning into a protracted one, changes are taking place in the public mind, registered among other things by the polls where they are repeated. For instance, in Rostov Oblast a second poll conducted on 21 December, three days after the original one, showed that the share of those who consider the actions of the Russian leadership with respect to Chechnya justified had declined somewhat. At the same time, the share of those who consider it possible to recognize Chechnya's independence increased to one-quarter. The share of those who consider Chechnya an inalienable part of Russia increased even more, however—to 60 percent. Both figures increased due to former fence-sitters taking sides. **One may thus speak of a somewhat increased awareness and polarization of opinions in society.**

As another poll in Kostroma shows, support for the use of force in Chechnya, where it exists, is associated not so much with abstract values such as preservation of the territorial integrity of Russia, which the authorities emphasize, as first and foremost with everyday nationalism and a negative attitude toward "persons of Caucasus origin." Why is it important? First of all, because the society, even that part of it which yesterday supported the "resolve" of the military, is not willing to pay the current price for the reckless military gamble in Chechnya. Because the "Afghan syndrome" is already beginning to manifest itself—the shift in public opinion as a result of a fear of potential personal participation, or more often—the prospect of one's children's participation in military action. It is the effect of this factor that explains the calm in the remote Far-Eastern regions and the anxiety in places from where military units have been sent to the territory of Chechnya. There are increasingly frequent calls in the regions for immediate recall of "ours" from the military contingent in Chechnya—those drafted from the region's territory, whether it be North Ossetia, Tatarstan, or Kaliningrad Oblast. The military brass is compelled to explain increasingly often to an agitated public—as, for instance, in the aforementioned Kaliningrad or Murmansk—that the press had made a mistake and "our guard does not participate in the conflict." As military operations become more protracted and the bodies of "our own" dead begin to arrive to the regions, the scale of protest actions in the society will inevitably grow. In a number of regions—Rostov Oblast, Chuvashia, and Khakassia—this is actually already happening.

The ethnic aspect of the population's attitude toward the reckless gamble in Chechnya is generally very prominent. Ethno-social movements of the Avar, Balkar, Ingush, Kabarda, Karachay, and Kumyk peoples denounced unequivocally the use of military force. Cossack organizations' positions varied: In some places, such as Kuban, Terek, Saratov, Iset, and others, they actively supported the use of military force by the government and are forming their own battalions; and in some, as, for instance, in the Don area, they advocate a peaceful way of conflict resolution. Numerous Chechen communities in Russian cities took a very balanced position, demonstrating their full loyalty to the Government of Russia and rejection of terror as a response to the violence in Chechnya.

Only five years ago, a population census showed that of the approximately 900,000 Chechens in Russia, about 200,000 lived outside of Chechnya proper: in Dagestan, current Ingushetia, Stavropol Kray, Volgograd Oblast, Astrakhan, Saratov, Tyumen, and other regions of the country. Much has happened since then, and the numbers of the Chechen diaspora—first of all in large cities and regional centers—has increased substantially. There are about 35,000-40,000 Chechens now in Moscow alone, and about 300,000 across the entire of Russia.

The escalation of the conflict in the North Caucasus and the buildup of emotions regarding the threat of Chechen

terrorism has dealt a painful blow to Chechens wherever they live. Anti-Chechen attitudes on an everyday level have intensified everywhere; administrative pressure on Chechen business has increased; nearly all Chechens have now been put on a special watch list by law enforcement organs. The mass media report on the activities of Chechen communities: In Tomsk the relatively small Vaynakh community called on both sides to stop the bloodshed, and in Tver, where the Chechen community numbers 5,000, a decision was made to refrain from denouncing the Russian policy in Chechnya and support the president's edict. In many regions—Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kirov, Perm, Ryazan, Samara, Tomsk, Yamal, Kamchatka, and others (in anticipation of terrorist acts?) special regional headquarters have been set up with the participation of heads of administrations and enforcement structures.

Regional Leaders Call For Peace Conference

LD2501134195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1239 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stavropol January 25 TASS—A working meeting of leaders of North Caucasian ministries and committees for national affairs finished here today. It passed a resolution that a peace conference is needed for settlement in Chechnya. The resolution is an extension of an earlier initiative of North Caucasian authorities, public groups and organisations to convene such a conference under the aegis of the Russian ministry for Nationalities and Regional Policies.

The meeting's resolution also states that mediator conflictology experts should be recommended by the government and administrations of the North Caucasus, Don, Kuban and Stavropol regions for organising the transition to peaceful political settlement in Chechnya.

The meeting said an intersectoral information service should be set up in the vicinity of the conflict area (in Mozdok or Nazran) to help Russians find their relatives involved in the Chechen campaign.

The meeting recommended that the association of social and economic cooperation of North Caucasian republics, the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and the Rostov region be given a status of a governmental advisory expert organ.

The meeting also discussed a programme of national policies which the ministry for nationalities and regional policies had drafted on orders from the Russian government. The draft programme will be soon sent to all component parts of the Russian Federation for scrutiny before submission of it for presidential approval in end-April.

Stabilisation of ethnic relations in the North Caucasus requires setting up a standing conference of leaders of North Caucasian authorities who handle national issues.

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A news conference after the meeting was told that the meeting had not supported attempts of a group of State Duma parliamentarians to channel practical discussion of Chechen settlement into passing "rally-style" resolutions.

Pro-Dudayev Leaflets Surface in Dagestan

LD2501190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1822 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Makhachkala, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—Leaflets urging Dagestani residents to "begin military actions in Dagestan on the side of Dzhokhar Dudayev" have been recently circulated in Makhachkala (the Dagestani capital) and the Khasavyurt Region close to Chechnya.

The Dagestan Interior Ministry told Interfax that the leaflets had been signed by Salman Raduyev, who called himself a representative of the commander-in-chief of the Chechen Armed Forces "in the eastern defense zone."

The same source said Salman Raduyev, 27, was a son-in-law of Dzhokhar Dudayev and had recently been the head of the Gudermes Region of Chechnya.

The Dagestan Interior Ministry said that "spreading leaflets and rumors about Dudayev appearing in Dagestan as well as the recent provocations on the Dagestani-Chechen border" were aimed at "fanning a war in Dagestan." The Dagestan Interior Ministry urged Dagestan residents to remain calm and patient and not to respond to provocations.

Dagestan Warns Against Dudayev Provocations

LD2601104095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0940 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gadzhi Shamov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Makhachkala, 26 Jan (TASS)—The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Dagestan today appealed to the population of the republic to display vigilance, and not give in to provocations which Dudayev's emissaries are trying to organize.

The appeal points out, specifically, that of late a stepping-up of armed provocations has been observed at militia posts, not only on the administrative border with the Chechen Republic but in districts deep inside Dagestan as well. At the same time, "intensified propaganda is being conducted among the republic's population, in order to draw them into the war, by organizing rallies and other mass demonstrations of citizens, with extremist slogans and declarations about the enlisting of volunteers." Dudayev's emissaries openly call for "the immediate mounting of combat operations on the territory of Dagestan on the side of Dudayev." Rumors have been circulated that Dudayev has allegedly arrived in Dagestan secretly.

"It is becoming evident," the MVD states, "that this process is being deliberately organized by forces with vested interests in taking the war over into the territory of Dagestan and to involve the Caucasus in it."

The document notes: "In this situation, we urge all citizens of Dagestan to show restraint, to be extremely vigilant and not give in to provocations leading to only one aim—the instigation of war in Dagestan."

FCS Officers Arrest Ukrainian Mercenary

LD2501204795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1930 GMT 25 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) January 25 TASS—Servicemen from the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] of the Russian Federation detained 23-year-old Ukrainian citizen Oleg Kharchuk in the zone of military operations in Chechnya. He was identified as a mercenary from Dzhokhar Dudayev's unlawful armed groups.

Sources from the Federal Counterintelligence Service told ITAR-TASS that Oleg Kharchuk was born in Zaporozhie in Ukraine, and was brought up in Latvia in the family of a Soviet officer. He served in the army in engineer construction troops. Later he worked in a plant in Zaporozhie.

According to Oleg Kharchuk, he "heard from his acquaintances that it is possible to earn a lot of money by fighting in Chechnya against Russians." He went to the Ukrainian capital Kiev to meet recruiters from Chechnya. He left his wife and a little child in Zaporozhie.

The detained Ukrainian told ITAR-TASS that he had concluded a contract under which he "was to fulfill all its terms for which recruiters promised to pay him 500 U.S. dollars a day plus 20 U.S. dollars for each Russian officer killed by him. If he killed ten Russian officers during ten days he would receive a bonus."

Should he violate the contract, Oleg Kharchuk would pay his life for it. According to him, some examples of such retributions with Ukrainians by Dudayev's henchmen really took place in Chechnya.

Representatives of the Federal Counterintelligence Service in Grozny told ITAR-TASS that "Dudayev's mercenaries are a special category of enemies whom the federal troops met in Chechnya." They are operating autonomously and well trained, especially snipers. At present detection and detention of mercenaries from different states is one of the major tasks of servicemen from the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

Representatives of this service believe that the moral and military spirit of Dudayev's supporters is going down. Data received by radio interception shows that many field officers consider further resistance useless, they experience shortage of ammunition and foodstuffs.

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At the same time part of militants disguising themselves as servicemen of federal troops in a corresponding uniform, commit outrages against local dwellers trying to attribute these actions to federal troops.

FCS Pays for Release of 20 Officers

LD2501213495 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 2001 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Twenty Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] officers taken prisoner in Chechnya have been released in return for a considerable sum of money, according to FCS Director Sergey Stepashin who recently returned from Grozny. At a meeting with journalists he said that talks were now under way on 43 assault troops being held prisoner. There are plans to carry out an exchange in the near future. Analysing the development of events in Chechnya, Stepashin expressed his confidence that a state of emergency would not be introduced in the republic and that the situation would normalize there in the near future.

Grozny's Northern Airport Operable

MM2601093195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Boris Vinogradov: "Grozny Airport Is Accepting Aircraft, Baking Bread, and Returning Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Grozny-Moscow—At the moment few people can imagine how the replacement of military units by MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunits is going to take place. If the command has indeed decided that the Army has fulfilled its mission, this must evidently be taken as the stabilization of a front which theoretically follows the Sunzha River.

I was told in Grozny that at this stage the task of the federal troops will, apart from everything else, consist of holding and organizing the work of Northern Airport, which is of truly vital importance. Shattered on New Year's Eve by aerial bombing raids, the airport has been restored and is already fulfilling its main functions—it is accepting airplanes and helicopters. They are mainly military aircraft flying out wounded and killed soldiers and delivering essential cargo to the Army.

Repairs have begun in the building itself and the air traffic control service is operating, and the airport's new chief, who asked to remain anonymous, said that civilian flights will resume in a week or two. A Chechen by nationality, the chief lives in Grozny but gets to work by a circuitous route rather than directly. In the morning he travels to Znamenskoye, where the Interim Council center is located, from there goes by helicopter to Mozdok in North Ossetia, and only then transits to Northern Airport. Toward nighttime he returns home the same way.

The area surrounding the airport is the same forward defense positions but with rear services elements. Here

the military have opened a bakery, bathhouse, and cafeteria, which feeds not only soldiers and officers but also visitors waiting to depart for various destinations. Every night Dudayev's supporters subject the airport to mortar bombardments from high ground and corpses. That is why, I was told by Rayon Commander General Aleksandr Naumov, one cannot feel safe here until the troops have taken control of every square of "brilliant green" (wooded areas) and every section of the roads passing through them. MVD, Internal Troops, and special-purpose troops forces are participating in the combing operations.

Lines of refugees, who have given up hope of surviving, stretch from Grozny toward the airport. People are making their way there any way they can: In ambulances, in armored personnel carriers, on foot. This is a safe haven for them. The helicopters, which do not have time to evacuate the wounded, sometimes cannot take all the people who want to go. They then have to wait for the next day. They are mainly Russians who have lived in Grozny for many years. [passage omitted]

Moscow Oblast Purge of Immigrants Previewed

MM2601101595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 95 p 1

["Our Commentary" by Aleksandr Kalinin: "Will Outsiders Be Deported from Moscow Oblast?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that a tremendous search can be expected in Moscow Oblast over the next few days. In the wake of its city counterparts the oblast leadership has ordered the militia and the local authorities to carefully check out hostels, hotels, boarding houses, and even the residential sector for illegal visitors, primarily Caucasians. Illegals will be deported from the oblast. Leaders of territorial internal affairs organs have been personally instructed to register guests from the Caucasus. Only people who have taken the trouble to obtain an oblast residence permit will be able to obtain refugee (displaced person) status.

This decision is evidently due to the war in the Caucasus and will undoubtedly meet with a broad response among Russians whose sense of patriotism has acquired the nature of a cancerous tumor, with every Caucasian being seen in their eyes as a kind of speculator, rogue, or bandit.

I agree that the mafia and crime must be combated—the Chechen, Lyubertsy, or any other kind. And if the Moscow authorities are pursuing this objective alone, I wish them well. But something else worries me: What if the oblast's fathers overstep constitutional bounds in their fit of patriotism?

However, legal norms have already been violated. The restrictions on granting refugee (displaced person) status conflict with federal law. I think that Chechen mafiosi and Dudayev's guerrillas have long since retreated to alternative positions. And will it not be the case that

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outsiders bear the full brunt of it while the authorities for the umpteenth time shake their heads; They had the best of intentions, but the usual happened.

Many refugees from Baku live in Moscow Oblast hotels and sanatoriums. What is to become of them? Political emigres from the near abroad and ordinary people who have escaped war have found refuge here. According to the "Memorial" rights defense center, refugees from Abkhazia have settled illegally in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, living in private apartments among their countrymen from Georgia. Suppose they are evicted: Where will they go? Lastly, refugees from Chechnya, who are now going to friends and relatives. By no means everyone has been able to register at migration centers and not everyone has documents, let alone a residence permit. Should they be sent back to Grozny? Are they not citizens of Russia and do constitutional norms not extend to them?

However, when state authority is weak constitutional norms can be ignored. Moscow was one of the first to demonstrate this. After mastering the fall 1993 state of emergency it also tried in the heat of the moment to get rid of refugees. The upshot being that several old people died of heart attacks and tenants of a hostel on Kashirskoye Shosse—mainly disabled persons and single mothers—threatened mass suicide. But the main point is that no one has made a legal assessment of the authorities' actions apart from the Russian presidential Commission for Human Rights, and it as usual has not been heeded.

So what is happening, as you can see, is that some places are deporting all foreigners indiscriminately. In some places people are even refusing point-blank to accept their compatriots who have been forced out of the countries of the new abroad. That did not even happen during the war.

People say to me: Excuse me, what do you mean this did not happen? What about the deportation of peoples? Did the authorities of other countries not restrict the rights of representatives of the warring party? Article 55 Section 3 of the Russian Constitution reads as follows: Human and civil rights and freedoms can be curtailed by federal law... for the purpose of protecting the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, and the health, rights, and legitimate interests of other individuals, or of ensuring the country's defense and the state's security."

That is by **FEDERAL** [printed in caps] law and not by decision of a local administration.

The actions taken by the Moscow Oblast authorities are illegal; that is even recognized by the Federal Migration Service. Admittedly, an appeal against these actions can only be lodged by the Constitutional Court, which is not functioning, or the prosecutor's office, which only operates on request.

New Legislative Chairman Chosen in Mordovia

LD2501135095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Saransk, Russia, Jan 25 (INTERFAX)—The new parliament of the Russian republic of Mordovia, at its first session opened on Tuesday, elected its chairman.

Forty-nine deputies of 74 present cast their votes for Nikolay Merkushkin, head of the Mordovian Property Fund. Nikolay Biryukov, chairman of the former parliament, mustered only 21 votes.

The new 75-seat legislature, the State Assembly, was elected on November 27 to replace the former Supreme Soviet.

Corruption Among Perm Oblast Leaders Detailed

MM2501111995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 8

[Article by journalist Mikhail Lobanov: "I Have No Faith in the Triumph of Justice, Although an Investigation Has Begun Into Cases of Corruption in Perm's Corridors of Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perm Oblast—Criminal proceedings have been instituted in cases where the leaders of Perm Oblast have abused their official position. Governor B. Kuznetsov; L. Nikitin, his deputy; Ye. Sapiro, chairman of the Legislative Assembly; A. Tulnikov, former deputy governor; and also other high-ranking persons are to have it out with the investigator with regard to their complicity in abuses. Almost simultaneously with the institution of criminal proceedings the Russian president has issued a special edict warning the governor of noncompliance with official duties. First Deputy Governor G. Igumnov has been reprimanded....

IZVESTIYA (No. 202 for last year) spoke of the cynical sharing out of supercheap Volgas which was organized in Perm on bloody Monday—4 October 1993. While fighting was going on in Moscow and people were dying, some Perm officials, bankers, and members of the former party nomenklatura rejoiced at the acquisition of vehicles at a price of just 2 million rubles [R] through the "LUKoil-Permnefteprodukt" Joint-Stock Company. Legislative Assembly Chairman Sapiro had acquired such a Volga earlier, paying, if documents are to be believed, just R200,000.

After carrying out an audit, staffers of the Russian president's Control Administration added new facts to IZVESTIYA's data. It came to light, for example, that Deputy Governor Nikitin became the owner of a new Moskvich-412 for just R440,000 paid in installments. In return for this, in the opinion of the auditors, some commercial firm was freed from paying fines totaling R9.2 million. In a report sent to the president the Moscow auditors stated: "Such actions by the leaders of

the legislative and executive power make them dependent on commercial structures." The General Prosecutor's Office ordered an investigation into the abuses, a decision on instituting criminal proceedings, and an examination of the question of bringing court actions to find the buying-and-selling deals invalid and to recover for the state's benefit the sums involved in the illegal enrichment.

But even after such formidable intentions on Moscow's part hardly anyone in the Kama region doubts that the potentates who were grabbed by the hand will once again come out unscathed. They blame for their own sins...the auditors from the capital, who, you see, were looking only for the "cons," without noticing the "pros." The governor declared for all to hear that the audit was the presidential structures' reaction to the Perm legislators' decision to withdraw the oblast leaders' signatures from the Treaty on Social Accord. Only recently, however, Boris Yuryevich had equally assuredly tried to persuade the people of the opposite by denying any connection between the visit of the Control Administration staffers and that scandalous demarche, and had called the audit a planned one.

It is better to appear a martyr in the eyes of public opinion than someone "undergoing" a criminal case of corruption. During his three years at the helm of power B. Kuznetsov, former secretary of the party committee and chief of the Kama River Shipping Company, seemed to be more concerned for his personal interests. He received a chic apartment in the obkom [oblast party committee] building, countless trips abroad at the treasury's expense, a free Volga bought in the name of an assistant.... During this time the region was losing millions of dollars from the inept sell-off of oil.

The Control Administration informed the president: "Regional quotas were distributed without tenders or auctions. In 1993-1994 most of them were bought up by various commercial structures which have nothing to do with production of output. By exporting strategic raw materials abroad, these organizations in exchange import into the oblast substandard commodities which are frequently purchased for rubles in the regions of Russia. Under the regional quota, for example, the 'Permskiy Agrotorgovyy Dom' individual private enterprise dispatched over 30,000 tonnes of oil worth \$3.4 million and received by way of barter 30,000 tonnes of substandard food grain from Rostov Oblast and the Republic of Kazakhstan."

While essentially not disputing such unseemly facts, the oblast administration makes a rather clumsy attempt to deny its complicity in these shocking things. When a bread riot was brewing, First Deputy Governor Igumnov "fed" the population on official assurances: There is an agreement with the Ministry of Railways to send petroleum products to Kazakhstan. Three weeks later he reported that 5,000 tonnes of food grain had been received from Tselinograd and that a new contract was

expected to be signed. The grain that was delivered a couple of months later was not fit even to be fed to livestock....

Igumnov now claims: "Although we received substandard grain, the administration had nothing to do with those actions."

It really cannot be denied that the nomenklatura knows how to get rich. Ye. Chernyshov, the last party leader of Perm CPSU Obkom, went off to Moscow taking with him several containers of party property from his official apartment, ranging from suites of furniture and a video player to blankets and crystal chandeliers. He paid mere kopeks for the property, since everything was valued at its residual value in accordance with a 1984 document. The directive or, rather, the settlement transaction/gift was signed by...Sapiro, former member of the obkom and chairman of the oblast commission for liquidating the property of the former CPSU. The deal did not receive any legal assessment, despite protests by rank and file communists and some deputies. All the papers collected by the oblast prosecutor's office went to the General Prosecutor's Office, where they are probably still gathering dust.

The fate of being consigned to the archives most likely also awaits the criminal proceedings which have just been instituted. The organization of the investigation has been entrusted to V. Vdovin, a department chief in the oblast prosecutor's office, at whose direction a case involving the selling off of free Volvos by the "Permnefteprodukt" Association was successfully terminated. From his former work as prosecutor in the city of Kungur Vdovin has close links with the "main" witnesses in both criminal cases. It was there that V. Bobrov, general director of the "LUKoil-Permnefteprodukt" Joint-Stock Company, and A. Tulnikov, former deputy governor and now general director of the "Permneft" Joint-Stock Company, started ascending the pyramid of power.

Connections and friends all around. A provincial ingeniousness that is kind on the pocket.

Maritime Kray Industrial Output Down

954F1047A Vladivostok VLADIVOSTOK in Russian
25 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by VLADIVOSTOK writer Viktor Mikhaylov:
"Prolonged Down Time in Kray Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a report from the Maritime Committee on State Statistics, as a result of regular production shutdowns during the course of 1994, the kray's industry failed to produce a total of about R130 billion worth of products, as a result of which the kray budget, in turn, failed to receive many billions in the form of deductions from profit.

Prolonged down time of production was noted at machine-building and metal processing enterprises (56.3

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percent of all losses in industry), the food industry, nonferrous metallurgy, etc. Typically, most of the down time came during the winter period. Thus, in January alone, 11 enterprises stopped work completely. In 1994 on average per one worker employed in industry, 11 work days were lost (for comparison: in 1993 the figure was 1.6 days).

The main reasons for this were a failure to provide the enterprises with material resources, the inconsistency in carrying out conversion at enterprises of the military-industrial complex, difficulties with selling products that were produced, and also periods when electric energy was cut off. But still, the main cause was the insolvency of the enterprises, many of which, even if they had been turned into joint-stock companies, were balanced on the verge of bankruptcy.

The production decline had a negative effect on the social position of many Maritime residents. Throughout last year, because of the production shutdowns, 641 workers were released and sent to the labor exchange and about 100,000 were sent on extended leave without pay.

Tatarstan Takes Steps on Living Standards

954F1047B Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in
Russian 25 Jan 95 p 1

[Article from the press center of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan: "Maintaining People's Standard of Living"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, when inflationary processes caused by the profound crisis in the economy, political instability, and the crime situation, as well as serious shortcomings in the financial-credit policy, are leading to a permanent increase in the cost of living and sometimes uncontrolled growth of prices of vitally important goods and services, the Government of Tatarstan, with the support of the republic's president and Supreme Council, is taking (in advance of the negative consequences of what has taken place) radical, one might say revolutionary, steps, which have no analogs in Russia or other CIS republics.

The republic is the first in the Russian Federation to develop a system of consumer budgets that make it possible to objectively assess the level of incomes of the population. Four consumer budgets have been established: subsistence minimum, minimum consumer budget, optimal, and high consumer budget. At the present time, the Center for Social Problems of the Republic of Tatarstan, on instructions from the republic interdepartmental commission on implementation of social policy, is conducting operational observation of the prices of the 80 basic goods and services, and each week it calculates the cost of forty consumer baskets for the subsistence minimum, the minimum, and the optimal consumer budgets, taking into account the specifics of each sociodemographic group of the population.

In order to carry out the adjusted social policy, Tatarstan is forming a republic data bank of the population, using information obtained during the course of the social registration of the population and the coordination of branch and narrow departmental data banks. Attempts to create this kind of information base are being undertaken in a number of other regions of Russia, but so far they have been practically unsuccessful. Yet this is one of the guarantees of effective control of social processes in many developed countries of the world.

The main achievements of social policy in the republic were the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan "On the Subsistence Minimum," "On the Minimum Wage," and "On the Minimum Consumer Budget." They make up the basis for the implementation of the entire complex of tasks within the framework, again, of the Program for Targeted Social Protection of the Population of Tatarstan, the only one in Russia. These laws provide a normative base for successful implementation by the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan of its policy in the area of incomes of the population.

At the present time, they have managed to adopt a radical decision for making the minimum wage equal to the cost amount of the subsistence minimum (R110,000), which will make it possible to take the first steps toward correcting the mistakes made after May-June 1994 in the area of the formation of the budgets of the population. This measure makes it possible to increase the motivation to work, to eliminate the existing discrimination against labor in the republic, to urge employers to reform the structure of production and methods of managing it, to begin to form a full-fledged labor market, and to raise the standard of living of the workers.

The state itself, in turn, as the largest employer, must provide a worthy standard of living for workers of budget-financed branches. Therefore, the complex of proposed measures for improving wages according to a unified wage scale (YeTS) is an indispensable part of all actions for raising and stabilizing incomes of the republic's population. A fairly large amount of additional effort will be required to improve the YeTS itself and to keep the incomes of budget workers at a level not below the subsistence minimum, taking into account that its cost amount is still increasing regularly. The decree adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan on average more than doubles the wages of workers of the budget sphere. The adoption of measures to maintain the incomes of the population at a level not below the subsistence minimum will make it possible to reduce subsidies from the republic budget for food products, transportation, and housing and municipal services.

Keeping the minimum wage at a level not below the cost amount of the subsistence minimum and monitoring the activity of the employers so that they will comply with the entire block of socially significant laws, including the

law "On the Minimum Consumer Budget," will make it possible to undertake a complex of measures for maintaining the standard of living of pensioners, disabled persons, children, pregnant women, single mothers, and families with many children, at a level not below the cost amount of the subsistence minimum. This will take more than R19 billion each month.

At the same time, it is obvious that the budget and the fund for targeted social support for the population cannot provide full-fledged financing for this vitally important task, since it will take more than R40 billion a month in addition to the amount from the aforementioned sources. Therefore, it would be expedient to add the funds included by the edict of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan to the money from nonbudget state funds. Thus, for example, it would be expedient to

use money from the pension fund to maintain the standard of living of veterans and pensioners.

The decisions adopted at the last session of the Supreme Soviet regarding raising the minimum wage, taking into account the package of decrees of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan prepared on the basis of the session's decisions, lay the principal foundations for a breakthrough in the policy regarding incomes of the population of Tatarstan and are a catalyst for the beginning of deep transformations in the republic's economy. It should be emphasized once again that such radical decisions have no precedent anywhere on the territory of the Russian Federation, and they will enable Tatarstan, under the condition that they are strictly observed, to utilize efficiently and effectively the advantage it gains in order to maintain the standard of living of the population.

International Affairs

Kuchma on 'Problem' of Debt Restructuring

LD2501195495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1718
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan 25 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—The main problem of relations with Moscow is how to get the restructuring of Ukraine's debt to Russia, President Leonid Kuchma said at a meeting with French Ambassador to Kiev Michel-Yves Peissik in Kiev on Wednesday.

Kuchma spoke of considering Russia as his country's neighbor and strategic partner.

On his visit to Moscow on Tuesday, the president expressed confidence about the prospects of bilateral relations.

He believes the break up of Russia could have dire implications for the world at large.

Official Comments on Kuchma-Yeltsin Meetings

LD2501180695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604
GMT 25 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature; compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The meeting of Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin in Moscow made it possible for the Ukrainian and Russian governments to sign an agreement on the principles underlying their trade and economic cooperation in 1995, Ukrainian president's press secretary Mikhail Doroshenko told Interfax.

Under the document, the bilateral trade and economic cooperation is based on equality, mutual benefit and direct contacts between businesses.

The two sides entrusted the Roskontrakt and the KAMAZ society in Russia and the state-owned Ukrresursy and Ukragorotekhservis in Ukraine with exchanging equivalent amounts of products.

The two sides undertook to encourage the setting up of transnational companies and the transformation of businesses, which are of interest to both sides, into joint stock company.

Ukraine will pay half of its debt and the interest on the credit obtained under an agreement with Russia of June 24, 1993 in goods and the remainder in hard currency or Russian rubles.

The minutes of the working meeting between Prime Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vitaly Masol were signed under which the two countries "agreed on approaches to the restructuring of the Ukrainian debt."

According to the minutes, Russia will give Ukraine a deferment of the payments overdue in 1994 of the basic debt incurred by Ukraine when it received Russian credits in 1992 and 1993.

A special agreement on this will be signed before February 15.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeniy Masol [as received] believes that the meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Moscow on January 24 was "a scheduled event" at which no breakthrough was expected.

Marchuk said that the six agreements discussed at the meeting, on military technological cooperation, merchant shipping and others, will be signed shortly.

Deputy Prime Ministers Aleksey Bolshakov and Marchuk will sign an agreement on cooperation in border areas in Kharkov on January 27.

Marchuk said that the atmosphere of the talks was constructive.

He expect the Black Sea Fleet to be discussed by government delegations early in February.

Marchuk confirmed that further integration of CIS Member states had also been discussed.

According to Dmitry Ryurikov, a Russian president's aide, Yeltsin and Kuchma had analyzed during their nearly 120 minute tete-a-tete in Moscow Tuesday the status of bilateral relations and came to a conclusions that they needed a complete overhaul. Ryurikov said that specific steps to do so had been planned.

The presidents also discussed specific issues such as the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine's debt to Russia. According to Ryurikov, both presidents were pleased with the meeting.

Ministers Discuss Moscow Summit

LD2501235295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Report by Anatoliy Komirenko on news conference by First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov in Kiev on 25 January; Recorded remarks by Marchuk and Mityukov in quotation marks]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Komirenko] The briefing was attended by First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov, members of the Ukrainian delegation. They spoke in detail about Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's meetings with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and about the results of this working visit.

To begin with, they told the briefing the meetings had become necessary as there accumulated a great many

problems. Some of them were resolved and some saw a convergence between the two states' positions.

Signing an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia for 1995 was one of the most important issues settled. It was stressed that in a conversation, Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin discussed a whole range of problems, including the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine's energy debt to Russia. Agreement was reached on ongoing meetings between the heads of state.

Another major decision made was that a large-scale treaty between Ukraine and Russia, so talked about lately, would be signed, tentatively, in March 1995.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin confirmed Russia was ready to pay for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia in the previous years.

As for its position on Black Sea Fleet bases, the Russian side agreed the fleet could be based in Sevastopol but Sevastopol could not be a base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet alone.

First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk's assessment of the trade and economic cooperation agreement signed between the two states was, as follows:

[Marchuk] "The signing of this agreement paves the way for normal cooperation. I would once again like to underline one aspect, which is that, unfortunately, our internal problems, the problems that we cannot resolve effectively and efficiently domestically, and the problems that are associated with slow reforms in our economy, unfortunately—I once again emphasize, unfortunately—are the main reasons for our difficulties with the Russian side.

"I will not idealize the Russian side, a difficult partner and not easy to deal with but, at the same time, a partner of extraordinary importance to us. And I am not afraid to say the problems of energy resources—the energy problems Ukraine experiences—at present over 80 percent depends on what arrangements we will make with Russia in this area.

"Unfortunately, the trade and economic agreement was not signed in connection with [pauses] One of the main reasons for this was the fact that we, that is Ukraine, accumulated a huge debt to Russia both for last year's gas [pauses] I would like to remind you that we failed to settle accounts with Gazprom, and last year's debt stands at approximately \$1.5 billion.

"Unfortunately, our debt to Roskontrakt for the past year only, amounts to approximately \$200 million. That is to say, here we cannot look for an excuse in the past and the consequences of the Soviet Union. In other words, this now depends on the results of our economic management. Unfortunately, a large sum has accumulated, which is to be paid off as interest. Something is to be done with this too, and this is over \$100 million. Well,

and the Russian partners, responsible mainly for the sphere of oil resources and mutual deliveries, have begun to raise this issue in an ever more acute manner, and, finally, they put forward an alternative: without solving, or at least determining the procedure for settling our current accounts, that is the sources and procedure of ensuring our current payments, and what we are going to do with our debts for the past year, at least, to say nothing about the large debt for previous years.... [pauses] And, proceeding from this, the Russian side made the following issues interdependent: without determining the procedure of payments for the past year's debts, and without determining the procedure and sources of current payments for this year, to the extent that they could see what the Russian side could count on when planning its budget, its economy and so on.... [pauses] The trade and economic agreement was not signed until this was determined. The notorious Article 6, which deals exactly with this issue, was the main obstacle in the way of signing this agreement.

"I would also like to make it clear to everyone that again, unfortunately, this year alone, in January alone we have already accumulated debts to Russia for gas to the tune of more than \$70 million. It is clear that this cannot last long in the world of business, among businessmen. Serious partners never behave like that. And, proceeding from all this, the president probably lost his patience—I can say this on my own behalf—the president had to personally meddle in the issues that, in principle, are beyond his sphere. These are not the issues to be resolved at the presidential level. And, by the way, the agreement was signed not by the presidents but by the prime ministers. Because this is a current agreement, I would rather say this is the agreement for the current year. There is presidential level and there are various other levels.

"Proceeding from this, I again emphasize and I can again say openly that the trade and economic agreement would not have been signed, and I do not know when it would be signed, if the president did not have a meeting yesterday and did not carry out fundamental work in Moscow, businesslike, laborious work I would say."

[Komirenko] Marchuk also informed journalists about the prospects for a large-scale treaty between Ukraine and Russia to be signed:

[Marchuk] "The conversation between the presidents once again emphasized the subject of a general political treaty and underlined the stumbling blocks that are in its way and have appeared in the weeks before at the latest rounds of negotiations—the article on dual citizenship once again underlined. The president of Russia confirmed this article was being excluded from the treaty as not being the subject of this treaty; as not being the subject of this treaty, rather than being a problem that does not exist.

"Apart from that, a provision that had caused certain differences at the talks on the general political treaty was

once again confirmed. It is the form of establishing the inviolability of.... [pauses] reaffirming the inviolability of the state borders. President Yeltsin entirely confirmed the form that was proposed by the Ukrainian side in the treaty.

"So it can be said all problems were totally eliminated. There are some insignificant nuances in the treaty but the problems that had blocked or impeded signing the general political treaty were eliminated altogether."

[Komirenko] It was also announced that some more documents of importance to Ukraine will be signed in the next few days. Our governmental delegation, led by Marchuk, will hold talks in Kharkov on 26 January with a Russian delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov, and with heads of six border regions of Russia and Ukraine. They will sign a document on state border crossing points and an agreement on cooperation between border regions. Apart from that, agreements will also be signed in the next few days on putting in place free trade arrangements and preventing double taxation of incomes and property, and on steps in cases of tax evasion, procedures in mutual deliveries of armaments and military hardware, merchant shipping, and so forth.

Deputy Prime Minister Viktor [as heard] Mityukov spoke about trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia this year in greater detail:

[Mityukov] "Establishing the general principles of trade and economic cooperation and establishing the principles of equality and mutual benefit, the agreement provides for the right of every business, regardless of its form of ownership and subordination, to take part in trade and economic relations on the basis of the principles laid out in this agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

"Article 2 contains the very list of commodities that are recognized by both sides as primary. Recognizing them as primary means export and import deliveries of these commodities are exempted from the respective export duties and are most favored to provide both countries with these types of commodities. The opportunity is given to control, or not to inflate, prices for these vital commodities. As far as Ukraine is concerned, this above all is oil and, in part, petroleum products, and sophisticated materials and machinery. This list is quite extensive and is presented in a separate addendum.

"Ukraine will supply Russia with rolled metal, machine building and, as you realize, food products that are needed in Russia.

"These lists were agreed and balanced, while the conditions on which these deliveries will be made, prices, and actual trade volumes in value terms will be decided by authorized organizations that will undertake these trade operations."

[Komirenko] The government officials answered numerous questions from journalists. The Crimean issue which is, undoubtedly, of concern to everybody, was also touched upon. Yevhen Marchuk said the following about it:

[Marchuk] "Somebody, not only in Crimea—I again emphasize this—forgets that there are boundaries beyond which something different begins, beyond which something that is called disintegration begins. And, as far as myself and the powers vested in me are concerned, it will be necessary to teach someone, even some big leaders in oblasts, at first the rudiments of legislation and explain to them what this is and then, probably, raise the issue in a more acute manner. We cannot allow, as they say, even a vague resemblance to Chechnya here in Ukraine, and, as they say, even the slightest signs leading to something that can end up in a Chechnya. And if we.... [pauses] I will say again that if we fail to put some leaders in their place—doing this in a normal, good-natured manner, without offences and insults—if we fail to explain to them at the rudimentary level that this is already within the sphere of state security, dear sir, friend, and comrade, that you have no powers beyond this boundary and that further on this is qualified in a different manner, by our silence we shall encourage, as they say, the accumulation of dangerous elements in our state. Therefore, we shall have to deal with issues of both property in Crimea and excessive, as they say, improvisation on the part of some oblast leaders, which penetrates the sphere of state security. We cannot allow even, I will say this again, the slightest hint of Chechnya, to say nothing about any methods employing force."

Udovenko on USSR Restoration Issue

LD2501131095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1102
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 25 (Interfax)—Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has condemned the intention of the Russian parliament's lower house to denounce 1991 agreements that put an end to the Soviet Union as "imparting an element of instability" to relations between member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

"Russian deputies are nostalgic about the past," Udovenko said in an interview with Interfax Wednesday.

But "there will be no return to the past. History cannot be turned back," Udovenko, who is attending as an observer a current Moscow meeting of the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers.

"We should try to make the CIS more efficient and not revive old, outdated structures," he said.

He called for restoring "severed economic links" between former Soviet republics. But "this must naturally be done on an essentially new basis."

Delegation Takes Part in NPT Conference*LD2501182395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1525 GMT
25 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—Ukraine is taking part in the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee (PC) of the 1995 Conference of the Countries-signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty, currently under way in New York, for the first time. UNIAN was informed about this at Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 January. More than 130 out of the 170 countries-signatories to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons are taking part in the session.

The session is resolving organizational issues of holding the conference on 17 April-12 May 1995, at which the countries-signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty are to determine whether this document will be extended for a fixed term or indefinitely.

A Ukrainian delegation, led by Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, chief of the department of control over armaments and disarmament at Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is taking part in the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee.

In his speech Kostyantyn Hryshchenko emphasized the historic significance of Ukraine's accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty. He also pointed out that our state counted on the fact that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would ratify START-II before the conference got down to business, and that the People's Republic of China, France, and Great Britain would announce specific steps toward a significant reduction of their nuclear armaments and means of their delivery.

Crimean Council Signs Appeal Over Citizenship*954F1044A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in
Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1*

[Text of Crimean Supreme Council appeal to President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Boris Nikolayevich!

The Supreme Council of Crimea expresses gratitude to the Russian Federation for having afforded Crimeans the opportunity to acquire Russian citizenship.

But a direct application to the Russian Consulate in the city of Kiev is difficult for the majority of inhabitants of Crimea on account of the high cost of travel.

Considering the numerous appeals of citizens of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol apropos the acquisition of Russian citizenship, we request that you, in accordance with international law, send to Sevastopol, Simferopol, and other cities of Crimea an out-of-town Russian Consulate in Ukraine to formalize Russian citizenship for all who wish to acquire it.

The legal principles and mechanism of realization of this undertaking were discussed at the end of last year by a group of deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea in the Citizenship Commission under the president of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] Supreme Council of Crimea.

[Dated] City of Simferopol, 19 January 1995.

No 10-1 SC.

Crimean Deputies Appeal to UN Over Chechnya*954F1044B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in
Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1*

[Appeal to Butrus Butrus-Ghali, secretary general of the United Nations, B.N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and the State Duma of the Russian Federation]

[FBIS Translated Text] The long-suffering, freedom-loving Chechen people have three times been subjected to genocide: at the time of Chechnya's annexation by tsarist Russia, during deportation from their homeland by the communist regime of the Soviet Union, and at the present time—in the period of the so-called democratization of society, the Russian Government is exterminating the peaceful inhabitants of the Chechen Republic on the pretext of the fight against "gangster formations."

The General Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948 proclaims: "Each individual has the right to life, freedom, and inviolability of person."

Principles of international law and human rights provisions have been violated and ignored in Russia.

The armed suppression of the expressed wishes of the Chechen people, the extermination of peaceful inhabitants, genocide—this is the bloody result of the present short-sighted nationality policy of the Russian leadership. We cannot look on indifferently as Russian troops wipe out the peaceful population in the Chechen Republic and as Russian soldiers, who have involuntarily found themselves hostages of the ill-considered policy of the Russian state, senselessly die. Human rights have no boundaries, and for this reason a violation of human rights, genocide even more, cannot be the internal affair of any state—it is an international crime against humanity.

The right to life is given people by God, and only God can take it away. Deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea appeal to you for the immediate adoption of a decision demanding a halt to the bloodshed in the Chechen Republic and the solution of contentious matters peacefully—by way of negotiations. We hope for the good will of the United Nations and the common sense and prudence of the Russian state.

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[Signed] E. Kurtiyev, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea Standing Commission for Nationality Policy and Problems of Deported Citizens. The signatures of deputies follow.

National Affairs

Deputy Prime Minister on Current Issues

LD2501212095 Kiev UNIAr in Ukrainian 1920 GMT
25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 25 Jan—Debts must be paid off, Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov said at a briefing on the outcome of the visit by President Leonid Kuchma to Moscow. Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol and his Russian counterpart Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a special protocol on 25 January envisioning the elaboration of a procedure for settling Ukraine's accounts for fuels. "We must assure Russia that Ukraine is a reliable borrower," Ihor Mityukov emphasized. In the opinion of Yevheniy Marchuk, first deputy prime minister, the main argument "to assure Russia of Ukraine's ability to pay off the existing debt will be the implementation of the economic reforms, namely, the settlement of accounts for the existing debts with Ukrainian property, including the shares of the transit gas and oil pipelines that cross the territory of Ukraine. Ihor Mityukov evaded a direct answer to the question in this connection, having emphasized that paying off debts with property is the issue of economic philosophy.

Mr. Marchuk emphasized that a decision was approved to initiate regional integration of Ukraine's eastern oblasts and western oblasts in Russia. Six chairmen of oblast councils of Ukraine's eastern regions will meet Aleksey Bolshakov, Russian deputy prime minister, in Kharkov on 26 January. It is expected that agreements "On cooperation between border oblasts of Ukraine and Russia" and "On state border checkpoints" will be signed. Taking into account this fact, the possibility that Ukraine will join the economic alliance that is being formed by Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan is not ruled out. In Yevheniy Marchuk's opinion, the customs union envisioned by the above alliance is the highest manifestation of freedom. "If accession to any alliance that does not stand in the way of Ukraine's independence is of benefit to Ukraine, Ukraine will do this," is how the first deputy prime minister outlined the future prospects for acceding to the alliance.

Ihor Mityukov believes that there is no need to introduce a state of emergency in Ukraine. The Ukrainian president's opinion on the issue was made known to those present at the briefing: the crisis can be overcome if everyone works in his individual state of emergency.

LPU Conference Debates Party Leadership

WS2601100895 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian No.
2 (160) 18-24 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by HROSHI DONBASU reporter Taras Bardin:
"New Leader of the Liberal Party Has Promised To
Return His Flock to the Church"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A conference of the regional organization of the Liberal Party of Ukraine [LPU], at which Oleh Soskin, deputy director of the National Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, was presented as candidate for the LPU president, was held in Donetsk on 11 January. After the Donetsk prelude, few people have doubts that he will become the new leader of LPU.

The debate on party leadership was not proceeding smoothly. Oleh Soskin had to experience many unpleasant moments, since certain deputies demanded that the presidential chair be unconditionally inherited by a Donbass resident, others were confused by the fact that a "Varangian" from Kiev had been invited to the liberals' ancestral land, and some admitted that they had never known that Oleh Soskin exists (in response to which the presidium advised the audience to "read papers"). Certain politicians close to the Oblast Council leadership know, however, that Donetsk Governor Volodymyr Shcherban once invited Oleh Soskin to become his adviser for issues of economic reform.

Everything returned to normal after a speech delivered by People's Deputy Yevhen Shcherban, a well known businessman from Donetsk, who reported that the initiative to nominate Oleh Soskin was conceived in the parliament. Moreover, Yevhen Shcherban himself and other people's deputy from Donetsk—Volodymyr Ampilohov—have recently become LPU members, thus initiating the liberals' parliamentary faction (yet another lawmaker—Donetsk Oblast Council Chairman Volodymyr Shcherban has suspended his brief membership in LPU, and, for some reason, refused to head the party). Yevhen Shcherban surprised the audience with the following paradox: Apparently, the Liberals did not lose the Supreme Council elections, but just the opposite, they won, and moreover, "quite unexpectedly." It is worth recalling here that a liberal faction was also "unexpectedly" found in the former Donetsk Oblast Council, when, at the end of their term as deputies, three local politicians suddenly proclaimed the existence of the LPU faction represented by themselves in the Oblast Council.

In his speech, Oleh Soskin also surprised old partisans with his opinion that LPU should become a "liberal-conservative-Christian" party, and that the new leader considers the establishment of strong ties with the Orthodox Church to be one of the priority tasks. However, these revelations were not what alarmed the Donetsk liberals most. They demanded explanations from the future LPU president regarding his thesis that it is essential for Ukraine to leave the CIS and establish a Baltic-Black Sea alliance; they were inquisitively interested in his stance on "bilingualism." Oleh Ihorevych [Soskin] categorically spoke in favor of one state language, having emphasized that, regarding language problems, a "status quo" must be preserved in the regions where these problems call forth a morbid reaction. If supranational structures were created within the framework of the CIS, a "role of the bedding for the Moscow

oligarchy" would await Ukraine. And finally, according to Soskin's forecast, the next Supreme Council elections will be held at the end of this year (or, the deadline should be the spring of 1996), in which the party will be supported by Ukrainian businessmen who will understand that it is not difficult to make big money, but it is much harder to protect one's wealth.

One of the LPU leaders said at the conference that, with the arrival of Oleh Soskin, a "new chapter" is beginning, or even a "new page is turning," in the party's history. Yet it seems that it is not these pictures that depicts the essence of the matter: The party has actually acquired a new image, and the recently established party of Volodymyr Hrynyov—the Interregional Bloc of Reforms—has acquired a new rival in the battle for minds and votes of "liberally disposed" citizens.

Right-Centrist Majority Seen 'Wishful'

WS2601101795 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian
18 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Stepan Romanchuk: "'New Majority' and 'Accord'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The arrangement of political forces in the parliament changed from session to session in 1994. While the left-wing forces held the absolute majority at the first session, they lost it at the second one. According to a widely held belief, the third session will bring another surprise: the right-centrist majority which might supposedly arise. However, such a prediction seems to be nothing more than just wishful thinking on the part of the politicians interested in this scenario of developments.

This prediction was prompted by consultations of leaders of six non-communist factions; nevertheless, their unification into a single bloc is very doubtful. Primarily, because there is no ideological base for such a union. If nationalists from the Rukh and the "Statehood" [faction] ally with pro-Russian liberals from the Interregional Deputies' Group [MDH], the "Unity" [faction], and the former nomenklatura from the "Center" [faction], neither the statehood, nor reforms could become the ideology of this union. The only imperative of this bloc can be the servicing of the position of President Kuchma. In this case, however, the six-faction bloc will be abandoned by those representatives of the democratic camp who do not trust Kuchma, voicing their doubts as to his commitment to national interests and criticizing his economic moves. As the first vote on the draft "Law on Power" showed, the number of such people is large enough to leave the new bloc without an absolute majority.

The main reason that made the faction leaders convene for consultations is the possibility of removing the parliament's leadership and of revising the line-up of the Supreme Council Presidium in case a new majority is forged. Candidacies are already in place. But this very

career motive, which is now the principal propellant for the union, can also prove to be the main factor preventing the process from being completed successfully—more than two competitors would rival for each position. The main stumbling bloc will undoubtedly be the position of Supreme Council chairman. The president's team takes advantage of the faction leaders' ambitions to remove its prime opponent, Oleksandr Moroz. Most probably, the "new majority" idea itself was crafted in a gray building at 11 Bankivska Street [residence of the president]. But Kuchma's protegee slated for legislative speaker is Oleksandr Karpov from the Interregional Deputies' Group. So, the national democrats are left with the choice to either support that man, controlled by the president but alien to the national idea, or to get out of the game. The MDH and the "Unity" will not support candidates of democrats or the "Center" "unreliable" for Kuchma.

Still, creation of a new majority is possible. The association "Accord," headed by former President Kravchuk, can become its prototype. The idea of rallying all, both left and right, forces, which was incorporated into its foundation, based on the protection of Ukraine's national interests can reconcile the Statehood, Rukh, and the "Center" with leftist deputies loyal to the Ukrainian state (pretty numerous in the three leftist factions) and, with Kuchma's economic failures growing, a part of the "Reforms" faction. The process of uniting around Kravchuk depends on two factors. First, Kuchma's integration-minded intentions in the form of the Interstate Economic Committee, the "zero option" agreement on dividing debts and assets, and a cooperation agreement with Russia. Considering Kuchma's electoral promises and Russia's aggressive dictate, there can be practically no doubt that this is going to be the path that Kuchma will opt for—further integration of Ukraine with the CIS—thus giving the "Accord" a chance to invoke the patriotic feelings of Ukrainians. The second factor is the visible divergence of some left-wing deputies from the "proletarian internationalism" to the Eurocommunist ideology—a leftist trend in West Europe recognizing private property and parliamentary democracy, and promising not to undermine the foundation of their states. Post-Communist parties of East European and Baltic states have already adopted such positions. That this process is under way in Ukraine is testified by the evolution of Oleksandr Moroz, who is proceeding down the road that had been paved by Kravchuk—from a communist leader to parliament head of independent Ukraine. By the way, the "Accord" was already joined by Anatoliy Danylenko, member of the legislative Presidium from the leftist agricultural faction. If the evolution of a strong Eurocommunist or national-communist trend based on the leftist movement were completed successfully in Ukraine, this would be a revolutionary event in the Ukrainian political life, because it would make the Left Bank [eastern] part of the country, whose electorate is largely controlled by the leftist forces, loyal to the Ukrainian state.

Speaking about the prospects of the "Accord," it should be remembered that the obvious goal of this association

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is also political support for Leonid Kravchuk during the future presidential elections. Organizationally, the "Accord" is not a party, but some kind of "agreement on civil accord" among various political forces, which best suits the preferences of Ukrainian voters, who have so far displayed little confidence in parties.

1994 Nuclear Production Shows Fewer Violations

LD2501161895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1030 GMT
25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] Last year there were 20 percent fewer violations in the generating sets of nuclear power stations than in the previous year. This was stated by Ukraine's State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power, which has just summed up the work of nuclear power plants for 1994. There were a total of 133 violations at nuclear power plants of which 21 were ranked at level one on the international scale of incidents at nuclear power plants. The rest were rated zero.

Most violations - 61, occurred at five of the generating sets of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant but if one were to proceed from the number of violations occurring at a single generating set then most happened at the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant, which recorded 16.

In generating sets that have water-cooled reactors type 1000, which are predominantly in use at Ukrainian nuclear power plants, in 1994 an average of 10.9 violations were recorded at each generating set while 7.0 violations were recorded at generating sets of the Chernobyl nuclear power plants which has high-powered pressure-tube reactors which means that they were more reliable.

Because of the violations, in 1994 nuclear power stations had a production shortfall of 1,688,650 kWh of electricity, as a result of stoppages connected with maintenance they underproduced by 2,821,500 kWh, and because of restrictions on the generating sets' capacity for various reasons there was a shortfall of 6,343,450 kWh. Overall, the shortfall in the production of electric power amounted to 16 percent of output.

On the whole nuclear, power plants in 1994 produced 68,847,600 kWh of energy or 34 percent of Ukraine's energy output. This is 98.4 percent of the initial projection or 104.6 percent of the adjusted figure because of delays in supplies of nuclear fuel, faults in the individual elements of the protection and control systems of water-cooled reactors, and changes in the maintenance schedules.

Crimean Council Protests Kiev Legislation

954F1045 Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in
Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1

[Supreme Council letter to President of Ukraine L.D. Kuchma]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Leonid Danilovych!

On 18 May 1994, the president of Ukraine issued edict 233/94—"On the Main Administration of Internal Affairs in Crimea of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine," which reorganized the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea into the Main Administration of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, bringing it directly under the jurisdiction of the minister of internal affairs of Ukraine.

In execution of this edict, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Decree 317 of 18 May 1994 "On the Main Administration of Internal Affairs in Crimea of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine."

The said decisions not only conflict with current legislation but also make considerably more difficult interaction between the internal affairs authorities and other organs of state power in Crimea.

For an improvement in this interaction, the stabilization of the work of the Crimean militia, and increased responsibility for the accomplishment of the assignments in the organization of the fight against crime, the Supreme Council of Crimea, as the spokesman for the wishes of the people, requests that you accelerate a decision on the question of the restoration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Crimea.

[Signed] Supreme Council of Crimea.

[Dated] City of Simferopol, 20 January 1995

No 11-1 SC.

Meshkov on Anniversary of Crimean Referendum

954F1019A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in
Russian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[Text of address by Republic of Crimea President Yu. Meshkov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear citizens of the Republic of Crimea! 20 January is a special date in the life of each of us. On this date four years ago, the peninsula residents for the first time became aware of themselves as one whole—a multi-ethnic people capable of making serious and responsible decisions.

On that memorable day, most Crimeans spoke in favor of the restoration of Crimean statehood—for the Republic of Crimea—as a Union component and a participant in the Union Treaty.

This date became a very important event that has a truly historic significance for the future of Crimea, and the determinant point in the development of the political situation on the peninsula and far outside its borders.

The restoration of the Republic of Crimea's statehood is inarguable from the standpoint of international law, since it happened from the "grass roots"—through a free expression of popular will.

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In February 1991, Ukraine recognized the results of the referendum, and with it our republic's right to statehood.

Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, up to the disintegration of the Union, the letter and the spirit of the first all-Crimea referendum in the part dealing with Crimea's rights as an separate component within the USSR were never implemented.

Over the past years, the Crimeans went through many trials. We acutely feel the consequences of the disruption of mutually beneficial ties with CIS countries and of the severe economic crisis that broke out in Ukraine, which placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of most inhabitants of the peninsula. This put a brake on the progress of vitally important reforms, whose implementation is in the interest of the majority of the population.

More than once, certain forces in Crimea and outside it tested the resilience of our state and the Crimeans' will, exerting direct pressure on us to force us to deviate from the chosen road.

The confrontation between the branches of authority did not improve Crimeans' life. It did not make it more secure and prosperous—rather the opposite.

Now as never before, we must do everything to reach accord in Crimea, get the branches of authority to work together for the benefit of each citizen of the republic. We will always remember the motto inscribed in our state seal: "Prosperity in Unity!"

Crimea will necessarily become a bridge of friendship between brotherly Slavic people.

Dear friends, citizens of the Republic of Crimea!

My greetings to you on the momentous date in the history of our state—the Day of Restoration of Crimean Statehood.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Crimea Yu. Meshkov

Simferopol

Economic Issues

Masol, Chernomyrdin Sign Protocol; Details Noted

WS260111395 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0900 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] On January 24, the Ukrainian and Russian Prime Ministers, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vitaliy Masol, signed the agreement on basic principles of trade and economic cooperation for 1995 and protocol regarding the restructuring of the Ukrainian debt to Russia for 1994. According to this agreement, the most important types of products will be sold to consumers for negotiated prices through the Russian joint stock companies KAMAZ and RAZNOEXPORT, and the Ukrainian joint stock company

UKRRESURSY ("Ukrainian Resources") and the state concern UKRTECHAGROSERVIS ("Ukrainian Technical Agrarian Services"). According to the agreement, goods turnover will not be subject to export or import taxes. The supplement to this agreement stipulates that in 1995 Ukraine will receive from Russia nearly 56.4 billion cubic meters of gas, 19 million tons of oil and oil condensate, 950 thousand tons of diesel fuel, 100 thousand tons of petrol, four million tons of coal, 19,300 cargo trucks, 16 thousand cars, and 11,550 tractors, etc. In return, Ukraine should ship to Russia two million tons of rolled iron, 250 thousand tons of cast iron, 135 thousand tons of aluminum, 10 thousand tons of titanic ore, five thousand tons of magnesium, 272 thousand tons of meat and dairy products, 55 tons of vegetable oil, and 500 thousand tons of sugar. During 1995, the Ukrainian party will be paying back to Russia its debt for 1994 and interest on the loan granted by the Russian Government on June 24, 1993. Fifty percent of payments can be made in the form of goods, and the remaining part—in hard currency or Russian rubles. Goods will be shipped to Russia by the Ukrainian joint stock company UKRRESURSY, and will be distributed on the Russian market by the Russian joint stock company ROSKONTRAKT ("Russian contract"). In the near future, these two trade companies will sign the protocol which will provide for terms of delivery of these goods, as well as the intergovernmental protocol on periods and dates of the Ukrainian repayment of its debt.

Masol Discusses Energy, Closer CIS Ties

WS2601114595 Kiev URYADOVY KURYER in Ukrainian 17 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol by Viktor Kosenko; place and date not given: "Ukraine's Prime Minister: Cooperation Is a Language Clear to Everybody"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the very creation of the CIS, Ukraine's role and place in this formation, as well as its relations with other newly independent states that sprang up on the former Soviet territory, has always been a pressing issue. It is now becoming even more acute and acquiring new aspects. Opinions are very different on this issue, ranging from the immediate departure from the Commonwealth to restoration of the [Soviet] Union.

[Kosenko] What do you think about this as head of the Ukrainian Government?

[Masol] First of all, I would like to spell out my principal position regarding not just this issue. We should take life as it comes, fully taking into consideration its realities instead of bending it to previously devised blueprints. Otherwise, one has to pay dearly for this.

I will speak mainly on economics. First, this is something that I am supposed to do all the time. Second, unlike politics, you cannot make an abrupt change by one or several, even most radical, decisions. Finally, everything

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that is happening in this sphere produces an immediate and direct impact on the condition of the entire society and our well-being.

It has become banal to liken the national economy to a complex organism sensibly reacting to the slightest—and seemingly of local importance—failures in its operation. But this is the truth. Here is an example from the times of the Soviet Union: due to the absence of spare parts worth even a penny manufactured in one of the republics, warehouses of nearly all television plants throughout the country were jammed with almost finished products.

Facts like this one can surely be explained by flaws of the overcentralized economy. But we have not yet escaped from it too far. The abrupt and total disruption of economic ties which were being established for decades inevitably resulted in a painful process with lingering negative consequences. Ukraine and other CIS states have fully experienced them.

Life can teach only those who are willing to learn. Even the staunchest optimists, I guess, have understood that it is not so easy to leave the traditional economic zone. The West and other developed countries are not waiting for us and our products with open arms. No one should be blamed for this; it is just a distinctive feature of the pragmatic market era.

Numerous facts make us understand that Ukraine's central sphere of economic interests is in the CIS and our closest neighbors in the West. This is where our prime sources of raw material supplies, energy sources, and assembly parts, as well as markets to sell our manufactured products are all located. Whether you like it or not, one thing is indisputable: a closed and isolated economy, primarily from its traditional partners, is not capable of coping with crisis phenomena, or developing normally altogether.

It is another thing that economic links, including with the other CIS states, should be equal and mutually beneficial, and be initiated and promoted at the state level. This is exactly what the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers sees as one of its key tasks. It is about the large-scale trade and economic cooperation. Our delegation is now on a visit to Moscow to sign such an agreement.

Intensified were official and personal contacts with leaders of Russia and other CIS member countries. For example, I met with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Deputy Prime Ministers Soskovets and Bolshakov, and had telephone conversations with Minister of Power Engineering Shafranik. The problem of energy sources was always central.

[Kosenko] My next question is connected with energy sources, too. Many people encounter difficulties in their deficient supplies—both at workplaces and at home. The

press furnishes often incomplete or contradicting information on this. Based on this information, it is hard to assess the present situation, reasons for the disrupted deliveries, and prospects for the future. What is, so to say, the first-hand information on this?

[Masol] Let me be honest: the situation is actually very complicated, especially in power engineering. For various reasons, electric power stations entered this winter with a limited stock of fuels, primarily coal. To make things worse, Turkmenistan suspended its gas deliveries in November. As the financial assistance promised by the West did not arrive on time, we had nothing with which to pay for that gas.

I feel compassion with the people when entire enterprises, residential areas, and town districts are cut off from electricity. On the other hand, we should realize that the consequences could have been much worse, if not disastrous, if the Ukrainian Government had not undertaken emergency measures.

In the first place, we had to do all possible and impossible things to compensate, at least in part, for the Turkmen gas. Russia should receive credit for agreeing to increase its gas supplies above the previously specified volumes. This to a considerable extent helped us avoid stoppages at our electric stations. In addition, in December Russia sold us a certain amount of electricity.

This support and recognition of problems of our state displayed by Russia should definitely be highly praised. After all, gas is sent to us on credit and at a time when our gas indebtedness exceeded \$1.5 billion already in 1993-1994.

The problem of energy sources will remain a priority also in the new year. I hold meetings with heads of the involved ministries and institutions twice a week. Initial headway, if not substantial, has already been achieved. The stocks of coal at electric power stations were increased by an additional 300,000 tonnes, and of black oil by 20,000 tonnes. Energy industry workers daily receive more than 10,000 cubic meters of gas than before.

[Masol] There are grounds to hope for improvement in the sphere of coal supplies. Ukrainian coal miners began to work better. Part of the fuel is purchased in Russia, Kazakhstan, and in Poland. The latter was agreed upon during my meeting with Polish Prime Minister Fawlak. First loads of a total of 2 million tonnes of Polish coal have already been received.

The situation with gas remains strained. Unlike all other energy sources, it can only be supplied from Russia and Turkmenistan. But we hope for the better in this sphere, too.

I would like to add that urgent as the issue of energy sources is, it does not set the limits for our work to restore and expand economic ties with Russia and the CIS states in general. We are trying to tackle this issue in

a multifaceted manner aimed at supporting national manufacturers. This effort includes expanding markets for their products, and granting tax, customs, and other benefits to the suppliers of assembly parts and products. I managed to reach a fundamental agreement with Russian Prime Minister Bolshakov on increased deliveries to Ukraine, compared with the volumes of 1994.

[Kosenko] How do you think the recent events in Russia, and in Chechnya in particular, can affect the status and prospects for cooperation with that country?

[Masol] It is a major concern when blood is shed and people die. It cannot be explained or, worse, justified. However, I would once again like to separate politics from economics. I believe that good will and common sense will finally prevail. We should by no means let anyone use the present situation to the detriment of good-neighborly and economic relations, whose restoration calls for tremendous efforts. Our peoples will continue to live and cooperate. However unsettling and grave the situation is, one should think about tomorrow. We simply have no right to sacrifice it to the immediate political interests.

[Kosenko] The so-called "zero option" agreement that you signed this past December on dividing assets and debts of the former Soviet Union occupies a prominent position in Ukrainian-Russian relations. It provoked mixed reactions. Some even described the signature of this agreement in the present wording as encroachment on the Ukrainian national interests. What would you answer your opponents?

[Masol] Left unsettled for quite a while, this issue put visible strains on relations between our states. This is why I would like to ask my opponents: What results could have been achieved at the negotiations if Ukraine had left its position regarding the "zero option" intact? I am sure not positive ones, and with all the ensuing consequences.

These are obvious things. If you dig deeper, by signing the "zero option" agreement, Ukraine resolves a whole range of mutually related political and economic problems.

As I have repeatedly commented on this issue, let me touch upon the most important, in my opinion, aspects. Special attention deserves the freeing of Ukraine from repaying debts of the former Soviet Union and interests on them. Such a respite is very valuable at a time when hard currency is not enough to meet even the most pressing economic needs. Especially when it is about \$700-million annual payments.

Another equally important point is that the signing of the agreement in this wording was a mandatory condition for restructuring Ukraine's debts according to agreements signed in May and June 1993. An opportunity has come up now to postpone the repayment of the main state debt and interests on it for two or three years, which makes up about \$500 million annually.

Also important is the political victory. By embracing the "zero option," Ukraine has reinforced confidence in itself on the part of the world community, especially the dozens of countries and hundreds of foreign banks that used to be creditors of the former Soviet Union. Now, they received a clearly determined debt payer, Russia, and can count on Russia's repaying their credits. As for Ukraine, it could only symbolically declare itself one of the Soviet Union's successors: the present abilities of our state would not allow it to return its portion of debt, whether in the short- or long-term perspective.

In this case, it is one step from politics to economics. The correctness of the adopted decision is proved by the important fact that after Ukraine signed the agreement, the West reactivated—suspended until then—credit lines to Ukraine.

I know that the following argument is mounted against the agreement: We bid too low a price, because the former Soviet Union's foreign assets may prove much larger than those offered to us by the "zero option." At first glance, it sounds convincing. However, the assessment of those assets, though assigned to the internationally recognized company, has not been completed until now. Besides, there is no guarantee that all debtors of the former USSR would quickly and fully settle all accounts with its successors. After all, the lion's share of this debt stems from the military shipments to pro-communist authoritarian regimes. Liquidity of such assets is low, while losing time in our conditions means losing very much, if not everything.

So, I still believe, as I always did, that the decision regarding the "zero option," approved by the Ukrainian president, was balanced, correct, and serving the national interests of our state.

I would like to summarize the above with the following. States and peoples of the former USSR, all without exception, are going through hard times now. In this situation, there is an especially acute need to seek common language and common points of interaction in overcoming the economic crisis. Mutually beneficial cooperation can and should become such a common and universally understandable language, which should be fostered regardless of what political winds are blowing over the vast land that used to be called the Soviet Union.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Meets With NATO Secretary General

LD2501110195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 2002 GMT 24 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* special correspondents Gennadiy Kulagin and Aleksandr Minayev]

[*FBIS Translated Text*] Brussels, 24 Jan (*ITAR-TASS*)—The most important thing for the CIS countries now is not to allow bloodshed within the Commonwealth, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan told *ITAR-TASS* in Brussels following his meeting today with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes.

Kazakhstan's head of state went on to say that at the next CIS "summit" in Almaty the Kazakhstan delegation would be putting forward a draft document called the Pact on Stability and Peace in the CIS. The president recalled his earlier initiative for convening a conference on confidence measures in the continent of Asia, which was supported by 27 countries, including Russia, China, and India. Should this conference be convened, an organization formed on that basis would be able to cooperate with the OSCE to create the conditions for a global security structure in the vast continent of Asia.

The drawing up of an individual partnership program for Kazakhstan and NATO and security on the Eurasian continent were discussed during the meeting. N. Nazarbayev noted that increasing military cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia does not go against the NATO partnership program. The armies of the two countries remain the independent armed forces of independent states.

The president said that he proposed making cooperation in clearing up the aftermath of the nuclear tests at the former Semipalatinsk test site and the ecological disaster in the Aral Sea area a special clause in the individual partnership program for Kazakhstan and NATO.

On the same day the state flag of Kazakhstan was raised over an attractive villa in the Bois de la Cambre in the southern outskirts of Brussels. The official opening of Kazakhstan's embassy in the Benelux and EC countries was held there. Addressing the guests, N. Nazarbayev stressed that Kazakhstan is becoming active in the world community and is building equal relations with many countries. This is the republic's 21st embassy abroad, and there are around 40 diplomatic missions accredited in Almaty.

Agreement With Russia on Citizenship

954F10041 Almaty *KAZAKHISTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian* 21 Jan 95 p 1

[*Agreement Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation on Simplification of the Procedure for Obtaining Citizenship by Citizens of the Republic of

Kazakhstan Arriving for Permanent Residence in the Russian Federation and Citizens of the Russian Federation Arriving for Permanent Residence in the Republic of Kazakhstan"]

[*FBIS Translated Text*] The Republic of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation, henceforth referred to as the Parties, proceeding from a striving of the peoples of the two countries to maintain and strengthen historic and traditional friendly ties and relations of good-neighborliness, reaffirming their adherence to obligations with respect to guaranteeing their citizens the observance of generally accepted international norms and human rights and freedoms, desiring to ensure favorable conditions for the exercise by their citizens of the right to select and acquire citizenship of the other Party on the basis of free will of the people, guided by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 25 May 1992 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation, and the Memorandum on Basic Principles of Resolving Issues Related to Citizenship and the Legal Status of Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan Permanently Residing in the Russian Federation and Citizens of the Russian Federation Permanently Residing in the Republic of Kazakhstan, dated 28 March 1994, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. Each Party affords its citizens arriving for permanent residence in the territory of the other Party simplified (registration) procedure for the acquisition of citizenship, when one of the following conditions are present:

a) When the applicant was a citizen of the Kazakh SSR or RSFSR and simultaneously a USSR citizen in the past, resided in these territories as of 21 December 1991, and has been permanently residing there up to entry into force of this Agreement, and/or

b) When the applicant has close relatives who are citizens of the Parties: husband (wife), parents (adoptive parents), children (including adopted children), sisters, brothers, grandfather or grandmother, permanently residing as citizens in the territory of the Party of citizenship to be acquired.

2. The procedure indicated in Point 1 of this article is applicable to citizens of the Parties permanently residing in the territory of the other Party, regardless of the period of residence in the territory of the Party of citizenship to be acquired.

The relinquishment of citizenship with respect to one Party and acquisition of citizenship with respect to the other Party are effected on the basis of the free will of the persons concerned.

Article 2

To relinquish citizenship with respect to one Party or acquire citizenship with respect to the other Party in accordance with the simplified procedure, a citizen of

one Party submits to the appropriate organs of the other Party the following documents:

- Application filled out as coordinated by competent organs of the Parties,
- Copy of birth certificate,
- Document confirming application of one of the conditions stipulated in Point 1, Article 1.

The organs of internal affairs effect registration of citizenship with respect to the Parties acquired in accordance with simplified procedure within a period of three months, observing the requirements envisaged by domestic legislation of the Parties.

In the event citizenship with respect to one Party is acquired with simultaneous relinquishment of citizenship with respect to the other Party, the person submitting application in this regard retains his citizenship with respect to the other Party until such time as a positive decision is made on his application.

Article 3

A person permanently residing in the territory of one Party who was born in the territory of the other Party, or at least one of whose parents is or was a citizen of that Party permanently residing or formerly residing in the territory of that Party, who has not registered his citizenship affiliation with either of the Parties as of the date this Agreement enters into force, is guaranteed the right by each of the Parties to freely choose citizenship of either of the Parties, at his own discretion, within one year of entry into force of this Agreement.

Article 4

1. When the citizenship of parents changes, both parents becoming citizens of the other Party or both relinquishing citizenship of one of the Parties, the citizenship of their minor offspring changes accordingly.
2. The citizenship of minor offspring, one of whose parents is a citizen of one Party and the other parent acquires citizenship of the other Party, is determined by agreement of the parents, which must be expressed in application submitted in accordance with Article 2.
3. Children whose parents live separately retain the citizenship of the parent in whose care they are entrusted, unless a different agreement exists between the parents in this regard.
4. The established citizenship of children who reach adulthood, one of whose parents has citizenship in the Republic of Kazakhstan and the other—citizenship in the Russian Federation, may be changed in accordance with legislation of the Parties through the simplified procedure.
5. The citizenship of children does not change when a change occurs in the citizenship of their parents deprived

of parental rights. The consent of parents deprived of parental rights is not required for changing the citizenship of the children.

Article 5

Issues not treated in this Agreement are resolved by the Parties in accordance with domestic legislation of the Parties.

If the domestic legislation of the Parties establishes more advantageous conditions for the acquisition of citizenship for a certain category of individual, the domestic legislation of the Parties is applied in this instance.

Each Party shall adopt measures to bring its legislation on citizenship into closer conformance with that of the other Party.

Article 6

Matters related to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved through consultations between the Parties.

Article 7

This Agreement is subject to ratification and enters into force as of the 30th day following the date of exchange of ratification instruments by the Parties.

Article 8

This Agreement is valid for a period of five years from its date of entry into force and is automatically extended for a subsequent five-year period unless one of the Parties declares otherwise at least six months before the expiration of the period in question.

Done 20 January 1995 in the city of Moscow, in two copies, each in the Kazakh and Russian language, both texts being equally valid.

[Signed] For the Republic of Kazakhstan

N. NAZARBAYEV

For the Russian Federation

B. YELTSIN

Deputy Premier Views Economic Policy

*LD2501152595 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian
21 Jan 95 p3*

[Interview with Viktor Sobolev, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by correspondent Irina Bektiyarova—place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bektiyarova] Victor Vasilyevich, the Cabinet of Ministers has approved the draft republican 1995 budget. Tell us, please, about this.

[Sobolev] Yes, the Cabinet of Ministers on 18 January did approve the draft republican 1995 budget. On 20

January it will be submitted to the Supreme Assembly for examination and approval. The draft was compiled on the basis of existing legislation. And an alternative budget has also been drawn up. This version takes into account the taxation code which has also been submitted to the Supreme Assembly for examination.

It is planned that the 1995 deficit will be 3.3 per cent of GDP. The main portion of it will be covered by issuing state securities and foreign sources, and to a considerably smaller degree by a credit from the National Bank.

In 1995 it is planned that the revenue part of the budget will grow by a factor of 2.75 in comparison with the expected implementation of the 1994 budget. On the whole this will be due to the growth in prices, exemption from tax burdens for goods producers (in particular, the mechanism of previous obligatory deductions to the economic reform fund will be abolished. Previously 5 percent of the cost of production was paid to it), and also due to the growth in income taxes (compared to 1994 they will grow by a factor of 1.64).

I want to note that the Cabinet of Ministers has set itself the task of connecting all macro-economic indices. The budget envisages a sharp fall of inflation by almost five-sixths. It is planned to have monthly inflation of 6 percent and annual inflation of 60-70 percent.

The government also intends to stabilize the national currency. The exchange rate of the tenge by the end of the year should not be more than 75 tenge per dollar (today it is 55.6 tenge per dollar, and in January 1994 it was 7.52 tenge per dollar). The monthly fall in the tenge rate is to decrease from today's rate of more than four percent to 1.5 percent. Accordingly the average monthly wage in the economy will increase. We propose that by the end of the year wages will grow to 6,500 tenge (in November the average monthly wage was 3,360 tenge, in December - 3,900 tenge).

We will continue to take measures to eliminate disproportions in and bring closer together wage levels in the production and nonproduction spheres (today they differ by a factor of more than 2.5).

In 1995 it is planned to increase the volumes of manufactured products in the light, food and processing industries, in the construction industry, etc. It is planned to significantly slow the rate of fall of GDP in connection with the restructuring of the economy and the elimination of unprofitable industry.

The Kazakh Government seriously intends to attract foreign investments. The budget envisages a growth in foreign economic activities. International financial institutions - the IMF and the World Bank - intend to allocate Kazakhstan a considerable amount in loans if the reforms are actively implemented.

Essential changes should take place in the social sphere as well. Privileges and compensations are planned for invalids, pensioners and other poorer sections of society

in connection with the liberalization of prices for foodstuffs and chargeable services. So 10 billion tenge is allocated to provide gas, 4.4 billion for liquid fuel and 9.7 billion for coal. Compensation for communal services will be 3.6 billion.

More than 3.1 billion tenge is to be allocated for the implementation of the new housing policy. The education system is to get 33 billion tenge from the budget, health care - 31.7 billion tenge and 2.2 billion tenge is to be allocated for cultural needs.

Kazakh Oil, Gas Production Figures

LD2501201595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1718
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty, Jan 25 (PIA-INTERFAX)—In 1994 oil and gas producing joint ventures located in Kazakhstan produced 20.312 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate and 4.052 billion cubic meters of gas.

Representatives of the Central Control Department of the state enterprise Munaigas, the largest producer of energy resources, reported to the Petroleum Information Agency (PIA) that last year volumes of oil production were 7.1 percent lower than in 1993. The planned volume of extraction was fulfilled by 93.8 percent.

The volume of annual production of oil by joint ventures operating on Kazakhstan's territory was 2.113 million tonnes, practically two times higher than in 1993.

Experts from the Central Control Department point to a substantial reduction in gas extraction—by 36.8 percent compared with 1993 and by 16.6 percent compared with the planned amount.

Tajikistan

Russian Border Guards Rebuff Attacks

LD2501125095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1102
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, Jan 25 (Interfax)—Russian border guards rebuffed two attempts by Islamic Revival Movement militants to penetrate into Tajikistan through the section controlled by the Moskovskiy detachment.

The headquarters of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan told Interfax on Wednesday [25 January] that the Russian border guards had not sustained any losses.

Opposition: Russian Planes Bomb N. Afghanistan

LD2601084495 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan
in Tajik 0300 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] For the fifth time Russian military aircraft have taken off from Tajikistan to carry out bombing raids on northern Afghanistan. According to Kunduz [Afghanistan] regional television, four people

were killed and more than 50 houses destroyed as a result of the last air raid, which took place two days ago [24 January].

More than 45 people have been murdered as a result of savage attacks by the Russian Air Force against peaceful Afghan villages since the beginning of 1995. After the first air raids, Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry protested to the governments of Russia and Tajikistan and warned them to refrain from these foul and militant attacks, otherwise it might have unpleasant consequences for both sides.

Parliamentary Elections To Be Held as Scheduled

LD2601111295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0901 GMT 26 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe January 26 (TASS)-
—The February 26 elections to the National Parliament

of Tajikistan will be held as scheduled, Kholmurod Sharipov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of the republic, told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [26 January]. He denied rumours about a Tajik Government's ostensible intention to postpone the parliamentary election date on a recommendation from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The election date was fixed by the republican parliament and only the parliament is empowered to reconsider it, Sharipov pointed out.

About 400 candidates have been nominated to run for a new National Parliament. The activities of opposition parties and movements were banned by the Supreme Court of Tajikistan in Spring 1993 and may be resumed only provided they re-register at the Ministry of Justice. However, no such applications have been filed so far, Sharipov said.

Armenia

Karabakh Official on Pace of Peace Talks

NC2501160995 Yerevan SNARK in English 0958 GMT 23 Jan 95

[“Azerbaijan Should Change Its Stance at the Negotiations on Karabakh Settlement, Considers Minister of NKR Foreign Affairs”—SNARK headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stepanakert, January 23 (SNARK)—Results of OSCE [CSCE] December Budapest summit, adopting a number of important decisions on Karabakh problem has not effected yet a process of negotiations on conflict settlement in a region, SNARK was told today by Minister of NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] Foreign Affairs Arkadi Ghukasyan.

According to him, some passivity in activity of mediators, in particular of Russia and OSCE after Budapest is probably a result of recent Christmas day and New Year holidays.

The minister expressed his hope that a visit of OSCE Deputy Chairman on Nagorno-Karabakh Per Anderman to conflict zone would revive peacekeeping efforts of mediators. Meanwhile, he mentioned that success of negotiations mainly depends on Azerbaijani stance, which as before puts forward unacceptable for NKR provisional demands.

If official Baku doesn't take into account reality, and don't show constructivism in its approach to negotiations, positive changes can hardly be expected in peace-keeping process, stressed a head of NKR Foreign Department.

Minister: Nuclear Power Station Will Reopen

LD2601112195 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Miron Shishmanyany, the Armenian fuel and power minister, reported that the nuclear power station which was closed down in 1989 will start to generate electricity again in June or July of this year. He said that there are now no obstacles to prevent the resumption of the power station's work, and its start-up will enable the government to approximately halve the volume of water taken from Lake Sevan. In all, the generation of electricity in the republic will increase by 40 percent compared with last year.

It is anticipated that in the second half of the year the inhabitants of the Armenian capital will receive electricity for 10-12 hours a day. At present lighting is permitted for only one hour in apartments in Yerevan.

Six Political Parties Form Election Block

LD2501174495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1634 GMT 25 Jan 95

[From the “Presidential Bulletin” feature: No. 15 (758); compiled by Nikolay Zhrebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Armenia's six political parties, led by the ruling Armenian National Movement (ANM), have formed up an election alliance. The elections have been scheduled for May.

The ANM's information center told Interfax that these parties' union is based on “common ideological and political approaches.” Besides the ANM, the alliance, called the “right-wing block”, includes the republican and social-democratic parties, the Christian-Democratic Union, the Union of Armenian Intellectuals and the Ramkavar Azatakan party (a party which has branched out from the Liberal-Democratic Party of Armenia.)

The “right-wing block” will be opposed by the Union of National Concord, consisting of the National-Democratic Union, the National Self-Determination Association, the Union of Constitutional Law and the Democratic Party. This block also included the Dashnaksutyun party, which was suspended until the end of June.

Observers believe that the absence of such a serious opponent as the Dashnaksutyun party gives the ANM good chances to win the elections.

Meanwhile, the “right-wing block” circulated a document on January 24 which expresses protest against statements by the U.S. State Department and by some of Russia's State Duma deputies in support of the Dashnaks' activity. The document qualifies such statements as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the encouragement of terrorism and drug business of which the Dashnaksutyun party had been accused.

Financial Organizations Not Effected by Political Events

NC2501192295 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1406 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 25/01/95 (NOYAN TAPAN)—“It is necessary to advise the United States and other countries to be careful in their assessments of the internal political events, which take place in Armenia. If resolutions, which do not contradict the legislation are adopted in the Republic, I do not think anybody has the right to evaluate them in the other way”—the Chairman of the Armenian Central Bank Bagrat Asaturyan said at the January 25 press conference.

He stressed that President's decree temporarily suspending the activities of ARF [Armenian Revolutionary Federation]-Dashnaksutyun had not affected the relations with financial organizations.

Currently the Armenian delegation headed by the Armenian Economics Minister Armen Yeghiazarian holds negotiations with The World Bank. The First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Armen Darbinyan participates in these negotiations. The negotiations are running normally and their outcomes will become known soon.

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Budget Deficit Predicted To Decrease This Year*NC2501153395 Yerevan SNARK in English 0844 GMT 25 Jan 95*

["The Budget Deficit in Armenia Will Decrease Twice This Year"—SNARK headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, January 20. (SNARK)—The budget deficit will decrease twice in Armenia. At the same time the deficit will be financed exclusively on account of foreign non-inflationary sources—credits of international financial organizations. These data are informed by the Armenian Minister of Finances Levon Barkhudaryan, today.

Appearing at the joint session of parliamentary commissions, the Minister informed that in the currency account the budgetary income and expenditure parts will increase several times compared with last year. The incomes are planned to be \$214 million, while expenditure will be \$276 million. The expected budget deficit will make 12 percent.

A material decrease of subsidies and grants is planned. At the same time Levon Barkhudarian announced, that this year the republic's budget will have a social incline. According to the project, the production incr [remainder of item not received]

Industry Minister on Industrial Production Rates*NC2501173995 Yerevan SNARK in English 0904 GMT 25 Jan 95*

["Armenian Industry Looks For New Markets"—SNARK headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, January 25 (SNARK)—40 percent of Armenian Ministry of Industry production is already realized by hard currency, announced yesterday Minister of Industry Ashot Safaryan.

Appearing at the joint conference of parliamentary commission, he stated, that last year a production worth \$147 million was produced; at present they have a production worth \$30 million in the stores.

Safaryan said, that last year's greatest achievement was resumption of the works of industrial association "Nairit"—a unique production of rubber. It is expected that the annual volume of production there will make \$60 million.

Last year a new technology was developed enabling to bring the gold portion in the ore up to 70 percent.

Minister also added that in Russia they could not sell a single Armenian machine-tool in 1994.

Armenian industrial enterprises have found new sales markets in Iran, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, Belgium, Northern Africa and other Arabian countries.

The planned increase of production in the system of Armenian Ministry of Industry makes 10 percent in 1995.

Developments in Drug Trafficking, 1994 Figures*NC2501175495 Yerevan SNARK in English 0904 GMT 25 Jan 95*

["Armenian Authorities Worry That the Republic Has Been Turned Into Transit Drug Way"—SNARK headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, January 25 (SNARK)—Armenia is turning into a transit way of drug transportation. This thought was announced at the session of republican state interdepartmental commission on drug addiction and drug business.

SNARK was told in the press-centre of the government, that only in 1994 Armenian law protection bodies confiscated 132 kg of marijuana, 700 kg of heroin, etc. 536 criminal cases have been instituted against more than 90 persons, including 40 persons trailed twice.

The commission claimed to intensify the measures of struggle against drug addiction.

Azerbaijan**Pakistani Foreign Minister Arrives, Signs Agreements***NC2501160295 Yerevan SNARK in English 1729 GMT 24 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku [dateline as received]—Today at noon, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, arrived in Baku. Immediately from the airport he visited the Foreign Office where he met briefly Gasan Gasanov.

Parties signed a protocol on consultations between the Foreign Ministries of two states. A commission to monitor the implementation of adopted resolutions was also set up. The sides initialed the agreements on inter-state relations, development of economic and trade cooperation, as well as cultural, scientific, and humanitarian relations.

Upon signing the documents, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan went to meet Geydar Aliyev.

Aliyev Praises Pakistani Support*LD2501172795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Jan 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Aliyev stated that relations with Pakistan, one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, "are of special

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importance" for his country, because Pakistan has done a great deal for the international recognition of Azerbaijan. "Our people will never forget this," he said.

Receiving Pakistani Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, Aliyev expressed hope that Islamabad will play a positive role in the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the CIS.

Sardar Asif said that Pakistan condemned Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan and "the occupation of Azerbaijani territories," and demanded "an immediate liberation of the occupied territory and the return of the Azerbaijani refugees to their homes." He also announced that he had brought humanitarian and medical aid for the Azerbaijani refugees. He added that "although Pakistan is a poor country, it considers it to be its duty to help Azerbaijani refugees."

He said his country was concerned about the situation in the Caucasus and in other regions of the CIS. "We are particularly worried by the situation in Georgia, Abkhazia and Chechnya," he said. He pointed out that Pakistan was against aggression and the use of force in settling such conflicts and called for solving them through peaceful talks.

He announced that Pakistan was taking every measure to put an end to the civil war in Tajikistan and to settle the conflict between the warring groupings in Afghanistan. One more round of talks between the Tajik opposition and government, and between the warring Afghan factions will be held soon under Islamabad mediation.

He informed Aliyev of the internal situation in Pakistan, including the Kashmir problem. He believes that the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir conflict is slowed down by India's militant position which is a source of tensions in the entire South Asian region. He said that the presence of nuclear weapons in India is making Pakistan begin developing nuclear weapons, too.

Aliyev thanked the Pakistani guest for "solidarity and support in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict" and said that "Baku shares Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue and will support Islamabad."

IF Note: On Tuesday [24 January], Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov and his Pakistani counterpart Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali initialled the inter-state agreement on trade and economic cooperation. This document envisages a four-year \$10 million credit at 5 percent annually, and is likely to be signed during the Azerbaijani-Pakistani summit to be held next spring. They also initialled the inter-state agreement on the development of scientific and cultural contacts, and signed the protocol on political consultations between the foreign ministries.

Ali: India Forces Nuclear Arming

LD2501161795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1335
GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Jan 25 (Interfax)—
"The militancy of India and the fact that it possesses

nuclear weapons force Pakistan to start work in that area too," Pakistani Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali said Tuesday [24 January].

It is India's "militant attitudes" that prevent the Jammu and Kashmir issue, Pakistan's chief problem, from being resolved by negotiation, the minister told Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev in Baku.

"The militancy of India is the source of tension in the whole of the South Asian region," he said.

Aliyev responded that Baku shared Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue.

Jammu and Kashmir have been a bone of contention for India and Pakistan since 1947, when the two states emerged from former British India.

India has always denied possessing nuclear weapons.

Aliyev Addresses Caspian Sea Oil Consortium Talks

NC2501164695 Baku TURAN in English 1728 GMT
24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, January 24 (TURAN)—
A first session of the Steering Committee for the joint development with the consortium of foreign companies the oil fields "Azeri", "Chirag" and "Guneshly" in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea opened today in Baku.

The president Geydar Aliyev addressed at the session. He congratulated the participants of the session with the beginning of the implementation of the "contract of century". "The discussion of the contract lasted for three years and there were some forces who observed the negotiations with great interest and tried to prevent them. But the will of the Azeri people, its desire for healthy co-operation with the West helped to overcome the resistance," said Aliyev. The attempts to prevent the implementation of the contract within and beyond the country were stopped, said the president.

The contract was approved by the Azeri Parliament and on December 12, 1994 a Law of the Azerbaijan Republic signed by the president was adopted. Thus a legal and the economic basis for its implementation was provided. "But despite the difficulties on the way to signing the contract its implementation will be much more difficult," said the president.

The contract is signed for the term of 30 years but I am concerned with the works during the first years of its implementation. He drew the attention to the fact that certain sources spread the opinion that the oil companies are not going to hurry with the implementation of the contract. There are some opinions that till 1998 the contract will be of no profit for Azerbaijan. "I assess these statements as an attempt of revenge by the sources who did not manage to prevent the signing of the contract," said Aliyev. He appealed to the participants of

the contract to speed up the works and to execute the program of works of first priority before schedule.

The Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea has the other unexplored oil and gas fields and we are ready to attract for their development the new oil companies, said Aliyev. After the address of the President Aliyev the participants of the session started the work. The results of this works the press will report later.

Aliyev Meets BP Delegation, Lord Ashburton

NC2501151195 Baku TURAN in English 1728 GMT
24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 24) TURAN—Last evening President Aliyev received the delegation of British Petroleum [BP] company headed by the Chairman of Board of Directors of BP, Lord Ashburton.

"All the ways are opened for the consortium's activity. The oil contract was ratified in December by the Presidential decree. Being the president I carried out my task. Now we have to work," President Aliyev said during his talk with Lord Ashburton.

Lord Ashburton said that the purpose of his visit to Azerbaijan is once again acknowledge the obligations BP company committed itself with. "We hope that within several months we will settle a number of the issues, including the issue on the route of the oil pipeline," he mentioned.

President Aliyev said that he sees the visit of Lord Ashburton to Azerbaijan as a starting point in the realization of the contract.

Then the meeting continued behind the closed doors.

Progress of Talks With Shell Oil Reported

NC2501163495 Baku TURAN in English 1728 GMT
24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, January 24 (TURAN)—"Over the last time such a big oil companies as Mobil, Exxon, Shell and ELF made proposals to enter the oil consortium and to receive 20 percent of the project which belongs to the Republic of Azerbaijan," the journalists were told by the president of SOCAR [State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic] Natig Aliyev. [sentence as received]

But the representatives of Shell were received by the president of the republic. It gives a ground for the analysis to think that just this company will have chances to win the competition for the 20 percent share of Azerbaijan in the consortium.

The representatives of Shell consider that participation of such company in the consortium can be approved economically only if it has the rights of one of the operators which according to the contract are "BP" and "AMOCO" (with a break for 5 years.) Shell would be able to speed up the implementation of the contract and to shorten the time for

the production of profit oil by the Azerbaijan. In this case the share of Shell's participation in the consortium should not be less than the share of "BP"—17.1267 percent and "AMOCO"—17.010 percent.

Having accepted the terms of Shell Azerbaijan will have to yield its total share 20 percent. In this case Azerbaijan will remain the party of the contract and will be represented in the consortium, said Natig Aliyev.

The terms of submitting the financial guarantees by Azerbaijan expire on February 9 1995. By this time [remainder of item not received]

Foreign Minister on Karabakh Official's Statement

NC2501165095 Baku TURAN in English 1417 GMT
25 Jan 95

["Peaceful Settlement of the Armenian-Azeri Conflict Is Hardly Probable at the Present Stage"—TURAN headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 25) TURAN—"Two problems remain unsolved in the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict: signing of the political agreement after the completion of the negotiations and the formation of the OSCE's [CSCE] peace-keeping forces," said Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov. According to the minister the main prevention on the way of solution of the conflict is the refusal of Armenia to liberate the Azeri cities Shusha and Lachin. "Armenia considers that Shusha is inseparable part of Nagorno-Karabakh, and by controlling the Lachin city they are going to create a complete system of the communication between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh."

"Azerbaijan does not agree with that as Shusha and Lachin as well as Nagorno-Karabakh are the inseparable parts of Azerbaijan," said Gasan Gasanov.

The position of Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in this question is quite different. Thus, "the Foreign Minister" of Nagorno-Karabakh Arkadi Ghukasyan interviewed by the SNARK agency on January 23 that "success of the negotiations depends on the position of Azerbaijan the terms of which are not acceptable for Nagorno-Karabakh." "If the official Baku does not take into account the present realities, there can hardly be any positive shift in the peacekeeping process," said he. Armenia will not agree to return Shusha and Lachin but will also oppose the stay of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan," said he.

Judging by all there will not be any significant changes in the positions of the sides and the drawing of the rope [as received] from one place to another will delay the process, so the problem will not be settled.

According to TURAN experts presently one can rely on only the continuation of a cease fire regime and in future

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it can be the basis for the continuation of the negotiations. However there were exchange of fire on the northern part of the Armenian-Azeri front (Geranboy region of Azerbaijan.) These information witness that this peace is very fragile and military actions can be resumed any time.

Georgia

Abkhazia Unable To Guarantee Safety of UN Monitors

LD2501182895 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 1640 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to reports from Zugdidi, the UN observers deployed in Gali Rayon have been told by the Abkhaz side that in connection with the exacerbation of the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the local administration cannot be responsible for the security of the UN observers during their movement on Abkhaz territory.

Russian Parliamentary Delegation Meets Abkhaz Refugees

LD2501154195 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1345 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi—A peace-keeping delegation of the interparliamentary assembly of the Russian Federation Council arrived in Georgia on 24 January. The delegation is led by Vadim Gustov, chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs. The Russian delegation held meetings with the Georgian leadership. A meeting with Abkhaz separatist leaders has also been planned.

The most difficult of all meetings held yesterday was the one with refugees from Abkhazia. Members of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia were at the meeting. Those who addressed the meeting slammed the Abkhaz separatists' and their patrons' actions which hampered the process of the return of the refugees to their homes and the restoration of peace in Abkhazia.

Lt Gen Vasiliy Yakushev, commander of the Russian peace-keeping forces in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, also came under a barrage of heavy criticism. Yakushev, who attended the meeting, was blamed for the fact that peace-keeping forces were not making efforts for creating security for the civilians in Gali rayon - who were plundered and abused by the Abkhaz militants. Refugees demanded resolute measures be taken and the Abkhaz separatists' illegal formations disarmed.

Russian Commander: Peacekeepers Are Not Police

LD2501165695 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in 1325 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi— The delegation of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and the Russian Federation Council on 24 January met Georgian MPs. The commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Yakushev, addressed the meeting by saying that the Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone could not carry out the duties of the police. According to him, the conflict in Abkhazia and the return of the refugees to their homes could only be resolved by political means. Yakushev noted that recently the process of the return of the refugees had been suspended and if the process was not speeded up, then it would take 50 years before the refugees could return to their homes. Yakushev added that the military could not replace politicians and that political and public organizations as well as MPs must make every effort to settle the Abkhaz conflict.

Explosion Reported at Russian Troops Headquarters

LD2601103395 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 0950 GMT 26 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (IPRINDA)—An IPRINDA correspondent was told at the press center of the headquarters of the Russian troops deployed in the Transcaucasus that on 26 January at 0150 [2150 GMT 25 January], an unidentified powerful explosive device went off at the fence of the headquarters facade. There are no casualties but the guard has been blown away by the force of the explosion, which also blew out glass from the windows in five floors. An investigation has been launched into the case. The press center of the headquarters brands this as a terrorist act perpetrated by destructive forces and aimed at damaging relations between Georgia and Russia.

Shevardnadze on 'Terrorist' Attack on Former Ministers

LD2501175195 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze this evening expressed concern about the terrorist act in Moscow. Shevardnadze also expressed confidence that the law enforcement bodies in Russia, and Moscow in particular, with the help of the relevant structures in Georgia, will take all necessary measures to clear up this crime and detain the criminals. Eduard Shevardnadze stated that there was no doubt that the highly qualified specialists from the Sklifasovskiy Clinic would do all they could to save the life of General Georgiy Karkarashvili.

Estonia

NATO Involved in Designing Defense Concept

LD2501153895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning a conference began at the Estonian Foreign Ministry on developing Estonia's defense concept. Its aim is to discuss issues dealing with the Estonian defense concept and to determine ways for its implementation. Attending the conference are Major General Aleksandr Einseln, the Estonian defense forces commander, and Defense Minister Enn Tupp. The opening paper was read by Chris Donnelly, the NATO secretary general's special adviser on central and eastern European affairs.

Among those attending are representatives of the presidential office, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the defense forces general staff, as well as officials of NATO and other international organizations.

The conference is today working in four groups and aims to establish during today and tomorrow the role of the mass media, civilians, and the military defense system, as well as that of the economy, and moral values involved in drawing up a state defense concept.

Finland, Sweden Provide Equipment for Border Guard

LD2501125895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0700 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Representatives of the Finnish border guard will be handing over two ships to the Estonian border guards today, at Tallinn border guard harbor [as heard]. They are guard vessels meant for patrolling within the economic zone and for rescue work. Heads of both Estonian and Finnish interior ministries and other officials will attend the handover ceremony today.

Motorized sledges provided by the Swedish government will also be handed over today. [passage omitted] The sledges are meant for patrolling on the ice of Lake Peipus. Apart from ten motorized sledges, Estonia will also receive five small sledges, two trailers for transporting the sledges, mobile Motorola-type receivers and radios, and other equipment.

Security Issues Discussed With Swiss President

LD2501140595 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Lennart Meri had a meeting with Kaspar Villiger, the president of the Swiss Confederation, in Berne yesterday. This has been reported by the presidential press service. During the meeting ideas were exchanged about Estonian political developments and security issues as well as the possible impact of the Chechen war on Europe's relations with

Russia. According to the press service, Villiger expressed his admiration and pleasure at Estonia's swift progress.

President Meri had also a meeting with the speakers and MPs of both parliamentary chambers of the Confederation. According to the press service, Lennart Meri emphasized that although the Russian troop's departure from the Estonian soil was significant for Estonian security, it did not by far resolve our security problem. [passage omitted]

Meri Says Russia Should Negotiate With Dudayev

AU2401161595 Berlin DIE WELT in German 21 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by President Lennart Meri: "Russia Has Recognized Chechnya Unintentionally"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Moscow's view, the war against the Republic of Chechnya is Russia's "internal affair" since Chechnya forms part of the Russian Federation. Formally, this claim is correct, and not just in Russia's view. The world public would have put up with a quick and successful police operation against the "secessionist" republic and would have tried to find parallels from the secession of the American southern states from the northern states. It would have accepted reluctantly Moscow's exotic terminology such as "bandits" and "illegal arms groups," a terminology that was last used during World War II.

For some politicians, it has remained a mystery that Dzhokhar Dudayev seceded from Russia just as the colony at the time of George Washington did from Great Britain. However, quantity has the unfortunate characteristic of turning into a new quality when it grows. Instead of a quick and noiseless police operation, the world has become the witness of a war into which the regular troops of the Russian Federation were commanded—air forces, helicopter gunships, artillery, missiles, tanks, naval infantry. A situation has developed that could be called absurd, if it had not at the same time claimed such a tragically large number of victims for both warring parties and if it had not been so disastrous for Europe's security system.

The Russian Federation has broken two essential international rules. Provided this is an "internal affair" of Russia, it is using military force against its own citizens. The Kremlin thereby is violating the Moscow final document of 1991 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which does not permit any country to consider the violation of human rights as its internal affair, but places human rights under international control. By deploying an immensely superior regular army against the Republic of Chechnya, the Russian Federation has violated the equally central Vienna OSCE document of 1992, in which the Russian Federation binds itself to observe fixed rules in the deployment, transfer, and use of troops. General

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Dzhokhar Dudayev turned to several countries, including the Republic of Estonia, with the appeal to recognize the Republic of Chechnya. Paradoxically, the Russian Federation by its declaration of war proved to be the first country to recognize—unintentionally—Chechnya de facto as a country that fights for its right of self-determination with the weapon in its hand.

The question is whether Europe is able to see dangers in order to prevent crises. Every mountaineer knows that a stone that has started rolling can touch off a fatal avalanche. The tragedy in Chechnya shows us that politicians must learn this simple truth from the mountaineers. Having returned from a very long Christmas holiday, back at their desks they have found a changed world. The media had supplied moving pictures reminding us of World War II, showing us the all out bombing of Grozny, housewives who, lining up for bread, were hit by shrapnel, a kindergarten under artillery fire, from the empty window of which a Father Christmas with a Chechen face drawn by a child's hand was looking at Europe reproachfully. The correspondents did not celebrate Christmas. The brutal truth on Chechnya has reached every corner in the world through the Russian Government's human rights commissioner, Sergey Kovalev. This leads us to a positive and a negative conclusion.

- First, Russian democracy is stronger than the Russian democratic parties. The failed attempts of conservative parties to reintroduce censorship show that the time of muzzles in Russia is over.
- Second, rarely has there been an equally wide gap between public opinion in Russia, Europe, and the United States, on the one hand, and the establishment, on the other.

The political parties are under strong pressure to bring their foreign policy programs with the new reality in line, which—strictly speaking—is not so new but is the old forgotten one. Before our eyes, realpolitik on the one hand, and the basic principles of democracy, on the other, on which international law is based, have clashed. Realpolitik does not solve problems, but shifts them along with the avalanche of results, which sooner or later catches up with us and buries us. The comfortable and lazy realpolitik of the past does not fit into our changed time any more. International law requires a political will. If such will is missing, the relations between countries will be shaped by brutal force instead of the law. So Europe will be able to recognize the dangers if it undertakes the effort to recognize Russian democracy and to support the painful democratization process.

Since the European Union has enough to do with itself, the question could be asked why it should sacrifice its limited opportunities for Russia. However, the Chechen tragedy is a European tragedy because it is also and above all a tragedy of Russia itself—the desperate plot of the Russian conservatives to stop the democratization of society, turn the state's back to Europe, cut themselves

off in order to maintain their feudalist privileges. There is no doubt about the fact that they enjoy certain sympathies among the people, the people that the learned Western advisers have baited with illusions of simple reforms and quickly attainable prosperity. The dangerous wishful dream has been clearly enhanced by Western politicians who have failed to see that modern Russia is a mixture of the 19th and 21st centuries, with the democratic experience of the 20th century having been added as spice drop by drop. I do not know whether such a cocktail is drinkable. In any case, it is explosive. However, gasoline is also explosive, unless it is in a gasoline tank, and Chechnya is explosive, if some 100,000 officials of international organizations close their eyes to the crisis.

The most dangerous formulas have been proposed by those advocating realpolitik. One of them says that the Chechens' right to self-determination should not be recognized since Russia is a nuclear state. This standpoint, which is seemingly pro-Russian, in reality betrays deep distrust and is so cynical that it is hard to think of a worse insult to the large country. In addition, it opens a really dangerous Pandora's box. Making the right of self-determination dependent on nuclear weapons will create the wish to procure such nuclear weapons. Let us try to imagine an evening at home in front of the television set, when the weather report is followed by a map showing the high and low pressure areas of nuclear blackmail. That would not be Europe any more. As difficult as the situation may appear, I of course still see a way out, which consists of deepening one's knowledge about Europe as a whole. These Russian conservatives and Western politicians share a common resentment of Griboyedov, Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy, who with great sympathy described Chechnya's 30-year fight for the right of self-determination under the leadership of Shamil Imam before and after the Crimean War. At the time when colonial empires were founded, the fight of Chechens, Cherkessians, and other mountain peoples was doomed to defeat.

As political refugees they found shelter in the Middle East, and until today, the Chechens are permanently represented in the Jordanian Parliament. But that devastating war already cost Russia one-sixth of its state revenues last century.

By order of Stalin 50 years ago, the Chechens were deported into the Kazakh desert to die, in inaccessible mountain villages they were burned alive. Instead of the media, there was then the Iron Curtain, and that is why Chechnya was never in the same line as Auschwitz, Lidice, or Oradour-sur-Glane. Whether we like it or not, whether we are ashamed of our ignorance or not, it nevertheless is the historic experience of Chechens, from which men, women, and children—as we have seen on television—have taken their Davidic will to fight for their right of self-determination.

Of course, politicians feel uneasy when in one breath they deny the Chechens' right of self-determination and

praise democracy. But the problem has a reverse side. All colonial wars have been "internal affairs" of states. Algeria was juridically and regarding all its rights a Department of France when at the time of Georges Bidault it started its anticolonial war under Ben Bella's leadership. You can only effectively heal scarlet fever if you call the disease by its proper name.

France owes the recognition of Algeria's right of self-determination to Charles de Gaulle's statesmanship, and Ben Bella owes the ambiguous title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the Lenin Peace Prize to the grim humor of history. Briefly, France and Britain, too, had the post-colonial teething troubles of the "foreign neighbor country." However, instead of bombing Algiers or Nairobi, these countries sat down at the negotiation table with the "bandits" and "mafiosi" and found a political solution to their "internal affair."

It is not yet too late, and all doors are still open to Moscow. Now it only depends on Russia's political will whether it will take leave of the past and sit down at the negotiation table with Dudayev. As a direct neighbor of Russia, Estonia supports stability in Russia—but not only for the sake of stability. A stability that is not based on democracy is not lasting, and without a thorough renewal of the Russian moral values, democracy is unthinkable. So far, all the bombs that were dropped over Grozny have hit Russia itself, as well as the conservatives' post-communist way of thinking. The negotiation table could change the tragic firelight of Grozny into a purgatory.

Meri Indignant at 'Lame Reaction' to Chechnya

BR2601115195 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Jan 95 p 7

[Report on interview with President Lennart Meri by Elisabeth Crona in Tallinn on 19 January: "Estonia Cried Out First Against The War in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tallinn—The OSCE took its Christmas vacation more seriously than the war in Chechnya. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] has been more or less worthless in the context of this issue.

Estonian President Lennart Meri is indignant at the international community's lame reaction to the Chechens' suffering. The war is being followed with concern in Estonia and the country was the first to cry out against Moscow, with great gusto and without any tactical reflection. Right now Estonia's difficult border dispute with Russia is deep-frozen.

On the same day [19 January] that President Meri received SVENSKA DAGBLADET for an interview in his neat pink and brown palace in Tallinn, Russian troops took control of Chechen President Dudayev's palace in Grozny. The Estonians have a special relationship with Dudayev, who was a Soviet Air Force

general in Tartu when Estonia became free. He is considered to have actively contributed to ensuring that this happened without bloodshed by issuing orders to the Russian troops to stay in their barracks.

Strong Feelings

Lennart Meri spoke with the same strong feelings about the Chechens as we Swedes have seen him talk about the dead and bereaved of the Estonia [Baltic ferry which sank in 1994].

"When you see someone being trampled by an elephant, you really want to help them. It is a miracle that the Chechens have risen up."

He compared the Chechens' historic fate with that of the Jews in Nazi Germany. In 1944 Stalin resolved to exterminate the Chechens. Some were deported, others were burnt alive in their villages by the NKVD, the forerunner of the KGB, he said. That is the background to today's war.

"People wonder why they are fighting with such determination. They have no choice. They already know what it is like to be a dead people. It is a miracle that the Chechens have come back from the dead."

"I am very sad that Russia in this particular situation has chosen the wrong path. It will be hard for the Russians to back down. They make decisions today as if we were living in the 1700's. But the world is like a village. In our living rooms every evening we see the suffering of Chechnya's children and old people. Human rights violations can never be one state's internal affair."

Political Prudence Is Needed

"I still believe that it is possible to resolve the conflict by appealing to political prudence on both sides. The initial reaction will be that Russia has lost face, but that is not the case at all. This is Russia's first chance to show that it is a democracy."

Lennart Meri answered every question with long historical, and sometimes philosophical, comments which were impossible to interrupt. On the other hand he was generous with his time. We spent five hours in his private state room, talking for half the time and waiting for the rest.

Suddenly we heard the Hungarian national anthem in the courtyard outside and the president broke off the interview, disappearing for one hour to bid the new Hungarian ambassador welcome.

When he returned he told us that the two men had mostly discussed the small Finno-Ugric group of languages and the danger of the smallest languages in the family, in deepest Russia, disappearing:

"They are like animals threatened with extinction, the small peoples and small languages."

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"Where were we?" he asked, adding with the streak of humor which, together with his sudden smiles, interrupts his lengthy comments:

"Somewhere in Siberia?"

No, we were on the border between Estonia and Russia, talking about the bitter dispute about whether it is Stalin's border or the old Estonian border dating back to 1920 that should apply.

"The Peace of Tartu in 1920 is Estonia's certificate of baptism," President Meri said. "We will never give up the principle behind this peace treaty, which made Estonia an internationally recognized, sovereign state. That is why the issue is so important to and so emotional for the Estonian people."

Right now Estonia is involved in negotiations in Brussels for a Europe agreement, but how will Moscow react to Estonia's endeavors to become a member of the EU [European Union]—and NATO?

Lennart Meri waves aside the issue of EU membership, which does not contain any dynamite.

"NATO is a more relevant question, but NATO has always been a defensive organization. I cannot see any reason for anyone to think that NATO will become aggressive starting in 1995."

Rebuild the Soviet Union

"If Russian politicians are now protesting against having a NATO border here, I do not believe they are being particularly honest. In my view the real reason is that they have still not abandoned the idea of rebuilding the Soviet Union, under a different name of course, in order to keep their sphere of influence.

"They are extremely aware that they still have influential friends in the West who prefer a stable state to a democratic one.

"It was a general view in the Western world that a series of new decisions in parliament would by themselves lead to democracy and a free market system in Russia. But that is completely unrealistic. Instead it will be a long and painful process."

President Meri then answered the question of corruption and crime in the former Soviet republics, including Estonia, by asking a counterquestion. How did things look in other young societies?

"The first generation of Rockefellers were up to their necks in blood.

"And in many countries corruption is a part of the tradition," he pointed out. "Here it will never be tolerated. We have passed approximately 400 laws. Only yesterday a law on the rights and duties of civil servants was pushed through."

The privileged class from the Soviet era who lost their privileges and political power are trying instead to carve out strategic positions for themselves in economic life, he said.

"That is what happens when what has been forbidden for 50 years is suddenly permitted. But this will only go on for a short while."

According to Lennart Meri, following the withdrawal of Russian troops last summer relations between Estonians and Russians in Estonia have greatly improved:

"The Russians did not come here as immigrants, but rather as masters. For decades they had been indoctrinated, been taught that all Estonians are brown-shirted fascists. However, everyday life in Estonia provides the best arguments against all lies. The Russian minority knows that it has better opportunities here than in Russia. Now Russian children are trying to get into Estonian creches."

Lennart Meri believes that Sweden, under Ingvar Carlsson, is going in the same direction with its Baltic policy as Carl Bildt, even if the words used are not always the same. And Meri believes that Swedish interest in the Baltic region will only increase in the future.

"To be frank this is not due to idealism. It is due to the fact that Russia's problems have not been solved and that developments there have taken a more threatening turn. This means that you must think about how your position in the area should be defined."

The Estonia: An "Open Wound"

In January 1995 Estonia continues to live in the shadow of the Estonia ferry catastrophe, and the fear that the important ferry traffic to Sweden will diminish in the future. But there is nothing in Estonia like the Swedish debate about recovering the dead.

"The Estonia is an open wound," Lennart Meri said, showing great understanding for the different reactions.

"This will take time. People believe in miracles. And it is difficult for many people not to experience the important part of the work of mourning that involves seeing and touching a coffin. Here in Estonia we have always regarded the sea as an extension of the country. The sea is a burial place for us."

He stopped speaking and searched for words. Then he came out with a slightly modified version of the introduction to Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*: "Happiness is the same for everyone, but misfortune strikes each and every one of us in its own special way."

Plans To Dump Radioactive Waste at Paldiski Revealed

WS2601102695 Tallinn BNS in English 1725 GMT
25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 25, BNS—Estonia revealed plans on Wednesday [25 January] to transfer its

dumping facility for radioactive waste from near the village of Saku, to the southwest of Tallinn, to the former Russian base area of Paldiski.

The radioactive materials dumped at the Saku facility would be taken to the new facility of Paldiski, if the plan of setting up a properly furnished dumping site at Paldiski wins final approval.

The authorities' ways of running the Saku dumping site have been widely criticized recently, particularly after lax security measures made it possible to steal radioactive metals from the dump.

The former Russian nuclear reactor area, which includes two reactor bodies, places for storage of radioactive waste, and a number of auxiliary buildings, is scheduled to be turned over to Estonia by Sept. 30.

The Estonian Economics Ministry is to set up a separate department to run the former reactor facility, the government's special representative Juri Tikk said at a briefing Wednesday. He said the new department would also take over dealing with the Saku radioactive waste deposit, from where the waste matter is to be taken to Paldiski.

The Economics Ministry must submit its proposals as to formation of the Paldiski facility governing unit to the government by Feb. 15.

Energy Minister Arvo Niitenberg, however, called for setting up a special company that would run the Paldiski facility after its takeover from Russia. He said the company would tackle the technical and economic matters, while regular checks as to environmental safety would be carried out by the Estonian Environment Ministry.

Niitenberg said Finland, Sweden and the United States had all promised to help Estonia train workers for the new company. "U.S. President Bill Clinton during his visit to Riga (in July 1994) pledged 2 million dollars in aid to clean the environment at Paldiski. A part of this aid comes in technological advice and know-how," the minister said, adding that a U.S. adviser would start work with his office from March 1.

Russia, who took out nuclear rods from the two reactors at Paldiski last fall, is currently working on a plan for conservation of the reactors. The reactor bodies are to be covered with a half-meter-thick layer of concrete. A team of Finland's Imatran Voima at the same time is purifying polluted water formerly used in reactor coolers at Paldiski.

Citizenship Statistics Provided for End of 94

WS2501161195 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Press Release in English 1341 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report provided by the Press and Information Department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—received via Internet E-LIST]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Estonian Government considers it of utmost importance to form a permanent and

loyal citizenry regardless of ethnic background. To this end, the government maintains a firm position on the right of people to choose their citizenship, and believes that citizenship cannot be forced upon people.

The government, thus, has adopted and implemented a policy that seeks to encourage individuals to choose the citizenship that they wish to hold. For those who are unable to hold the passport of the country of their choice, the Estonian Government issues alien's passports, as well as temporary travel documents to ensure that these people can still leave and return to Estonia.

Since 1992 the government has appealed to all non-citizen residents in Estonia, who wish to apply for Estonian citizenship by naturalisation, to present their applications for citizenship. To assist people to meet Estonia's language requirements, the government, with assistance with other foreign government's has established language training centres throughout the country.

Importantly, citizens of another state, who are permanent residents in Estonia, also have the right to vote in local government elections. Local governments are the main providers of basic services in Estonia. This right, which is exceptional in Europe, highlights the government's commitment in supporting people to exercise their free choice in the citizenship they wish to hold.

Estonian Citizenship Is Not Based on Ethnicity

Both Estonians and non-Estonians were citizens of Republic of Estonia between the wars. Estonia has always had various ethnic minorities and these people and their descendants are also automatically Estonian citizens.

Persons who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940, and their descendants, automatically have Estonian citizenship according to the "Supreme Council" (the Soviet occupation era legislative body) resolution "On the Application of the Law on Citizenship". However, the exact number of non-ethnic Estonians automatically entitled to citizenship is currently not known. All Estonian citizens must have changed their old (Soviet) passports for Estonian passports by 1 July 1994. Surveys estimate that about 80,000 non-Estonians are already Estonian citizens through their parents or grandparents.

Many ethnic Estonians did not live in Estonia between the wars, and as such they do not automatically have citizenship. These people, like non-Estonians, must also apply for citizenship.

Estonia has asked all those who wish to take Estonian citizenship to fulfill three basic conditions: pass a basic proficiency test in Estonian, two years residency and to swear an oath of loyalty to Estonia.

Assistance is also given to individuals to learn a basic level of Estonian in order to qualify for citizenship. This assistance is provided by the Estonian Government as well as by foreign governments and non-governmental organisations.

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	December	November, 1994
Total number of persons who have received Estonian citizenship:	48,238	(47,463)
According to the following categories:		
1) Normal naturalisation procedure	8,688	
2) Simplified naturalisation procedure	39,550	
Number of persons who have applied for Estonian citizenship according to the following categories:		
1) Normal naturalisation procedure	16,773	
2) Simplified naturalisation procedure	44,269	
Source: Citizenship and Migration Board (21 November and 26 December 1994)		

Explanation

The process of obtaining citizenship is regulated by law. The Estonian Law on Citizenship is a re-activated and modified version of the law that was in force before Estonia was occupied. Estonian citizenship, like that of other European countries, is acquired by birth or by further legal procedures such as naturalisation.

Each application for citizenship by naturalisation is submitted and processed, and as specified in the Law on Citizenship, the decision on granting citizenship is made one year after its submission.

In accordance with the Law on Citizenship, foreigners who wish to acquire Estonian citizenship by naturalisation must have permanently resided in Estonia for at least two years prior to and one year after the date of application for Estonian citizenship. The Resolution on the Application of the Law on Citizenship defines permanent residency as beginning from March 30, 1990.

Other States' Citizens Residing in Estonia

Information from the respective foreign embassies in Estonia shows that the following Estonian residents have taken foreign citizenship (November 1994): Russian citizens 54,000; Latvian 357; Lithuanian 482, and Ukrainian 7 (all figures are approximate).

Future Directions

As Estonia is seeking further integration with the institutions of Europe and will soon begin negotiations with the European Union on associate member status, Estonia needs to bring its laws into harmony with that of the EU countries.

Although much of Estonia's legislation matches European norms, some changes are necessary to ensure that some of Estonia liberal provisions such as only two years permanent residency match the European requirements of five years.

Latvia

Birkavs Lists Main Foreign Policy Tasks

LD2501141795 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1300 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A neutral foreign policy for Latvia would mean coming into the sphere of Russia's interests, however this fact should not hinder shaping good neighborly relations with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs said at a meeting devoted to the issues of the Latvian-Russian border and the possibility of economic cooperation between Latgale province and Pskov oblast of Russia, held in Balvi today. He explained that integration into European and transatlantic structures still remained the basic task of Latvian foreign policy. After the admission to the Council of Europe, concluding an associate agreement with the European Union and joining GATT would be the main tasks of Latvian foreign policy for this year.

Speaking about relations with neighboring eastern states, Birkavs said that relations with Russia had normalized last year and added that Russia had also acknowledged that these relations had become constructive. Cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine has also begun and it is necessary to develop it. But speaking of the Abrene problem, Birkavs said that the issue would be considered at a session of the Cabinet of Ministers in the immediate future and expressed the view that a political decision was necessary to tackle the problem.

Further on Birkavs' Comments

LD2501223495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
2100 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It is clear that Abrene [Pytalovo] district once belonged to Latvia, and it is just as clear that Latvia will not get that territory back from Russia this century, said the Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs at Balvi [near Abrene] on Wednesday at a meeting of Saeima deputies and local government representatives on Latvian-Russian border issues. Martins

Virsis, the parliamentary secretary at the Foreign Ministry, explained that Russia has declared its (?stance) on the border problem with Estonia, and in the event that Latvia has such a problem, (?it will be taken as a territorial claim). Virsis added that nevertheless it is necessary to solve the problem, as the time (?is no longer good) for Latvia. Saeima Deputy Juris Sinka told the meeting that there is land and other property in that territory belonging to about 7,000 Latvian citizens. Birkavs is convinced that a political decision needs to be adopted on this issue, and (?hopes for an initiative) from Russia to settle the border (?issues) with Latvia. Birkavs added that Latvia is no exception at all, and the Russian border is not marked in nature, just as with most of the other countries on its border, excepting those whose own border was that of the USSR.

Lithuania

Brazauskas To Attend Auschwitz Commemoration

WS2601104095 Tallinn BNS in English 1254 GMT
25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Jan 25, BNS—Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas leaves Thursday for Poland to attend ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. Brazauskas was invited to attend official events at the former Nazi death camp by Polish President Lech Walesa.

The Lithuanian president's spokesman Nerijus Malukevicius said unofficial meetings with other state leaders are expected during the visit.

The commemorative ceremonies are to be attended by Nobel Peace Prize winners and heads of state or their representatives from 26 countries which had citizens in the camps or helped to liberate them.

Officials Decry Russian Conditions for MFN Status

LD2501134095 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lithuanian high-ranking officials are surprised at the allusions made by Russian representatives that the most favored nation status could be linked with certain reservations.

The most favored nation regime came into force on 18 January and Russia itself informed Lithuania about it in a special note. Albinas Januska, secretary of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Baltic News Service.

Albinas Januska expressed his view on the statement made by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev at a news conference in Minsk on Tuesday, when he said there that all the preconditions exist for the introduction of the most favored nation regime in trading with Lithuania, and that a final agreement on this would be

reached when the prime ministers of Lithuania and Russia hold a meeting in Moscow shortly. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, Konstantin Zatulin, a member of Mr. Kozyrev's delegation in Minsk and chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Links with Russian Citizens Abroad, said that the deportation of the former Yedinstvo organization leaders would significantly worsen Russo-Lithuanian relations, first of all in the sphere of the economy. Apart from other things, he maintains that the opinion of the majority of deputies while ratifying the agreement at the Russian Parliament on the most favored nation agreement with Lithuania would be influenced by the deportation.

Albinas Januska stressed in an interview to Baltic News Service that the agreement on most favored nation status signed in Vilnius on 18 November 1993 did not envisage any ratification by the parliaments of both countries. Linking this economic agreement with irrelevant conditions is groundless, and is not beneficial to both sides, Albinas Januska said.

Lithuania's Interior Minister Romasis Vaitiekunas said he believes that the deportation of four persons who fought against Lithuania's independence is too insignificant to attract much attention from the State Duma and high-ranking diplomats.

In an interview to the daily DIENA, Minister Vaitiekunas points out that every country has a right to act according to its own laws. He believes that Russia would also deport foreign citizens for similar offenses. The minister stressed that neither Valeriy Ivanov nor his accomplices have appealed so far to the Lithuanian Interior Ministry with any request, therefore it is difficult to establish what arguments they present for their displeasure.

The decision on the deportation of Russian citizens from Lithuania will be adopted on the presentation of the reference document by the Ministry of Internal Affairs Migration Department, Minister Vaitiekunas said. Each person will be given a reference document with the exact appraisal of the person's past and present activities.

Bishops Conference Refutes LDLP Statement

LD2501210895 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As already reported, the Council of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP] adopted a statement last Saturday accusing the Catholic Church of efforts to influence the state policy. It was also stated that a tendency was emerging in Lithuania to turn the Catholic Church in Lithuania into a state church and Catholicism into an official ideology and that this was contrary to the Lithuanian Constitution.

The Lithuanian bishops' conference replied in its statement today saying that the above mentioned statement

by the LDLP has provoked great astonishment and pain among the believers [words indistinct] how the teaching and interests of the Church are treated.

General and unfounded accusations are made of interference in politics, of a totalitarian wish to turn the Catholic Church into a state church and Catholicism into an official ideology.

According to the Lithuanian bishops's conference, the LDLP leadership, under the pretext of defending spiritual values and human rights to live in accordance with one's beliefs and conscience, wishes to impose on the whole nation a model of public life having no place for religion. The authors of the statement forget in their totalitarian thinking that religious liberty and the liberty of conscience are the innate right of every man, which the state must respect, guard, and grant the possibility to the Church freely to proclaim its teaching, reads the statement. The Lithuanian bishops remind the LDLP that Pope John Paul II, receiving President Brazauskas at the beginning of December last year, said: The Church is well aware of the fact that direct political activity is not a part of its mission, but at the same time it is aware that it cannot refuse to take part in the life of the country [passage indistinct].

Therefore, unilateral diktat and ideology of the dominating political grouping in establishing the relations between the state and the Church threatens further cooperation for the well-being of the people of Lithuania, claim the bishops of the Lithuanian Catholic Church.

They level special criticism at the LDLP statement about the negotiations between the Holy See and the Lithuanian state being [word indistinct] and unofficial.

In the sphere of the restoration of immovable property the Lithuanian bishops' conference has proposed to proceed along the path of agreement between the Church and the state, as it is envisaged in the Constitution, striving for the consolidation of the main principles for the implementation of the act of restitution, taking into consideration the wishes of all the interested parties. This is a sore topic, greatly annoying the LDLP representatives, notes the Lithuanian bishops' conference. Therefore unilaterally, without consultations with religious communities, even without acquainting them, a law was passed by the votes of a single party last week, which crudely violates justice and demonstrates complete disregard for the Church in Lithuania and for the Holy See on whose proposal working [word indistinct] have been set up.

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